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A bstract
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the 
interaction between ownership and efficiency when sequential decisions are 
taken by majority voting.
The first chapter analyzes the influence of dynamic voting in the produc­
tive efficiency of a firm. Inefficiencies arise as a result of conflict in decision 
making concerning two decisions: technology choice and distribution of ag­
gregate production. Two distinct constitutions are considered: employee and 
outside ownership. When the initial constitution turns out to be inefficient, 
the firm’s owners can hand over control rights to efficient investors in ex­
change for a selling price. Constitutional change, by allowing current owners 
to internalize social surplus, would in principle increase efficiency. Yet con­
stitutional change will never take place, giving rise to institutional inertia.
The second chapter considers the effect of redistribution on efficiency in 
a the framework of a general cooperative where both the set of alternatives 
and the preference profile of voters is unrestricted. Efficiency is defined by a 
public decision, i.e. the implementation of a productive technology, as well 
as by a collection of individual investment decisions, i.e. employees’ choice 
of effort. The first result provides conditions that, by restricting conflicts 
of interest in redistribution, ensure the existence of equilibrium in collective 
choice. It turns out that, provided that an equilibrium exists, the technology 
implemented in the firm is always Pareto efficient. This result holds even 
if it may lead to greater distortions in employees’ choice of effort. The re­
maining analysis compares the direct effect of redistribution on efficiency via 
employees’ individual investment with its indirect effect via distortions on 
technology choice.
The last chapter investigates the effect of privatization on the efficiency 
of a public firm within the context of a representative democracy. Public de­
cisions are implemented by a self-interested government selected by majority 
voting. Collective choice is embodied by the firm’s regulation policy as well as 
by the tax shedule imposed on citizens. Provided privatization takes place, 
two polar ownership structures are analyzed: concentrated and dispersed 
ownership. The main result is that concentrated ownership, by favoring the 
participation of lobbies in the political game, may increase the efficiency of
a regulated firm. This result is robust to both a hidden information model 
and a moral hazard approach.
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0.1 Introduction
This dissertation addresses the question of how the ownership of a firm may 
affect its efficiency when the distribution of total surplus is decided by major­
ity voting. This section will first present the general framework of analysis. 
Then it will introduce the specific applications tha t are developed through­
out the thesis. Finally, it will briefly present the main results under the light 
of the related literature.
Voting as a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences over collective 
decisions has been justified using different lines of argument. First, from 
an axiomatic approach, majority rule is the only decision procedure that 
meets the test of decisiveness, positive responsiveness, anonymity of voters 
and neutrality of alternatives (May, 1952). Second, making a collective de­
cision through voting is supported by the belief that individuals will reveal 
their preferences when casting their vote, thus leading to the determination 
of which public activity is worth pursuing. Revelation of preferences can 
be achieved with different mechanisms such as a demand-revealing process 
(Groves and Leyard, 1977). Third, policy choice in representative democ­
racies can be regarded as the outcome of a voting mechanism. A classical 
application of majority voting is the choice of a redistributive tax rule in a 
society of heterogenous voters (Roberts, 1977). The political process can be 
interpreted as the delegation of authority in the public domain to particular 
citizens that compete to acquire power through an electoral process (Besley 
and Coate, 1997). A major drawback of majority voting is however, the 
possibility of creating cycles whereby any alternative belonging to the feasi­
ble set can be defeated by another alternative in a majority contest (Black, 
1958). We shall consider two different applications of voting. First, voting 
by a firm’s stakeholders in the context of an enterprise (chapters I and II). 
Second, voting by citizens in the political arena (chapter III).
The decision of how to distribute aggregate surplus can only create in­
efficiencies as long as there is some friction preventing perfect contracting. 
We shall assume the presence of asymmetric information between the par­
ties involved in a transaction. In particular, we will consider two different 
impediments leading to inefficiencies. The existence of private information 
received after the contract has been signed (chapters I-III), giving rise to 
hidden knowledge, and the non verifiability of the action taken by the agent
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th a t influences either the benefit from a productive decision (chapter II) or 
the distribution function of a random variable (chapter III). Both situations 
are encompassed in a model of moral hazard.
Failure to internalize total surplus may induce two main types of ineffi­
cient behavior. First, a distortion in an agent’s individual investment. This 
source of inefficiency has been widely recognized in the literature on pub­
lic choice -distortionary taxation induces an inefficiently low level of labor 
supply-, as well as in the literature on transaction costs where an agent 
may underinvest in firm specific skills driven by the anticipation of future 
expropriation.
The second inefficient behavior that we shall analyze is the distortion in 
collective choice on a public decision. Asymmetric information in this setting 
will prevent the application of Coasian bargaining to restore efficiency. This 
type of distortion has been analyzed in the literature on social choice -the 
fact that an activity is favored by a majority does not imply that its benefits 
exceed its costs- and in the literature on contract theory, where the existence 
of asymmetric information at the trading stage may prevent agents from 
reaching an efficient decision, thus neglecting gains from trade.
We will focus the analysis on two different types of collective decisions. 
Namely, the implementation of a productive decision within a firm (chap­
ters I and II) and the design of a contract specifying a regulation schedule 
(chapter III). We shall assume that the collective decision is implemented 
by the individuals endowed with control rights to exercise authority. This 
assumption is in line with the literature on public choice where citizens del­
egate authority to a representative government through an electoral process. 
Also, it is consistent with the literature on incomplete contracts where the 
allocation of property rights award residual rights of control to the holder 
of ownership. We therefore rule out the application of implementation the­
ory to determine collective choice and the justification is twofold. The first 
reason draws on the inability of the contracting parties to foresee all future 
contingencies as well as the limited efficacy of mechanism design to improve 
efficiency when information is only partially revealed ex-post and renego­
tiation is allowed (chapters I and II). The second reason lies on the rules 
of the game observed in representative democracies where the government 
appointed by the electorate is not committed to implement specific policy 
choices. Even though his performance is in practice restricted by the antic­
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ipation of the rewarding or penalizing voting behavior of the electorate in 
the next election. In principle, we might consider the design of a contract 
between the government and its electorate whereby the actions taken by the 
government on each potential state of nature is determined in advance. But 
we can envisage a main problem inherent to the public domain, namely the 
existence of free riding problems among citizens to enforce such a contract 
(chapter III).
We shall consider two notions of ownership. First, the possession of resid­
ual control rights over a physical asset. That is, the ability to decide how 
the asset should be used in all contingencies where any prior contract re­
mains silent, as defined by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 
(1990). Ownership may lead to the inefficient allocation of resources in a 
public decision as long as different alternatives provide agents with differ­
ent protective shields against the owner’s opportunism to expropriate their 
transferable utility. Protection may come from the agents’ outside opportu­
nity which is in turn determined by the existence of a competitive market 
or alternatively, from the anticipation of different sharing rules under dif­
ferent public decisions, which are implemented using a majority voting rule 
(chapters I and II).
Moreover, it may also lead to underinvestment in individual decisions 
driven by the anticipation of expropriation following the bargaining game 
that allocates total surplus among the various contracting parties (chapter 
i i ) .
Second, in the context of a regulated industry, we shall define ownership as 
the endowment of residual income rights from a physical asset. This definition 
is driven by the assumption that regulation implies that control rights are de 
facto held by the government irrespective of the ownership structure of the 
firm. Still ownership may influence efficiency by changing the preferences of 
the government towards regulation. This change in preferences may be due 
to a change in the cost imposed to the electorate under alternative ownership 
structures or alternatively, to a change in the benefits from regulation that are 
internalized by the government motivated by the actions taken by organized 
groups of citizens (chapter III).
When individuals holding control rights fail to act efficiently, we allow 
for the existence of two mechanisms that potentially may restore efficiency.
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The first instrument that we consider is the feasibility of a change in the 
initial constitution of the firm whereby control rights would be transferred 
to efficient owners (chapter I). There is a limited literature on the theory 
of the firm th a t endogenizes the allocation of control rights among a firm’s 
stakeholders.
The second mechanism that we allow to restore efficiency consists of a 
lobbying game played between the government and the minority group of cit­
izens tha t are excluded from political fife (chapter III). Lobbying, by allowing 
citizens to reveal their preferences towards collective choice, will in principle 
help the government to internalize total surplus. The influence of organized 
groups in collective decision making has been analyzed in the literature of po­
litical economy. Typically, a lobby forms with one of the following objectives 
in mind. Either to contribute resources to increase the winning prospects of 
its preferred political party or alternatively, to offer contingent contributions 
to the incumbent government in order to influence policy choice.
Also, we shall analyze how the existence of uncertainty at the productive 
stage regarding the power of each party to set future redistribution, may 
affect the efficiency of a firm. Uncertainty will be explicitly analyzed in 
chapter I, where the identity of individuals forming the majority group at 
the redistribution stage is not revealed until the productive decision has 
been implemented. We shall explore the impact of this source of ‘political 
uncertainty’ under the assumption of individuals’ risk neutrality. Uncertainty 
will also be implicitly considered in chapter III, where the behavior of an 
incumbent government is driven by its fear to lose power in future elections.
More specifically, we will analyze in this thesis the effect of ownership on 
efficiency in three different applications.
First, consider the behavior of a firm governed by its initial constitution. 
The role of a constitution is to assign control rights to the owners of physical 
assets. Control rights will be exercised with respect to the technology to 
be implemented in the firm. Once the technology has been implemented, 
ownership will also give control rights to decide how to distribute aggregate 
surplus. In the presence of heterogenous preferences decisions are taken by 
majority voting. Consider the special case where control rights are held 
by the employees of a cooperative. Each employee acknowledges that the 
outcome of the first vote will determine the formation of the winning coalition
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at the date of the second vote. Hence forward looking employees, anticipating 
the influence of technology choice on redistribution, will vote strategically to 
influence future voting outcomes. Dynamic voting will impinge upon the 
efficiency of the firm via distortions in technology choice.
Provided the voting outcome on technology is inefficient, employees may 
decide to change the ownership structure of the firm by transferring property 
rights to an efficient outsider. Assume the most favorable case conducive to 
constitutional change where employees hold all the bargaining power at the 
selling stage. Under this assumption, the selling price would account for 
the expropriation which is anticipated under the new ownership structure. 
Yet we shall see that the feasibility of constitutional change will not help to 
overcome inefficient technology choice. Then we consider a new informational 
environment regarding the information available to each employee at the time 
of technology choice. More specifically, we shall assume that each employee 
only knows the probability distribution over his productivity type under the 
efficient technology. This uncertainty will carry over to the second voting 
stage where redistribution is decided. Will this ‘political uncertainty’ have 
any impact on efficiency under the assumption of employees’ risk neutrality? 
This is the subject of analysis of chapter I.
Chapter II considers a more general set up that encompasses a richer 
choice set than the model analyzed previously. This generalization is carried 
over along two dimensions. First, in the expansion of the set of employees’ 
productivity types as well as in the set of available technologies. In partic­
ular, both sets will include an unrestricted yet finite number of alternatives. 
Second, in the addition of a new choice variable defined as a collection of 
employees’ choice of effort. That is, whereas in chapter I efficiency is en­
tirely determined by the technology implemented in the firm, in chapter II 
efficiency is defined as a function of two variables: a vector of employees’ 
individual decisions, namely effort choice, as well as the outcome of a joint 
investment decision, namely technology choice. This characterization urges 
for an analysis on the relative impact of these two variables on the firm’s 
efficiency. Moreover, a majority voting rule in a setting with more than two 
types of preferences and more than two alternatives may cause inefficiencies 
not only through an inferior choice of investment but also through the in­
ability to reach an equilibrium decision. This additional cost will also be 
accounted for in the analysis presented in chapter II.
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Last, chapter III considers an alternative set up th a t characterizes the 
productive firm as a natural monopoly which implements a public project. 
Also, it defines the stakeholders of the firm as the set of heterogenous citizens 
th a t extract a positive surplus from consuming the project. The constitu­
tion that governs a state-owned firm can be interpreted as the outcome of 
a political contest that delegates political authority to a representative gov­
ernment chosen by majority voting. This government will be endowed with 
control rights to regulate the natural monopoly. It will act to maximize its 
prospects of reelection (incomplete contracting). In particular, the govern­
ment will exercise authority regarding two decisions. First, which transfer 
scheme should be offered to the firm in order to cover the cost of the project 
(productive decision). Second, which tax system should be imposed on citi­
zens to raise funds (redistributive decision). The choice of regulation echoes 
the productive decision taken by the owners of a firm as explored in chapters 
I and II. Likewise, the choice of discriminatory taxation mirrors the choice 
of redistribution. Suppose that the cost of the project depends on two vari­
ables, i.e. the state of nature and the effort exerted by the manager of the 
firm. Assume that effort is non-verifiable. First, suppose tha t the manager 
has private information over the state of nature that has realized. In this 
setting, the transfer scheme offered to the firm will serve not only to cover 
the cost of the project but also to induce the manager to reveal the tru th  
(hidden information). Second, consider an alternative setting where the man­
ager can influence the distribution function over the realized state of nature 
tha t is publicly observed. Now the transfer scheme received by the manager 
will also serve as an incentive mechanism to exert effort (moral hazard). In 
both cases, the efficiency of the firm is defined by the effort invested by the 
manager in cost reduction.
Suppose that the government can change the ownership structure of the 
firm by transferring property rights over the assets of the firm to a group 
of citizens. Remember that the project is defined as a natural monopoly. 
This means that the firm will be regulated by the government irrespective 
of its ownership structure. That is, the government will hold control rights 
over the regulation of the firm even after it has been privatized. Therefore, 
privatization can be defined as the transfer of income rights to a group of 
prospective investors. The natural question that arises is whether ownership 
may influence the efficiency of a regulated firm. The answer can only be
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positive as long as ownership is relevant to pin down the preferences of the 
government towards regulation. A self-interested government will represent 
the preferences of the majority group towards regulation but will neglect the 
preferences held by the minority group. Hence, it will implement a distribu­
tive rule that expropriates the surplus enjoyed by the minority through tax 
discrimination. Also, it will offer a regulatory outcome that minimizes the 
cost of taxation levied upon its electorate. Yet suppose tha t the minority 
group decides to constitute a lobby and bargain over the regulatory scheme 
offered by the government. As the minority will typically be formed by a 
large group of citizens, the existence of free riding problems will preclude the 
formation of such an organized group. But free riding problems may be over­
come as long as each citizen has a sufficiently high stake in the rents accruing 
to the firm. In other words, provided each investor has a non-negligible share 
of the firm’s income rights. To achieve concentrated ownership, the process 
of privatization will be addressed to a core group of institutional investors. 
In this context, the final outcome on regulation will be driven by the pref­
erences exhibited by the majority group through voting together with the 
preferences of the minority group revealed through lobbying. Yet there is a 
key difference between voting and lobbying. In particular, the role of voting 
is to fix the status quo outcome that will prevail at the negotiation stage 
between the government and the organized group. There are two questions 
that arise from this framework. First, which ownership structure will be 
observed in equilibrium? Second, what is the combined effect of majority 
voting and lobbying on efficiency? The monetary contribution offered by the 
lobby plays a similar role to the price offered by outside investors in chapter 
I. Yet whereas the lobbying game may lead to privatization -despite the fact 
that the lobby captures all surplus from the government-, the selling game 
will always lead to the continuation of the status quo -even when employees 
hold all the bargaining power in front of investors-.
In the remainder of the introduction we will discuss some of our results 
in connection with the relevant literature.
The effect of ownership on efficiency when productive decisions are taken 
by majority voting has been analyzed in the incomplete contract literature. 
Hart and Moore (1998) focus on the voting behavior of a cooperative where 
the source of inefficiency lies either on the cost advantage enjoyed by the 
cooperative or otherwise on the conflicts in decision making among employ­
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ees. Our chapter however, highlights how conflicts in collective choice are 
emphasized by dynamic voting. It will turn out that the anticipation of ex­
post transfers via redistribution will generate vested interests ex-ante in favor 
of the status quo project irrespective of the efficiency of a new technology. 
Such vested interests might even lead a firm to neglect a Pareto improving 
technology. Moreover, we endogenize the choice of ownership structure. In 
particular, we allow the owners of an inefficient firm to transfer ownership 
to an efficient third party as a device to capture efficiency gains. Whereas 
in chapter I the cooperative votes on constitutional change, in chapter III 
the government decides whether to relinquish income rights on a state-owned 
firm. In the former case, a cooperative will never sell off the firm to efficient 
investors. In the second case by contrast, the government may decide to 
privatize the firm. Yet the motivation that prevents constitutional change is 
the same that underlies the decision of the government to hand over owner­
ship rights to investors: the protection of power to set future redistribution. 
On the one hand, it is the fear to lose power in future voting decisions that 
induces the winning coalition to block the transfer of ownership to efficient 
investors in chapter I. Yet when there exists uncertainty over the composition 
of the majority group that will prevail in future voting decisions, inefficient 
owners may sell off the firm as an insurance policy that covers against the 
loss of political power under the initial constitution despite employees’ risk 
neutrality. On the other hand, although chapter III does not model explicitly 
future political campaigns, it is the prospect to expropriate the losing side 
from the forthcoming election that leads the incumbent government to accept 
the monetary contribution offered by a lobby at the privatization stage.
Technology choice and efficiency in the presence of uncertainty links with 
the literature on economic reform and growth. In both cases, decisions are 
taken by majority voting. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) analyze how major­
ity voting may lead citizens to neglect an efficient reform in order to keep 
the benefits generated by the status quo. In their model, the reason why 
an efficient reform may be foregone draws on the existence of an upfront 
payment which is imposed on all citizens even if they may not benefit from 
reform. This contrast with our analysis where the cost of a new technology is 
normalized to zero. Moreover, they do not allow for ex-post transfers among 
citizens. Thus, a status quo bias can only arise in a dynamic setting in which 
citizens vote twice on economic reform. Yet in our analysis, ex-post transfers
12
lie at the heart of inefficient decision making. Furthermore, it is the feasi­
bility of redistribution that generates the status quo bias arising in a static 
setting where citizens vote on technology choice only once.
Our results also relate to the literature on ‘political failure’ where the 
incumbent government may fail to adopt a public investment that is poten­
tially Pareto improving when it may change the identity of future policy 
makers in a way that is detrimental to the current government (Besley and 
Coate, 1998). However this prediction lies on the assumption that the policy 
outcome involves two sequential votes on redistribution, before and after the 
investment has been implemented. In Besley and Coate (1998), citizens face 
a trade-off between accruing future efficiency gains from the implementation 
of an efficient investment and gaining redistributive gains today from their 
current power to set the tax policy. This trade-off would no longer hold in 
a setting where redistribution was decided only once, after the investment 
had been implemented. Yet this is the case in our analysis, where the Pareto 
inefficiency is driven not by the gain realized under the status quo but by 
the uncertainty of holding power under the new investment.
The existence of organized interest groups trying to influence a polit­
ical party’s platform or the government’s policy choice has been recently 
analyzed in the political economy literature. A lobby will typically offer a 
monetary contribution contingent on policy choice. The payoff accruing to 
the government is assumed to increase with the contribution received from 
the lobby, and the reason can be twofold. The government can either use 
contributions to finance future electoral campaigns that may swing votes of 
indecisive voters. Or it may use contributions for its own future consump­
tion. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) model the lobbying game as a menu 
auction game in which each lobby bids a monetary contribution contingent 
on the action implemented by the government. Likewise, the government 
takes an action to maximize its prospects to be reelected given the contribu­
tion schedules offered by the lobbies. They show that the menu action game 
has an efficient equilibrium. Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1996) generalize 
this framework to a setting of non-transferable utility across lobbies. They 
show not only that a truthful Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient but also 
that the government will use a non distortionary policy instrument such as 
lump sum transfers as opposed to inefficient policies such as commodity taxes 
or subsidies. Their results are based on the assumption of a benevolent gov­
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ernment tha t maximizes total welfare as well as on the availability of policy 
instruments that are non-distortionary. In Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
the government, although still benevolent, is however restricted to use pol­
icy instruments that are inevitably distortionary. This assumption together 
with the existence of just one lobby representing the interest of a specific 
industry induces protection for this sector hence generating inefficiencies in 
a world characterized by free trade otherwise. To summarize the above argu­
ments, the participation of lobbies in political life can only induce inefficient 
outcomes. By contrast, our results show that the lobbying game may rise ef­
ficiency. In particular, it may induce first best incentives in the regulation of 
a privatized utility. This suggests that in the absence of lobbying, the policy 
outcome is inefficient. Indeed, inefficiencies arise due to  two factors. First, to 
the presence of private information that makes the rents accruing to the firm 
an increasing function of efficiency. Second, to the constraint imposed to the 
government in the use of regulation by confining its choice to the design of a 
distortionary tax policy. We shall see that only a self-interested government 
seeking to be reelected may value sufficiently monetary contributions that 
are in turn an increasing function of informational rents, to favor increased 
efficiency.
Throughout this dissertation, individuals exhibiting heterogenous prefer­
ences are compelled to make a collective decision. In particular, in chapters I 
and II, employees varying in their productive abilities decide which technol­
ogy to implement in the firm and how to distribute total surplus. Likewise, 
chapter III introduces a representative democracy where citizens, enjoying a 
different surplus from the consumption of a public project, delegate author­
ity to a government to implement policy choice. In all cases, the mechanism 
used to aggregate heterogeneous preferences into a social preference relation 
is majority voting. Additionally in chapter III, we allow a bargaining game 
between the government and a minority group of consumers. In chapters I 
and III, the use of majority voting always induces a transitive social prefer­
ence relation by assumption. In effect, either the set of feasible alternatives 
has been restricted -in  chapter I, there are only two available technologies- 
or the number of types among voters has been restricted - it  is the case of 
chapter III where there are only two types of citizens-.
In chapter II we generalize both the number of voters and the number of 
technologies to an unrestricted number of alternatives. In a general frame­
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work, a majority voting equilibrium may fail to exist, giving rise to instability 
or cycling. The literature on social choice has provided two types of condi­
tions to guarantee the existence of equilibrium. First, restrictions in the 
dimensionality of the policy domain. Second, limitations on the preference 
types of voters. Yet chapter II considers a two dimensional voting game 
defined over the choice of a technology and the choice of a linear redistribu­
tive schedule, with no prior weak ordering among pairs of alternatives. This 
implies that we cannot apply the results proposed by Roberts (1977) on hier­
archical adherence nor the analysis provided by Gans and Smart (1996) who 
show that single-crossing preferences in a one dimensional space is a sufficient 
condition for the existence of equilibrium by majority voting. Instead we pro­
pose a condition that, by restricting the characterization of technologies, pins 
down an equilibrium sharing rule that reduces the extent of conflict among 
voters, hence ensuring the existence of equilibrium in technology choice. Also 
we explore the interaction between different sources of inefficiency with re­
distribution. Specifically, we show that the direct effect of redistribution on 
efficiency via individual underinvestment, although negative, is limited by 
an upper bound. However the indirect effect of redistribution via technology 
distortion, although it may generate unbounded efficiency losses, it may also 
lead to an increase in efficiency. The reason is that redistribution, despite 
causing free ride problems, helps however to internalize total surplus.
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Chapter 1 
Institutional Inertia
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to explain how vested interests may 
arise among a firm’s stakeholders; second, to show how the existence of such 
vested interests may prevent not only the choice of an efficient technology, 
but also the adoption of an efficient constitution.
To illustrate the type of inefficiencies that will be discussed in the chapter, 
consider the following example. A group of 15 explorers sets off to extract 
the mineral resources from some island. To this end, they will need access 
to equipment. There are two alternative ownership structures. Either they 
could organize themselves as an independent expedition; i.e. they could 
own the equipment as a cooperative, with decisions taken by majority vote. 
Or they could become a royal mission, whereby the king would own the 
equipment and take all decisions.
There are two decisions to be taken. First, which kind of mineral to 
extract: they can either settle on an island with diamonds or on an island 
with gold. Second, how the spoils should be divided. Crucially these decisions 
are to be taken in sequence: they have to choose the island, and then they 
have to split the surplus. Also, neither decision can be contracted upon in 
advance.1
1The idea that decisions cannot be contracted upon in advance and that the owner of 
the equipment has the right to decide how it is used, first appeared in Grossman and Hart 
(1986).
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In the spirit of subgame perfection, suppose that the expedition has al­
ready landed on, say, the diamond island, and that the question is now how 
to share the profit. On this island, only 7 out of the 15 explorers are pro­
ductive (let us say that the other 8 suffer from claustrophobia and cannot 
go underground). Each of the productive explorers has a productivity of 12. 
The unproductive have zero productivity. The productivity of each explorer 
is privately known before they set foot on the island, but becomes public 
information after they disembark.
If the mission is run as an independent expedition, the unproductive ex­
plorers will have a majority of the votes and so they will be able to expropriate 
productive explorers by denying them access to the equipment. To put a limit 
on expropriation, we suppose that the productive explorers have an outside 
option whereby they can get a payoff of 7 (that is, they have a productivity 
of 12 with access to the equipment, and 7 without). The winning proposal 
in the vote will thus be to leave 7 of the 12 in the hands of the 7 productive 
explorers, and divide the rest, 35, equally among the 8 unproductive.2 That 
is, the unproductive will get a payoff of 4 |.
Had the king been in command of the expedition, he would simply ex­
propriate all the explorers as much as possible, reducing their payoff down 
to their outside options (7 and zero for the productive and the unproductive 
types respectively). This would yield the king a payoff of 35.
Now let us suppose the expedition landed on a gold island. There axe 
productive and unproductive explorers in this island too. But now the pro­
ductive types are in the majority. Specifically, 8 of them have a productivity 
of 10, whereas the remaining 7 have a productivity of zero (we might suppose 
that they suffer from vertigo and cannot hike into the mountains searching 
for gold). In other words, there are more productive people on a gold island 
than on a diamond island, but their individual productivities are lower. For 
ease of comparison, let us continue to suppose that the productive explorers 
have an outside option of 7.
In an independent expedition, as the productive types are in the majority, 
there will be no expropriation on the gold island. The payoff accruing to 
each explorer will equal his own productivity, that is 10 or zero. Under royal
2We suppose equal treatment within a group of explorers of the same productivity type. 
Various auxiliary assumptions could be made to rationalize this.
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authority, however, the king would expropriate the productive explorers, just 
as he did in the diamond island. Each of the 8 would have their payoff pushed 
down from 10 to their outside option 7. The king’s payoff will be 24.
Having established the various’ parties payoffs on each of the two islands, 
we can now move back to the first decision: which island to choose. Under 
royal authority, the king will obviously choose the diamond island, as the 
payoff, 35, exceeds the payoff of 24 from the gold island.
In the case of an independent mission, the choice of island is more intricate 
because there are four categories of explorers with competing interests: those 
who are productive on both islands, those who are productive on only one 
island, and those who are unproductive on both islands. Note that at this 
stage the question of who is in which category is private information, which 
precludes Coasian bargaining. Instead, the decision over which island to 
choose is made by a straight vote. Consider the payoff of an explorer who 
is productive on the gold island. His payoff, 10, is greater than the payoff 
he would get on the diamond island irrespective of whether he is productive 
there or not (7 or 4 |  respectively). Therefore, he will vote for the gold island. 
But there are 8 such explorers, so they will win the vote.3
Given that the decision over which island to choose varies across own­
ership structures, we might ask which organization performs better. The 
wealth of the diamond island is 7 • 12 =  84. The wealth of the gold island 
is 8 • 10 =  80. So efficiency calls for diamond extraction. The fact that 
the independent mission votes for the gold island whereas the royal mission 
chooses the diamond island means that, in this example, outside ownership 
performs better than common ownership.
Of course, before the vote on choice of island is taken, the independent 
expedition should recognize that it would perform better under royal gover­
nance. This suggests that they should negotiate with the king for a transfer 
of ownership. Take the ‘best’ case where the explorers have all the bargaining 
power. They would demand a transfer price of 35, the king’s maximum pay­
off. This amount would be divided equally among the 15 of them. Will they 
vote to sell to the king? No! The winning coalition formed by the 8 explorers
interestingly, the decisive factor in determining the outcome of this vote is the fraction 
of productive explorers on each island, not the exact numbers of explorers in each of the 
four categories.
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who axe productive on the gold island will block it. Under the status quo -  
independent mission -, they each get 10, as a result of the vote to extract 
gold. Under royal governance, the king would choose the diamond island 
and their overall payoff would be the sum of their outside option (either 7 or 
zero) plus their dividend ( | | )  from the transfer -  in total less than 10. Here 
we have an illustration of what we call institutional inertia: the failure of an 
inefficient organizational form to evolve into an efficient organization.
So, certainly, outside ownership is more efficient than common ownership 
in the above example. But this is by no means always the case. Consider 
a minor change to the example. Keep all the numbers the same except for 
the gold island where a productive type now has a productivity of 11 instead 
of 10. The gold island is then the efficient island as 8 • 11 =  88 is greater 
than 7 • 12 =  84. Applying the previous logic, it is straightforward to confirm 
that an independent expedition will still choose the gold island whereas the 
king will select the diamond island. In this modified example then, common 
ownership is more efficient than outside ownership.
Thus both forms of ownership structure can be efficient, depending on the 
circumstances. But can we say anything general about the biases away from 
efficiency? It turns out that we can. One thing to notice from the previous 
examples is that the independent expedition seems to have a tendency to vote 
for islands where there are more productive explorers albeit each has a smaller 
productivity. We might term such islands as ‘egalitarian’. By contrast, the 
king seems to be inclined to choose islands where the productive explorers 
have higher productivity even though there are fewer of them. We might term 
these islands as ‘polarized’. In the chapter we prove the following general 
result about the relative bias of the two ownership structures.
A cooperative is more biased towards egalitarian projects than is an 
outside-owned firm. That is, if an outside-owned firm chooses an ineffi­
cient egalitarian project then so too does a cooperative. Correspondingly, 
an outside-owned firm is more biased towards polarized projects than is a 
cooperative. That is, if a cooperative chooses an inefficient polarized project 
then so too does an outside-owned firm.
It is important to note that this is a general result. It does not depend 
on the fact that one island has a majority of productive types and the other 
has a majority of unproductive types (as in the above examples). It might
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be the case that both islands have a majority of unproductive types -  so that 
there is always redistribution.
Let us remind ourselves about the informational assumptions we have 
made so far. At the time when the island is chosen, explorers privately know 
their productivity on both islands. It is only by the time of the second 
decision, concerning redistribution, that this private information has become 
public. Of course there are many other possible informational assumptions 
that we might make. For instance, it could be that some of the explorers 
do not have a clear idea about their productivity on the islands. Consider 
the following example. Suppose that, at the time of the first decision, there 
are only two (not four) categories of explorers. The first category privately 
know their productivity: they know that they will be productive on both 
islands. Let us say that their productivity is always 12, and that there are 7 
explorers in this category. The second category of explorer, who are in the 
majority, axe uncertain about their productivity. They know that they will 
be unproductive on the diamond island, but that there is some chance they 
may be productive on the gold island. Exactly one of the 8 of them -  at 
this point they do not know which -  will turn out to be productive and have 
a productivity of 12 too (the rest will be unproductive). Notice that, given 
these numbers, in technological terms the gold island Pareto dominates the 
diamond island. Whereas on the diamond island there are only 7 productive 
explorers, on the gold island not only are these 7 explorers productive but 
also one additional explorer is productive. In all cases individual productivity 
is 12, and the reservation payoffs of the productive explorers is 7.
It is clear that the king will choose the gold island. Prima face, one 
would think that the independent mission would too. Surprisingly, this is 
not the case. Consider the payoff of an explorer who is unproductive on the 
diamond island. His payoff from this island, 4 |,  is greater than his payoff 
from the gold island which, under the assumption of risk neutrality, equals 
his expected productivity |  • 0 + 1 • 12 =  | .  Therefore, he will vote in favor of 
the diamond island. As there are 8 such explorers, they will win the vote, and 
the expedition will make a Pareto dominated choice. This voting outcome 
results from what we call political risk aversion: the failure of a cooperative 
to be efficient when the power of the current winning majority is jeopardized. 
And this result holds despite the explorers’ underlying risk neutrality.
Given this extreme form of inefficiency, it might be supposed that the
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independent expedition will choose to change their constitution and sell to 
the king. But even this turns out not to be true! The king would pay them 
his expected payoff 8 (12 — 7) =  40. Since at the time on the decision of 
whether or not to sell there are only two categories of explorers, the majority 
group will have their way. Under the current constitution they get a payoff of 
4 |,  given that the diamond island is chosen If they sell to the king, the king 
will choose the gold island and, their overall payoff will be the sum of their 
expected outside option, |  • 0 +  |  • 7 =  | ,  plus their dividend, from the 
transfer -  in total 3^|, which is less than 4 |.  Again this is an illustration of 
institutional inertia, of an extreme form: a failure to choose a new ownership 
structure that would yield, in technological terms, a Pareto improvement.
Individual uncertainty is not all bad news, however. It can reduce the 
scope for institutional inertia. For the case of no individual uncertainty, we 
prove a rather surprising result: if a cooperative chooses an inefficient tech­
nology (whereas an outside owner would not), the cooperative will never sell 
to the outsider. Yet this is not the case when there is individual uncertainty. 
The transfer price, accrued by the members of the cooperative as an upfront 
payment, may act as an insurance policy which compensates for the loss of 
political power.
The chapter is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in 
Section 2 where the relative efficiency of employee and outside ownership is 
analyzed. Section 3 allows for the possibility of constitutional change. Sec­
tion 4 introduces individual uncertainty. Section 5 analyzes the predictions of 
the model in the light of the empirical evidence. Section 6 presents a discus­
sion of the hypotheses of the model and suggests some governance provisions 
to increase efficiency. It concludes with a revision of the related literature. 
The concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
1.2 Basic model
We consider a firm with I  heterogeneous employees, where I  is an odd num­
ber. At date 0 the firm is defined by the assets required to implement a 
productive technology. Two potential technologies are revealed by nature: 
project i and project j.
The firm decides at date 1 which project to undertake. The cost of either
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project is normalized to zero. Once the technology has been implemented, 
the firm determines at date 2 how to distribute aggregate surplus among the 
firm’s participants.
Contracts are incomplete. In particular, owners cannot commit at date 
0 to a date 1 technology choice. Also, they cannot commit at date 1 to a 
date 2 sharing rule. It is this dynamic interaction between production and 
redistribution that can lead to inefficient decisions.
We consider two ownership structures: cooperative and outside owner­
ship. In a one-member-one-vote cooperative, each employee is assigned one 
control right; decisions Eire taken by majority voting. As employees are het­
erogeneous, conflicts in decision-making are likely to arise. By contrast, in an 
outside-owned firm, investors are assumed to be homogeneous because they 
take decisions to maximize profits; as a result, their interests are aligned and 
the allocation of control rights among them is thus irrelevant. We discuss 
these two structures in turn.
1.2.1 The Cooperative
Consider a one-member-one-vote cooperative where both decisions, namely 
the technology choice at date 1 and the redistribution at date 2, are decided 
by majority voting. The characterization of employees is as follows. Under 
project i, employees can either be low productivity types, with productivity 
normalized to zero, or high productivity types with productivity Xi > 0. 
Under project j , low types still accrue zero productivity whereas high types 
accrue productivity Xj >  0. We do not impose any ordering of employees 
across projects in terms of their individual productivity; that is, a low type 
under project i might be a high type under project j and viceversa. Thus at 
the voting stage at date 1, there are four types of employees, {11, Ih, hi, hh}, 
where (11) denotes the group of employees whose productivity is low under 
both project i and project j, (Ih) denotes the group of employees who are 
low types under project i but high types under project j, and so on. The 
fraction of these four types of employees is denoted by gu,gih,ghi and ghh 
respectively. We assume that there is a strictly positive fraction of all types;
i.e. gu,gih,ghi,ghh  > O' The productivity of employees across projects is
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summarized in the following table:
Employee’s type Productivity (project i) Productivity (project j) Fraction 
11 0 0 gu
Ih 0 Xj gih
hi Xi 0 ghl
hh X i  X j  ghh
Note however that at date 2, once the technology choice has been under­
taken, there are only two types of employees, namely low and high produc­
tivity types. Denote by fi and f j  the fraction of high types under projects i 
and j respectively. The relation between the fractions of employees at date 
1 and at date 2 is as follows:
ghi +  ghh = fi, and gih +  ghh = fj-
Notice that there are many combinations of gu,gih,ghi  and ghh, which 
yield the same fi and fj.
Different types of employees will exhibit different preferences at each vot­
ing stage. At date 1, it is unlikely for one single type of employee to be in the 
majority; rather, different types of employees will form coalitions in order to 
win the vote. At date 2 by contrast, there will always be a majority formed 
by either low types or high types.
We assume the existence of a spot market at date 2 offering a reservation 
wage to employees. We assume that as low types are unproductive inside the 
firm, their outside wage is zero. By contrast, once the technology has been 
implemented, high types develop skills that are only partially firm specific.
We assume that their outside wage is contingent on technology choice, i.e.
Wi and Wj; we also assume that for each project, the outside wage is strictly 
higher than zero, but strictly lower than high types’ inside productivity, that 
is, 0 < Wi < Xi and 0 < Wj < Xj. The effect of the outside market is to put 
a limit on expropriation at date 2. Low types cannot be expropriated. High 
types cannot be pushed below their outside wage.4
4There is an alternative way to motivate the assumption of partial expropriation. As­
sume that high types need to exert effort in order to be productive. If effort is costly and 
non-verifiable, the anticipation of expropriation will lead to underinvestment in effort. In 
equilibrium, expropriation, if positive, will be limited so as to induce high types not to 
shirk. This moral-hazard approach has been explored in Chapter II.
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In the analysis that follows, we characterize the technology and the re­
distributive schedule which is chosen in equilibrium. Each employee votes 
to maximize his expected payoff. As it is a two-stage voting game, we solve 
backwards.
R ed is tr ib u tio n  (d a te  2 vote)
Suppose that project i was chosen at date 1. At date 2, we assume that 
voting is “anonymous” , in the sense that employees of the sam e type must 
be treated equally: coalitions cannot gang up on individual(s). Nonetheless, 
when low types are in the majority (fi < 5  ), they can expropriate high types. 
We assume, however, that their payoff remains lower than high types’ payoff, 
even after expropriation. That is:
Here, the LHS denotes high types’ payoff following expropriation (i.e. 
their outside wage). The RHS denotes the expropriation receipts accrued by 
each low type; the numerator shows the individual expropriation suffered by 
high types, multiplied by the fraction of high types; the denominator shows 
the fraction of low types in the firm. The same applies when instead project 
j is chosen. These inequalities can be written more simply as:
(Al) Wi > fiXi and Wj > fjXj  
Technology choice (d a te  1 vote)
As there is no ordering of employees, we cannot apply the median voter 
theorem at date 1. Notice, however, that a stable voting outcome always 
exists as the technology set has been restricted to two projects.5 To determine 
the equilibrium outcome, we should instead look at the formation of coalitions 
at this voting stage. Under majority voting, the winning coalition will be 
formed by at least ^  employees. It turns out that coalition formation 
depends on which group is in a majority at date 2. We can thus distinguish 
three cases:
5A general environment with J projects and I employee types is analyzed in Chapter
II.
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(Case H): High types’ power: fi
(Case L): Low types’ power: fi < §> f i  < 2
(Case S): Split balance of power: e^ er (?) ^  < \  < ^
or yu) ji < 2 < f j
Notice that in case H, type (hh) is on the winning side in the date 2 vote, 
whichever project was chosen at date 1. That is, if project i was chosen, 
he would be productive and, since productive types are in a majority, they
would vote against redistribution. The same applies if project j was instead
chosen at date 1. Likewise, in case L, type (11) is decisive in the date 2 vote, 
whichever project was chosen at date 1. Finally, look at case S. Under S(a), 
an employee of type (hi) is always on the winning side in the date 2 vote; 
if project i was chosen, he would be productive and, since productive types 
are in a majority (fi they would vote against redistribution; whereas
if project j was chosen, he would be a low type and, since low types are in 
a majority (fj  < |) ,  they would vote in favor of redistribution. Similarly, in 
case S(b), type (Ih) is always decisive in the date 2 vote.
It turns out that, apart from an exceptional case, an employee who is 
always on the winning side at date 2, will always be able to form a winning 
coalition at date 1 too. Let us now examine in detail the argument whereby 
this is true.
Look first at case H, where type (hh) always wins the date 2 vote and there 
is no redistribution at date 2. Because there is no redistribution, type (hi) 
always prefers project i and type (Ih) always prefers project j. This implies 
that if (hh) prefers project i, he will join (hi) to form a winning coalition at 
date 1 since ghh +  ghi =  fi > I  On the other hand, if (hh) prefers project 
j, he will form a coalition with (Ih) employees. This coalition will also win 
as ghh +  gih =  f j  >  5- In short, (hh) wins the vote at date 1, whichever his 
preferences between project i and j.
Consider now case L, where type (11) is always on the winning side at 
date 2 and there is always redistribution. At date 1, if (11) prefers project i, 
this means that y z ( x i  — w i )  > (xj ~  wj) ■ By A l, (hi) will also prefer 
project i since he anticipates a payoff of Wi under project i which is strictly 
higher than y ^ -  (xj — Wj) under project j. If (11) prefers project j instead,
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then type (Ih) will also prefer project j, using the same argument. Hence 
there are two potential winning coalitions at date 1. Either {11, hi} wins, 
because glt + ghi = 1 -  f j  > \ ,  or {11, Ih} wins since gu +  gih =  1 -  fi > As 
a result, type (11) wins the date 1 vote, irrespective of his preferences across 
projects i and j.
Finally, look at case S. As we have seen, in case S(a), type (hi) always 
wins the date 2 vote; moreover, there is redistribution under project j but 
not under project i. Look now at coalition formation at date 1. Type (11) 
always votes for project j; although his individual productivity is zero under 
both projects, he gains through ex-post redistribution under project j. The 
voting preference of a type (hi) is in principle ambiguous. If redistribution 
receipts under project j are high enough to outweigh his loss in individual 
productivity with respect to project i, he will join (11) type at date 1. They 
will form a winning coalition since ghi +  gu = 1 — f j  > Yet again, we find 
that the winner of date 2 vote, also wins date 1 vote. Alternatively, (hi) may 
prefer project i over project j and, the reason can be twofold; either because 
the value of Xi is relatively high, or because the value of redistribution under 
project j is small . In this case, coalition formation will depend on (hh)’s 
preferences. If (hh) prefers project i, i.e. Xi > Wj, the date 1 winning coalition 
will be formed by {hi, hh} , since ghi +  ghh =  fi > b  thus (hi) will also win 
the date 1 vote. By contrast, if (hh) prefers instead project j, i.e. Wj > x i} 
(hi) may not be able to form a majority group in favor of project i. This is 
the exceptional case in which a type who always wins the vote at date 2 may 
fail to win the vote at date l .6 As we want to rule out this exceptional case, 
we make the following weak assumption:
(A2) Whenever f j  < ! <  fi and Xi >  j z ff  (xj ~  wj)> it must be the case
6As an illustration, consider two projects i and j, characterized as follows. Under 
project i, fi =  0.7, x* =  6 and Wi =  4. Alternatively, under project j , fj = 0.4, xj  — 10 
and wj  =  8. Moreover, assume that ghi <  0.5. This technology set satisfies case S(a) since
fj 2 f i’
Type (hi) prefers to be a high type under project i rather than a low type under project 
0.4j as 6 > —  (10 — 8) =  1.33. But notice that type (hh) prefers project j as 8 > 6. Likewise, 
0.6
type (11) prefers project j in order to enjoy positive redistribution, in particular 1.33 > 0. 
Finally, type (ih) will clearly vote for project j as 8 > 0.
Given that type (hi) is in the minority, the winning coalition will be formed by {11, Ih, hh}  
in favor of project j at date 1, despite the fact that (hi) is always decisive at date 2.
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that Xi > Wj.
-and  similarly, with the subscripts i and j  reversed in the symmetric 
case S(b).
Notice that, we only need this assumption when type (hi) favors project 
i. A2 guarantees that (hi) always wins the date 1 vote, irrespective of his 
preferences. Thus we have proved:
L em m a 1 Under A l  and A2, an employee who always wins the vote at 
date 2, also wins the vote at date 1.
As A2 is an intricate assumption, we can instead propose two sufficient 
conditions which are simpler to interpret and still ensure Lemma 1. The 
first condition is to assume that the high types’ outside wage is never greater 
than their inside productivity, irrespective of the project, that is Wj < 
(and Wi < X j ) .  This implies that, an employee who is always a high type, 
weakly prefers the project which guarantees no redistribution at date 2.
Alternatively, we could restrict the outside wage to be the same across 
projects, namely Wi =  Wj — w. By A l, a high type always prefers the project 
that leads to no redistribution at date 2; hence, type (hh) will always be 
willing to join type (hi) in favor of project i.
The above analysis has shown that, assuming Al and A2, for a given fi 
and f j ,  the pivotal employee is decisive irrespective of the particular com­
bination of giugih,9hi and ghh, i.e. regardless of the ex-ante distribution of 
employees across the four types. This has the interesting implication that 
equilibrium outcomes will only depend on the ex-post distribution of types, 
fi  and f j .
Now tha t we know how coalitions form at date 1, we can ask whether 
employee ownership is an efficient institution. We shall see that the outcome 
of the date 1 vote can be inefficient. The reason is that employees who are 
better off under the efficient project, cannot commit at date 1 to compensate 
employees who are worse off under the efficient project. An employee can be 
worse off under the efficient project not only when his individual productivity 
is lower, but also when he anticipates to be in a minority at the redistribution 
stage.7
7 One may wonder why there is no Coasian bargaining at date 1. We have in mind
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As a benchmark, consider the first-best case, where it is feasible to commit 
to a date 2 redistribution. In this case, it is efficient to choose the project 
maximizing aggregate production. W ithout loss of generality, we suppose 
that:
Projects i is efficient, that is: fiXi >  fjXj
Notice that a project is characterized not only by its level of efficiency, 
but also by the fraction and productivity of its high type employees. These 
two variables pin down the nature as well as the extent of redistribution at 
date 2; therefore, they will also prove to be crucial to determine the voting 
outcome at date 1. Given project i characterized by {fi,Xi}, project j can 
necessarily be classified as one of the following.
First, project j may be a dominated project, when it delivers fewer high 
types and they have lower productivity than under project i, that is, f j  < fi 
but Xj < Xi. Alternatively, project j might be characterized as a polarized 
technology, when it generates fewer high types but who each has greater 
productivity in comparison with project i, tha t is, f j  < fi but Xj > Xj. 
Finally, project j might be described as an egalitarian technology, when it 
delivers a bigger fraction of high types, but who each has a lower productivity 
in comparison with project i, namely f j  > fi  and Xj < x {. As the last two 
cases are more interesting than the first, we restrict project j to be either 
polarized or egalitarian.
a world in which an employee’s type is private information at this stage. For a large 
I, free riding would preclude transfers at date 1 and hence inefficient outcomes might 
arise in equilibrium; see Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). However, we are assuming that, 
once the technology has been implemented, an employee’s productivity becomes public 
knowledge (witness the fact that the outside market can then distinguish between low and 
high types). So the date 2 vote takes place under symmetric information. We recognize 
that the tools provided by mechansim design could help to disclose private information at 
date 1; although its power would be limited by employees’ participation constraint (i.e. 
their outside wage) and, by the fact it is only possible to screen on what high types’ 
productivity turns out to be under the technology chosen on the equilibrium path but not 
off the equilibrium path. We intend to explore this avenue in future work.
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(A3) Project j is either a polarized or an egalitarian technology. That is,
either f j  < f  and xj > x i}
or f j  > fi and Xj < Xi.
In addition, given that the chapter seeks to explore the effect of redis­
tribution on technology choice, we ignore case H under which there is never
redistribution.
(A4) At least one of the projects generates a majority of low types.
That is, either case L or S holds.
Now we turn to the main question of this section. Is it possible for a 
cooperative to select an inefficient project in equilibrium? The answer is 
positive. Consider the example presented in the introduction, satisfying as­
sumptions A1-A4. An independent expedition of 15 explorers has to decide 
whether to settle on an island with diamonds or on an island with gold. In 
the diamond island 7 out of the 15 explorers are productive with individual 
productivity of 12 and outside option of 7. Positive redistribution yields a 
payoff of 7 and 41 for a productive and unproductive explorer respectively. 
In the gold island, 8 explorers are productive with individual productivity 
of 10. An explorer’s payoff equals his individual productivity. The decisive 
coalition in technology choice is formed by the 8 productive explorers who 
are productive in the gold island. They favor gold extraction despite the 
efficiency of diamond extraction. Note that the inefficient project is egalitar­
ian as it generates more productive explorers (8 > 7) albeit each has lower 
productivity (10 <  12). But is this a necessary condition for a cooperative to 
be inefficient? In other words, can a cooperative also vote for an inefficient 
polarized project? The following example provides the answer.
Example: Voting for an inefficient polarized technology
Consider a slight variation of the example presented in the introduction. 
The diamond island is still characterized by 7 productive employees with 
productivity of 12 and outside option of 7. But now in the gold island 5 
explorers are productive with productivity of 16. Their outside option is 
again 7. Crucially now, unproductive types are in the majority in the gold 
island. They will thus expropriate productive types via redistribution. The
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winning proposal in the vote will be to give out 7 to the productive types and 
divide the rest 5 (16 — 7) =  45 among the 10 unproductive, each accruing 4 |.
As the wealth of the diamond island, 7* 12 =  84 is greater than the wealth 
of the gold island, 5*16 =  80, efficiency calls for diamond extraction. But the 
cooperative will turn out to be inefficient. In fact, consider the payoff of an 
explorer who is unproductive in the diamond island. His payoff 4 |  is lower 
than the payoff he would get on the gold island irrespective of whether he is 
productive or not (7 or 4 |) .  Therefore, he will vote for the gold island. As 
there are 8 such explorers, they will win the vote. Note that the gold island 
is polarized as there are fewer productive explorers (5 <  7) but with greater 
productivity (16 > 12).
The above example illustrates that there is not a clear direction of ineffi­
ciencies towards polarized or egalitarian projects. Also, a cooperative might 
be an inefficient institution even when redistribution is anticipated under 
the efficient project. More specifically we shall see that only in case L may 
a cooperative choose an inefficient polarized technology. In case S by con­
trast, a cooperative will always be efficient provided the inefficient project is 
polarized.
Yet we can provide a general result concerning the relative bias of a coop­
erative in relation to an outside-owned firm. Before presenting the argument, 
let us first analyze technology choice under outside ownership.
1.2.2 Outside Ownership
Consider the behavior of an outside-owned firm. Investors are homogeneous 
and seek to maximize profits. In this model, profits are defined by the ex­
propriation of employees’ productivity. There are two types of participants 
in the firm. Outside investors, who are endowed with residual control rights 
and employees who receive a compensation to stay in the firm.
Notice that at date 2, outsiders can differentiate between low and high 
types. They will thus expropriate high types, obtaining a payoff of I f i  (x^ — wf) , 
under project i. Similarly for project j. Both low and high types will receive 
their outside options, namely 0 for low types and w^, Wj for high types under 
project i and j respectively.
Will an outside-owned firm always choose the efficient project i ?  Notice 
that, project i will be chosen if and only if f i  (x^ — > f j  ( x j  — W j ) .  The
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fact that investors’ payoff increases with project’s efficiency may induce out­
siders to choose project i as fcxi > fjXj.  However, provided fiWi > f jWj , the 
expropriation effect under project j may dominate the efficiency effect under 
project i, leading to inefficient technology choice. As an extreme example, 
consider the case in which high types’ inside productivity is almost equal to 
their outside option under the efficient project ( i.e. Wi ^2 x^ .  Outsiders will 
hence weakly prefer project j, no m atter how inefficient this may be. More­
over, the inefficient project j can be selected, irrespective of whether it is 
polarized or egalitarian relative to project i. However, an egalitarian project 
can only be selected as long as the high types’ outside option under the inef­
ficient project is strictly lower than under the efficient project. To see why, 
suppose that outside ownership is inefficient, that is, f iXi—fjXj < fiWi—fjWj. 
As the LHS of the inequality is positive, this means that fiWi must still ex­
ceed f j W j .  If project j is egalitarian ( f j  >  f i ) ,  it must be the case that W j  
is strictly less than w{. Yet this constraint does not apply when project j is 
polarized. This observation may suggest a stronger bias towards polarized 
projects than towards egalitarian projects. But is the direction of distortion 
related to the firm’s ownership structure?
1.2.3 Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership
The above analysis shows that institutional efficiency depends on the tech­
nology set revealed at date 1. A firm can be inefficient irrespective of its con­
stitution; however, the factors leading to inefficiency differ across ownership 
structures. Whereas in a cooperative, the relative power between low and 
high types ex-post is crucial to determine efficiency, under outside-ownership 
the key variable is the firm’s specificity of skills. Despite this observation, 
we can still compare the relative distortions in technology choice between 
employee and outside ownership. The answer is contained in the following 
Proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  1 Assume A l-A f .  A cooperative is more biased towards egal­
itarian projects than is an outside-owned firm; that is, i f  an outside-owned 
firm chooses an inefficient egalitarian project then so too does a cooperative.
Correspondingly, an outside-owned firm is more biased towards polarized 
projects than is a cooperative; that is, i f  a cooperative chooses an inefficient 
polarized project then so too does an outside-owned firm.
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Proof.
Consider the first claim of the proposition. In case S, the characteriza­
tion of project j as egalitarian implies that fi <  5 <  f j .  Assume that an 
outside-owned firm is inefficient: / *  ( X i  — W i )  <  f j  ( X j  — W j ) .  But notice that 
f j  (xj -  Wj) < f j  (1 -  f j)  Xj, since, by A l, Wj > fjXj.  Also, f j  (1 -  f j)  < 
(1 — f j )  <  (1 — fi). Therefore f i{x i — Wi) <  (1 — f i )xj ,  so that Xj >
Y (xi — Wi)
1 1 . This means that in a cooperative, type (Ih) will vote in fa­
vor of project j. Remember that, given fi <  2 <  / j ,  by Lemma 1 type (Ih) 
is pivotal in technology choice. As a result, project j will also be selected by 
the cooperative.
In case L, project j is egalitarian if fi < f j  < ^- Note that in case L, 
by Lemma 1, the pivotal type at date 1 is (11). Therefore our claim is that, 
if an outside owner chooses project j, i.e. if f i  ( x i  — w ^  <  f j  ( x j  — W j ) ,  
then it follows that (xi — Wi) < (xj — Wj) . But this claim follows 
immediately from the fact that fi < fj .
Let us now turn to the second claim of the proposition. In case S, 
project j is polarized if f j  <  2 <  fi. By Lemma 1, a cooperative will choose 
project j if the pivotal type (hi) favors it. His expected payoff is Xi and 
Yzff (xj — Wj) under projects i and j respectively. But notice that, using A l,
(xj — Wj) < fjXj.  And, since j is inefficient, fjXj  < foxi, which in turn 
is strictly less than Xi. This means that (hi) will always vote for project 
i. In other words, a cooperative will never choose a polarized project. By 
contrast, this is not always true under outside ownership. In particular, an 
outside owner will choose a polarized project as long as the value of Wi is large
enough: f j  (xj — Wj) > fi (xi — Wi) if and only if Wi > ——J — ^ xj)
Ji
(Notice that this last inequality may hold even if Wi < Wj , given that f j  < fi-)
In case L, project j is polarized if f j  < fi  < i  By Lemma 1, a coop­
erative will choose project j if the pivotal type (11) prefers it. That is, if 
(xi — w ^  < y^ j- (xj — Wj) . But given f j  < f i , this inequality implies 
that fi ( x i  — W i )  < f j  ( x j  — W j ) .  Hence the outside owner will also choose 
the polarized project j.
Q.E.D.
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In proving this proposition, we have also shown that, provided employees’ 
power changes across projects (so that we are in case S), and as long as the 
inefficient project j is polarized, a cooperative is always efficient. This is 
because an employee always prefers to be a high type under the efficient 
project rather than a low type under the inefficient project; hence type (hi) 
favors project i. As (hi) is pivotal, he will always form a winning majority in 
favor of project i. By contrast, an outside owner will instead be inefficient, 
whenever his expected expropriation receipts are higher under the inefficient 
project.8
The intuition that underlies Proposition 1 is the following. Suppose that 
an outside-owned firm chooses an inefficient egalitarian project. Then it 
must be the case that the inefficient project allows higher expropriation than 
it does the efficient project. Now consider a cooperative. In case L, type 
(11) is pivotal at date 1. He shares similar preferences with outsiders as, 
by Lemma 1, he is in power under both projects and will thus expropriate 
high types through redistribution. The only difference in preferences being 
that, for a given level of expropriation, type (11) favors projects generating 
fewer low types as these would allow higher per-capita expropriation. But 
this is precisely the characterization of an inefficient egalitarian project. The 
inefficient behavior exhibited by outside owners is thus emphasized in a co­
operative. In case S, the fact that the inefficient project is egalitarian means 
that (Ih) is pivotal in technology choice. The inefficient project now looks 
more attractive to the pivotal type than it did in case L, because it allows 
him to become a high type, while still being in the majority at date 2. As 
we know from A l that, for a given project, an employee prefers to be a high 
type rather than a low type, (Ih)’s preferences for the inefficient project will 
be stronger vis-a-vis type (11).
Concerning the strong bias towards polarized projects under outside own­
ership, note that in case L, if type (11) favors a polarized project, -generating 
more low types- it follows that total expropriation is necessarily higher under
8This logic might suggest that an employee may also prefer to be a high type under 
project j, rather than a low type under project i. If this were the case, whenever the 
inefficient project j was egalitarian, a cooperative would always be inefficient since the 
pivotal type is then ( Ih) . Yet, this is not always true. If project i is efficient enough -  
specifically, if Xi >  Wi +  -^j^LXj -  then the redistribution effect will dominate the individual 
productivity effect and a cooperative will be efficient.
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the inefficient project. Therefore, an outside-owned firm would also be inef­
ficient. Finally, the fact that a cooperative is never biased towards polarized 
projects in case S completes our result.9
1.3 Constitutional Change
So far we have assumed that the firm’s constitution is in place from date 0, 
before the choice of technology at date 1. As we have seen in Proposition 
1, the initial constitution may be inefficient. Moreover, the fact that 
and {f j ,Xj}  are public knowledge means that everyone can anticipate an in­
efficient technology choice. In this section, we allow the firm to change its 
initial constitution as a commitment device to increase efficiency. The ques­
tion is, will the firm’s current owners hand over control rights to prospective 
efficient owners?
As a case in point, consider a cooperative. We know from Proposition 1 
that a cooperative may select an inefficient egalitarian project j, even though 
an outside owner may not. If this is the case, will employees prefer instead 
to sell off the firm to efficient outsiders?
The context that we have in mind is one of competition among potential 
outside owners. Therefore the cooperative will extract all the surplus from a 
sale. A one-member-one-vote cooperative will divide returns equally among 
its members.10 Also, the decision on constitutional change will be driven by a
9At this point, it is important to emphasize that Lemma 1 underpins Proposition 1. 
To illustrate why, let us look back at the example presented in footnote 6, where A2 did 
not hold. In particular, type (hi), although decisive at date 2, failed to win the date 1 
vote.
Given that fcxi =  4.2 > 4 =  f jXj ,  project i is efficient. Also, as x j  >  Xi and f j < \ <  f i , 
project j is polarized. Recall that the date 1 winning coalition was formed by {//, Ih, hh}  , 
in favor of project j.
On the other hand, notice that an outside-owned firm will choose the efficient project 
since fi  (xi — Wi) =  1.4 > 0.8 =  f j  (xj  — Wj). Although the extent of expropriation is the 
same across technologies, project i delivers a higher number of high types. Thus, here is 
an example where Lemma 1 fails and the cooperative is more biased towards polarized 
projects than an outside owner.
10One may wonder why dividends are distributed uniformly among employees. In prin­
ciple, we could envisage a contingent rule whereby dividends were tied to employees’s type. 
But this information is private at the date of the constitutional vote. Following consti-
34
simple majority vote at date 0.11 It turns out that, with a mild strengthening 
of A2, we can show that an employee who is pivotal at dates 1 and 2, will 
also win the vote at date 0. Replace A2 with the following assumption.
(A2)’ Whenever f  |  < f j  and Xj > — Wi), it must be the case
that
X j  >  (1 -  f i )  W i  +  f i X i .
-and viceversa, interchanging the subscripts i and j.
A2’ resembles A2 except for the RHS of the final inequality, which is now 
(1 — fi) Wi +  fiXi rather than simply Wi. Notice that the value of this convex 
combination is closer to Wi than to Xi as fi  < \ .
Surprisingly, an inefficient cooperative will never vote to sell off the firm 
to outsiders. That is, there is institutional inertia.
Proposition  2 Assume A l ,  A 2 \  A3 and AJf. A cooperative that is 
currently voting for an inefficient project will never sell to an outside owner 
in order to restore efficiency.
Proof
We know from Proposition 1 that if the cooperative is voting for an inef­
ficient project and the outside owner is not, then the inefficient project must 
be egalitarian, i.e., f i  <  f j .  When casting his vote at date 0, each employee 
computes his expected payoff under both employee and outside ownership. 
Remember that an outside owner is efficient but cannot commit not to ex­
propriate high types ex-post. This implies that the profit of investors under 
outside ownership is determined by I  fi (Xi — Wi). As the cooperative extracts 
all surplus from outside owners and divides the returns uniformly among its 
members, each employee receives fi (xi — Wi) as a lump sum at date 0, in
tutional change, employees relinquish their control rights and hence have no incentive to 
renegotiate. The problem then boils down to the question of why Coasian bargaining fails 
at date 0 in a world of private information -as explained in foonote 7-. Under the veil of 
uncertainty, at the time of the initial constitution, a uniform dividend rule seems to be a 
focal decision rule.
n We might think of a more stringent voting rule, i.e. qualified majority. A more 
inclusive rule would be more conducive to constitutional inertia (as private information 
rules renders bargaining unfeasible). Our results would then be reinforced.
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addition to his salary, under outside ownership. The equilibrium outcome at 
date 0 depends on the preferences exhibited by the winning coalition.
Under S, project j is egalitarian when f i  < 5 <  f j .  Provided type (Ih) 
can always form a winning coalition at date 0, the outcome on constitutional 
change will be robust to any ex-ante distribution of types {gu,gihi9hi,9hh}- 
The fact that the cooperative is inefficient and that (Ih) is decisive in tech­
nology choice implies that Xj > (x^ — Wi) > f i (x i  — Wi), where the last
term captures the payoff accruing to (Ih) upon sale. Thus, type (Ih) favors 
employee ownership. Type (11) by contrast will vote in favor of constitutional 
change. Whereas his individual productivity is always zero, the anticipates 
no redistribution under employee ownership but yet he receives a dividend 
under outside ownership. Finally, type (hhf s  anticipated payoff following 
constitutional change is Wi + fi (xi — Wi). Given that the cooperative is in­
efficient, by A2’, this payoff is weakly lower than his expected payoff under 
employee ownership, namely X j .  The winning coalition will thus be formed 
by {lh,hh}  in favor of the initial constitution.
Under L, project j is egalitarian when f i  <  f j  < \- Note that if type 
(11) prefers employee ownership so too does type (Ih). Whereas under out­
side ownership the payoff of both types is the same -  in particular they are 
both unproductive when the efficient technology is implemented-, under em­
ployee ownership the payoff of (Ih) is strictly greater than (Il fs  payoff -  as 
the cooperative implements the inefficient project and by A l W j  >  f j X j  - .  
Likewise if type (11) prefers instead outside ownership, so too does type (hi). 
The argument mirrors the previous logic. In effect, under employee own­
ership the payoff of both types is the same, but under employee ownership 
the payoff of (hi) is greater. Therefore, type (11) can always form a winning 
majority in favor of his preferred constitution; that is, (11) is decisive at the 
date 0 vote. Crucially, as he is also decisive in technology choice, the coop­
erative can only be inefficient if and only if y^_ (xj — Wj) > (xi — Wi).
But y (xi — > fi (xi — Wi), where the RHS captures (Il fs  payoff un­
der outside ownership. Therefore, the winning coalition will vote in favor of 
employee ownership.
Q.E.D.
The above result shows that an inefficient cooperative fails to sell off 
to outsiders even when it holds all bargaining power at the selling stage and
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hence a take-it-or-leave-it offer would allow all employees to internalize aggre­
gate surplus. The reason why this compensation is not sufficient to guarantee 
constitutional change draws on the magnitude of the vested interests enjoyed 
by the pivotal type at the selling stage. These vested interests arise from his 
decisive role in both technology choice and redistribution. The argument 
works as follows. A cooperative can only become an inefficient institution 
when the type who is decisive at date 1 favors the inefficient technology. But 
he is also decisive at date 2. Therefore he neglects the efficient technology 
despite his power to set redistribution ex-post. Yet if the firm is sold off to 
outsiders, not only will the efficient technology be implemented but also he 
will lose power to expropriate the minority. He will however be compensated 
through the selling price following a one-vote-one-dividend rule. But this 
rule treats all employees equally. This implies that his privileged political 
position under employee ownership is jeopardized under outside ownership. 
Hence his payoff from the inefficient technology is strictly greater than his 
payoff from the efficient technology irrespective of the ownership structure 
of the firm. But the inefficient technology will only be implemented under 
employee ownership. This explains institutional inertia. In short, the ini­
tial constitution is favored by the decisive type as a shield to perpetuate his 
‘political power’.
1.4 Political Risk Aversion
So far we have assumed that at the time of technology choice at date 1, each 
employee privately knows what his productivity type will be under both 
projects. This assumption, coupled with the fact that the fractions of high 
productivity (fi and f j )  are public knowledge, allows each employee to antic­
ipate whether he will belong to the majority group at date 2 or not: there is 
‘political certainty’. In this section we change the informational assumptions 
of the model to account for uncertainty. The question that we address is 
whether uncertainty may influence technology choice even though we con­
tinue to maintain the assumption of risk neutrality.
The framework that we have in mind is the following. At date 1 there are 
two feasible technologies, the status quo, project j ,  and a new technology, 
project i. Under the status quo, a fraction f j  of the employees are productive 
with productivity Xj, and the others are unproductive with productivity zero.
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Whereas each employee privately knows his productivity under the status 
quo, he is uncertain about his productivity under the new technology. In 
particular, a low type under the status quo can become productive under 
the new technology accruing productivity X{ with probability p. Likewise, a 
high type under the status quo is also a high type under the new technology 
accruing productivity Xi with probability q. The values of Xi, Xj, f j ,  p and q 
are all public knowledge. Given a large cooperative, the ex-post realization 
of types approxiamates the ex-ante distribution of types. Hence the fraction 
of high types under the new technology equals:
fi = i1 -  f j )P + fjQ
As we want to explore the interplay between efficiency and uncertainty 
we continue to assume that project i, the technology about which there is 
individual uncertainty, is more efficient than project j: fiXi > fjXj.  After 
the technology is implemented at date 1, the productivity of each employee 
is publicly revealed at date 2. So that redistribution at date 2 takes place 
under symmetric information.
There are two main differences with respect to the case of certainty. First, 
there axe only two types of employees at date 1, {l ,h}  say, defined by their 
productivity type under the status quo. This renders the analysis of voting 
straightforward: technology choice will be simply determined by the larger 
group. Second, there is ‘political uncertainty’: a member of the majority 
group at date 1 may turn out to be in the minority group at date 2. Note 
that this can only happen if the new technology is implemented. We might 
expect that under risk neutrality, such uncertainty will not affect technology 
choice at date 1. That is, if we considered two worlds characterized by the 
same technology set (i.e. the same Xi, Xj, fj),  with the only difference lying in 
the information structure of the new project, the choice of technology would 
remain unaltered. Surprisingly, this intuition is mistaken. We will compare 
how the cooperative functions with and without individual uncertainty. As 
the most interesting analysis arises under split balance of power, we shall 
focus on this case. Replace A4 with the following assumption.
(A4’) Case S holds: either f j  < \  < fi  or fi < \  < fj.
The following proposition shows that political uncertainty increases the
38
likelihood of inefficient technology choice. We might say that a cooperative 
is ‘politically risk averse’.
Proposition 3
Assume that A l ,  A2, A3 and A4 ’ hold. I f  the efficient project i was 
chosen under political certainty it may no longer be chosen when it generates 
political uncertainty. However, i f  the inefficient project j  was chosen under 
political certainty, it will continue to be chosen under political uncertainty.
Uncertainty has no effect on technology choice as long as the winning 
coalition under certainty is formed by the same productivity types that com­
prise the majority group under uncertainty. This is because the expected 
payoff of an employee belonging to the majority under uncertainty is a con­
vex combination of the payoffs accruing to each type belonging to the winning 
coalition under certainty. Risk neutrality ensures that the preferences of both 
groups are then aligned. Therefore, to analyze the influence of uncertainty in 
technology choice we should look at the composition of the majority group 
under uncertainty vis-a-vis the composition of the winning coalition under 
certainty. By A4’, there are only two cases to consider.
Suppose first that fi < 5 <  fj .  Under uncertainty, the majority group 
is formed by high types under the status quo. Under certainty, the pivotal 
type is (Ih) by Lemma 1. He may favor either the status quo project or the 
new technology. If he prefers project i, by A l, (hh) also prefers project i. 
If he prefers instead project j , by A2, (hh) will favor project j  too. Hence 
the winning coalition at date 1 is always formed by high types under the 
status quo, irrespective of technology choice. Therefore, the composition of 
the majority group at date 1 is not affected by the existence of uncertainty. 
From the above discussion follows that the voting behavior of the cooperative 
will not be altered by political uncertainty.
Suppose instead that f j  <  5 <  fi. Recall that, in the course of prov­
ing Proposition 1, we showed that a cooperative is always efficient under 
certainty. As the pivotal type is (hi), he favors project i. By A2, (hh) also 
prefers project i. The winning coalition at date 1 is thus formed by high types 
under the new technology. Under uncertainty however, the majority group 
is formed by low types under the status quo. Hence, the composition of the 
majority group under uncertainty varies with respect to the certainty case.
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To show that the cooperative is politically risk averse we should then prove 
that low types may favor the inefficient project under uncertainty. Their 
voting behavior is the outcome of the following trade-off. On the one hand, a 
low productivity type likes the new technology. If he succeeds and becomes 
a high type, this is good news for two reasons: his individual productivity 
is higher; and, he is in the majority group at date 2. But he also likes the 
status quo project. If he failed and remained as a low type under the new 
technology, he would lose his power to set redistribution. If the probability 
of becoming a high type is low enough, the subsidy effect accrued under the 
status quo through redistribution will dominate the productivity effect under 
the new technology. Specifically, this is true whenever p  <  . To see
why, note that the payoff accruing to a low type from the status quo project, 
(xj — Wj), is higher than his expected payoff from the new technology,
pxi.
As decisions are taken by majority voting, the fact that uncertainty can 
generate inefficiencies only when f j  < \  <  f u  means that the uncertainty 
faced by high types is irrelevant for efficiency. In effect, when the cooperative 
is efficient under certainty, an employee who is a high type under the status 
quo yet a low type under the efficient project, favors the new technology. 
Under uncertainty, there is a positive probability that such an employee be­
comes a high type under the efficient project. Therefore his efficient behavior 
is reinforced by the existence of uncertainty. Also, note tha t uncertainty is 
binding only when the dispersion between low and high types’ payoff in­
creases under the new technology. In effect, whereas the status quo ensures 
the existence of redistribution, the new technology leads to no redistribution.
Interestingly, there are two channels through which uncertainty feeds into 
an employee’s payoff. First, through his productivity type. Second, through 
his power to set redistribution at date 2. Yet uncertainty can only create in­
efficiencies through the political channel. To see why, consider an alternative 
characterization of the new technology whereby all employees may either suc­
ceed and become high types with probability p, or may fail and remain low 
types with probability (1 — p). Hence there is aggregate uncertainty. Sup­
pose that the majority is formed by low types. Although their productivity 
under the new technology is uncertain, they are certain to be in the majority 
group at date 2 irrespective of technology choice. It is straightforward to
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see that the cooperative will always choose the efficient project regardless of 
whether there is uncertainty or not.
1.4.1 Political Insurance
Proposition 3 has shown that uncertainty can reinforce the extent of a co­
operative’s inefficient behavior. The assumption that p  and q axe known at 
date 1 means that everyone can anticipate inefficient technology choice. In 
section 3 we saw that a transfer of ownership to efficient outsiders was always 
blocked by the winning coalition. Will the introduction of uncertainty render 
constitutional change feasible to restore efficiency?
Consider a technology set such that employee ownership is inefficient. 
Before the vote on technology choice takes place, the cooperative decides 
whether to transfer ownership to efficient outsiders through a take-it-or-leave- 
it offer. The decision on constitutional change will be determined by the 
preferences exhibited by the larger group at date 0.
Surprisingly now, an inefficient cooperative may sell off the firm to effi­
cient outsiders, as long as the inefficient behavior is driven by political risk. 
That is, constitutional change may act as an insurance policy protecting the 
majority group from the loss of vested interests.
Proposition  4
Assume that A l ,  A 2 \  A3 and A 4 1 hold. Constitutional change may act as 
an insurance policy. That is, i f  a cooperative is inefficient under uncertainty 
but efficient under certainty, it may sell off to outsiders. However, i f  an 
inefficient cooperative under uncertainty is also inefficient under certainty, 
it will never sell off to outsiders.
Consider the first claim of the proposition. Following the discussion of 
Proposition 3, uncertainty can render an otherwise efficient cooperative into 
an efficient institution only when f j  <  k2 < fi. Low types are decisive for 
technology choice. We shall then look at their voting behavior at date 0. As 
the cooperative is inefficient, project j  is adopted under employee ownership. 
Low types’ productivity is therefore zero. Given that they win the vote 
at date 2, their expected payoff is given by -^fy- ( x j  — W j ) .  Under outside 
ownership, the firm is efficient by assumption; hence project i is implemented. 
A low type will become a high type with probability p. His expected outside
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option is therefore pwi. Also he will receive an upfront payment from the 
selling price equal to fi  (xi — w^.  Therefore, whenever pwi +  fi (xi — >
(Xj — Wj), he will vote in favor of constitutional change.12 Note that 
this inequality may hold even if project j  is to be chosen under employee 
ownership.
Let us now turn to the second claim of the proposition. Assume that 
the cooperative is inefficient under certainty. Given A4’ it should be true 
that f i  < 5 < f j .  In proving Proposition 2 we showed that the winning 
majority, blocking constitutional change at date 0, was formed by high types 
under the status quo. In particular, an employee who was always a high 
type irrespective of technology choice favored employee ownership. Under 
uncertainty, the majority group is formed by high types under the status 
quo. Their expected payoff under outside ownership is strictly lower than 
the payoff of an employee who is always a high type (given that q < 1). 
Hence the majority will favor employee ownership.
Proposition 4 says that the cooperative may favor project i indirectly 
under outside ownership even if it favors project j  under employee ownership. 
More specifically, this may happen provided low types form the larger group 
at date 0. Given that they are also in majority at date 1, what is the 
intuition for this change in preferences concerning technology choice? The 
reason is that outside ownership guarantees low types a compensation of 
f i  ( x i  — W i ) ,  irrespective of their productivity type under the new technology. 
Constitutional change acts as an insurance policy against the loss of vested 
interests provided by date 2 power under employee ownership. This result 
contrasts with the certainty case, where the power enjoyed by the date 0 
pivotal type was independent of technology choice allowing vested interests 
under the status quo to carry over under the new technology.
It turns out that a low type is indifferent between implementing a technol­
ogy with probability of success p, and favoring the adoption of a new technol­
ogy following constitutional change with probability of success /*—(/* ~  p) ff-
12This is equivalent to f x i  >  (%j — Wj) +  (/* — p) Wi- The LHS of the inequality
denotes project i’s efficiency, which is partially internalized through date 0 dividends. The 
first term in the RHS denotes the status quo subsidy and the second term captures the 
constraint imposed by high types’ outside wage which limits the date 0 dividend, although 
it also rises the payoff of a successful low type.
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The difference given by /* (q — p) can be interpreted as the price of the 
insurance policy provided by outside ownership. Note th a t a necessary con­
dition for this price to be positive is that q >  p. As high types’ productivity 
is partially expropriated under outside ownership, the upfront compensation 
given by fi (x; — outweighs the expected expropriation of p ( x { — Wi), only 
when the probability of success is low enough, namely p < fi which is equiva­
lent to p < q. Therefore, constitutional change may restore efficiency as long 
as there exists positive correlation of productivity types across technologies.
We have shown that although political risk may turn a cooperative into an 
inefficient institution, constitutional change may however restore efficiency. 
But this is not necessarily the case. Remember the last example presented 
in the introduction as illustrative of two striking remarks. First, uncertainty 
led a cooperative to reject a Pareto dominant technology under which all 
employees were weakly more productive with probability 1. Second, the 
cooperative failed to sell off the firm to efficient outsiders.
1.5 How does the model fit the facts?
The purpose of this section is to analyze the theoretical predictions of our 
model in the light of the evidence provided by the empirical literature. Most 
of the relevant empirical research falls within two main types of analysis: 
either the comparison between the aggregated behavior of employee and out­
side owned firms across industries; or alternatively, the dynamics of firm 
performance in particular economic sectors as the character of the industry 
evolves over time. These two lines of study provide a natural ground to test 
our results which concern the performance of a firm as a function of its own­
ership structure and, in relation to the technological environment where it 
operates. Although there exists an extensive empirical literature on cooper­
atives, most of the comparative results turn out to be contradictory or fail 
to generate robust evidence on the tested hypotheses. Yet we can still find 
some empirical regularities that hold in most of the case studies analyzed 
in the literature as summarized by Bonin, Jones and Putterm an (1993) and 
Hansmann (1996).
(a) Cooperatives present lower wage dispersion and higher productivity 
compression than outside-owned firms.
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There is persistent evidence showing that the wage structure in coopera­
tives is less dispersed than the differences in productivity across employees. 
Also, employee-owned firms present less differential wage structures than 
similar investor-owned firms. For instance, in plywood cooperatives, nearly 
all employees adhere to a scheme under which all members receive the same 
rate of pay regardless of their task and seniority. Most law firms share the 
partnership’s earnings equally among partners regardless of their individual 
productivity even if this is easily measurable. In France, 25 per cent of the 
surplus is distributed to workers as a bonus payment in all cooperatives. A 
case in point is the well known Mondragon cooperatives where 30 per cent 
of an employee’s salary is transferred to a collective account.
Further, employee-owners tend to do similar work; rarely they have sub­
stantially different types of skill and productivity. In US plywood coopera­
tives semi-skilled employees commonly rotate over time through various jobs. 
In other words, not only pay but also productivity is more equalized among 
employees in cooperatives rather than in outside-owned firms. Even if these 
decisions engender inflexible technology choice and lack of diversification.
Our model accounts for this fact in Proposition 1. Following a particular 
technology choice, a cooperative will favor redistribution as long as low pro­
ductivity types are in the majority. Redistribution under employee ownership 
narrows the gap in payoffs between employees by comparison with outside- 
owned firms. Moreover, proposition 1 shows that cooperatives are relatively 
more biased towards technologies generating more high types with lower in­
dividual productivity than investor-owned firms. This result predicts that 
the productivity among employees is bound to be less dispersed in employee 
controlled firms, as argued in the empirical literature.
(b) Cooperatives are more inefficient in the presence of uncertainty.
Employee ownership seems to be more common in industries where there 
is more available information on employees’ individual productivity, such 
as the case of service professions. If we believe that a cooperative is more 
likely to survive the higher its efficiency, it follows that cooperatives are more 
efficient in the presence of more precise information on productivity.
Also, in volatile sectors like plywood cooperatives, although member­
ship is marketable, there is evidence of underinvestment in comparison with
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plywood investor-owned firms, even when financial markets are available. 
Moreover, these cooperatives have significantly higher capacity utilization.
Finally, Holmstrom (1999) argues that employee dominated firms seem to 
be less successful in shifting resources to new technologies than shareholders 
dominated firms in economic environments characterized by higher volatility.
Proposition 3 in our model takes account of this fact by predicting than 
uncertainty, while increasing the likelihood of inefficient performance in co­
operatives, does not affect the behavior of outside-owned firms.
(c) Cooperatives are more likely to change their ownership structure in 
volatile industries.
When the character of the industry has changed, there is evidence of an in­
creased reversion of ownership from employees to outside investors. The best 
known examples of constitutional change of cooperatives axe documented in 
the advertising industry and in the investment banking sector. In effect, ad­
vertising firms began converting from partnership to investor ownership in 
the early 1960’s. Similarly, investment banking started to abandon the part­
nership form in the 1970’s. Although one obvious reason is the need to attract 
more capital, this reversion process seems to be correlated with the increase 
in the complexity of new technologies and greater internal departmentaliza­
tion, which renders expected productivity under feasible technologies more 
uncertain.
This empirical observation is accounted form by Propositions 2 and 4 
of our model, which predict that a cooperative is more likely to sell off to 
outsiders in the face of individual uncertainty over employees’ productivity.
Finally, there are two empirical regularities concerning both the efficiency 
of a cooperative and the dynamics of its ownership structure in relation with 
the mobility of its employees. Such cooperatives typically belong to industries 
characterized by technological uncertainty.
(d) Under uncertainty, cooperatives are more likely to be inefficient when 
employees are subject to higher lock-in effects.
In large industrial firms, where employees become more specialized, firms 
are rarely employee-owned. Conversely, employees are unusually mobile in 
employee-owned firms that belong to the transportation sector, plywood in­
dustries and small service professionals. If higher efficiency increases the
45
likelihood of survival, this empirical observation can be explained by the 
predictions of our model on the relative efficiency.of both ownership struc­
tures.
(e) Under uncertainty, efficient cooperatives selling off to outside in­
vestors are more likely to belong to industries with lower lock-in effects.
This is the case in the most prominent example of cooperatives in the US 
which belong to the plywood industry as well as in some service professions 
like advertising agencies. Yet efficient cooperatives belonging to less mobile 
industries such are large law firms have followed an up-or-out system whereby 
an employee must leave the firm if she has not been made a partner in a 
specific time horizon. This rule implies that all except more junior lawyers 
are owners, hence preventing the tendency to substitute employee owners 
with hired labor prevailing in other industries.
How does our theory account for these last two facts? Note that these 
two predictions fall within the territory analyzed in Section 4 as the indus­
tries analyzed belong to an uncertain economic environment. From proving 
proposition 4 we know that a cooperative is less likely to behave inefficiently 
the higher the efficiency of the new technology. But we have not provided 
any prediction relating the behavior of a cooperative with the firm specificity 
of its employees’ productivity. In addition, although we showed in proposi­
tion 4 that inefficient cooperatives may sell off to outsiders in the face of 
uncertainty, the question of whether an efficient cooperative might change 
its initial constitution to modify the distribution of payoffs among employees 
was not addressed. Likewise, there was not any prediction concerning the 
likelihood of a sell off in relation to the characterization of the industry to 
which the cooperative belongs.
To analyze these two questions in the light of the empirical evidence, we 
present an example of the model outlined in Section 4. At date 1, the cooper­
ative chooses between two feasible technologies, the status quo project j  and 
a new technology i. Whereas each employee knows ex-ante his productivity 
under the status quo, his productivity under the new technology is only re­
vealed ex-post. Project j  is characterized by the fraction of high types fj ,  
their inside productivity Xj, and their outside option Wj. The new technology 
is characterized by the fraction of low types that will become high types p, 
the fraction of high types that will remain high types q, and the inside and
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outside productivity of high types denoted by Xi  and W i  respectively. In the 
present example we simplify this setting by assuming q = 1, Xi = Xj — x  and 
W{  =  W j  =  w.
This simplification allows a natural characterization of an industry ac­
cording to the firm specificity of employees’ productivity measured by (x — w). 
Also it simplifies the set of new technologies as they can be defined by the 
parameter p.
There are two main implications to be drawn from this example. First, 
the productivity of each employee is weakly higher under a new technology. 
In other words, project i Pareto dominates the status quo. Second, by A4, 
low types are in the majority under the status quo. Therefore, they will be 
decisive in the vote on technology choice under employee ownership as well 
as in the vote on constitutional change. Applying the results from Section 4 
we also know that uncertainty is detrimental for efficiency. The question to 
be addressed is whether a cooperative is more or less likely to be efficient the 
higher the mobility of its employees. To answer this question we first consider 
a given industry and analyze the performance of the cooperative in relation 
to the efficiency of the new technology. Then we restrict all technologies to be 
equally likely and study the likelihood of efficient behavior across industries.
A priori, a technology characterized by a higher value of p is more attrac­
tive to low types and the reason is twofold: a high p increases the expected 
productivity of a low type. Also it rises the efficiency of the cooperative that 
can be in principle internalized via redistribution. Yet the anticipation of 
a change in the balance of power following the adoption of a new technol­
ogy generates a non-monotonic relation between the efficient behavior of the 
cooperative and the efficiency of the new technology. More specifically, a 
cooperative is Pareto inefficient for intermediate values of efficiency. That is, 
when p < p < p.13 For low values of p, the balance of power between low and 
high types under the new technology remains unchanged. All employees will 
then favor the efficient option. For higher values of p, the balance of power 
between low and high types under the new technology is reversed. Yet as 
the probability of a low type becoming high increases, the efficiency effect 
dominates the political effect and the new technology will be implemented 
by the cooperative even under unanimity rule.
13Where p  =  A~2A  and p  =  -r^b- —— —.
— K1  J j )  1 J j  x
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Now, how does the behavior of the cooperative relates to the character­
ization of the industry? Note that p is a critical value that determines the 
swing in the redistribution policy in the cooperative and is thus independent 
of lock-in effects. On the other hand, p  is an upper bound that trades off 
the increase in low types’ expected productivity against their expected loss 
in subsidy from current redistribution. We can conclude that if all new tech­
nologies are equally likely, the efficient behavior of a cooperative increases 
with the mobility of its employees. This is precisely the empirical observation 
presented in (d).
In order to address the fact stated in (e) we will proceed as follows. First, 
we will consider a particular industry characterized by a measure of lock- 
in effects given by (x — w). We will then determine the set of technologies 
for which the cooperative will behave efficiently. And likewise, the set of 
technologies for which the cooperative will select an inefficient technology. 
For each of these two cases, we will determine whether constitutional change 
will take place. Finally, assuming that all technologies are equally likely we 
will look at the reversion of ownership from efficient cooperatives to investors 
across industries.
In an industry defined by (x — w), consider a new technology character­
ized by p , where p satisfies p < p < p. Employee ownership is inefficient. Yet 
low types may vote to sell off the firm to outsiders provided their expected 
payoff under outside ownership is higher than under cooperative form. This 
will be the case as long as p < p u  The value of p  denotes the ratio between 
the difference in redistribution accrued by the pivotal type under the status 
quo (where receipts are divided only among low types) with respect to the 
per capita dividend obtained upon sale, together with the increased benefit 
of a pivotal type under project i as he may not only become a high type but 
also receive greater dividends from higher efficiency.
Next we determine the set of technologies that will drive a change in the 
14A low type will vote in favor of constitutional change as long as pw  +  f i (x  — w) >
A (x_w)-
Substituting for the value of fa and rearranging, it is easy to see that this is equivalent
M 2 { x - w )
tO p  >  p  =  - ------------- T y .
f j W  +  (1 -  f j )  X
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initial constitution of the firm even if employee ownership is efficient. There 
are two cases to analyze:
First, consider a new technology i , such that p < p. Remember that the 
cooperative is efficient and that there is positive redistribution under project
i. It can be easily shown that a majority of employees will vote for employee 
ownership.15
Second, assume a new technology i such that p > p .  Now the cooperative 
will choose project i at date 1 but there will be no redistribution at date 2. 
By comparing the payoffs of low types under employee and outside ownership 
it can be shown that low types will always sell off to outsiders.16
Finally, we analyze the interaction between ownership and skills’ firm 
specificity. Consider the definition of p, p and p as a function of w, where 
0 < w < x. The value of p is constant for all values of w. Yet p is a decreasing 
linear function of w. More intricate turns out to be the function p. However 
we can still calculate the sign of the partial derivatives with respect to w,
. dp d2p  17
namely —— < 0, and —— >  0. ow ow
We can extract three main empirical predictions. First, conditional on 
an efficient technology reverting ownership to outsiders, it is more likely that 
lock-in effects are lower. This prediction corroborates the empirical anecdote 
presented in (e). Second, restricting attention to inefficient cooperatives 
that change their ownership structure, it is more likely that they belong to
15In effect, low types will vote in favor of outside ownership as long as
Replacing the value of /* in terms of p, this inequality would only hold if p  >  p  +  
f j ( l - p ) .  A s p <  1, this is a contradiction and hence, cooperative form will remain.
Again, replacing the value of f i  and rearranging, this inequality is equivalent to p  <  
p  -f f j  (1 — p),  which is always true.
16 Current low types under the status quo will only sell off the firm to outsiders provided
p w  +  f i (x  — w) >  px
17In particular < 0, and -
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industries with higher lock-in effects. As a result, constitutional change is 
more likely to restore efficiency for lower values of w, for which the date 2 
decisive role of the date 1 pivotal type is more valuable. Finally, employee 
ownership is more likely bo be observed in industries characterized by greater 
lock-in effects. To our knowledge, these two last predictions have not been 
explored in the empirical literature.
Interestingly, and showing a reversed causality with respect to most of 
the literature on the theory of the firm, the specificity of high types’ skills 
which is assumed to be determined by industrial factors, plays a crucial role 
on a firm’s efficiency through its effect on technology choice.
1.6 Discussion and Related Literature
The above analysis has been placed in an economic environment character­
ized by technological uncertainty. But how can we justify the existence of 
uncertainty in a firm? And, could uncertainty also distort investment deci­
sions in an outside-owned firm with heterogenous investors? In what follows, 
we first motivate the introduction of uncertainty into the model. Next we 
propose some policies that may circumvent this inefficiency. Also we suggest 
some testable implications that may lead to future empirical work.
1.6.1 M otivation of Uncertainty
We could think of an increase in the size of the firm or the complexity of 
its operations as two main factors leading to uncertainty regarding the ef­
fect that the project undertaken by the firm will have on an employee’s final 
payoff. We can illustrate this argument with the following examples. First 
consider an increase in the size18 of the cooperative. We can view size as the 
replication of productivity across the population of employees. As now there 
are several employees belonging to the same categories, there may be some
18A different effect of size on efficiency is given by Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) where 
cooperatives are characterized by partnerships with equal-sharing rules. Cooperatives 
will be smaller than their optimal size so as not to redistribute to lower productivity 
employees. However as the number of employees belonging to the same category increases 
the inefficiency generated by suboptimal size vanishes as cooperatives can achieve more 
homogeneous populations of employees.
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reorganization ex-post by which some of these employees will be transferred 
to job assignments dealing with the new project whereas some other employ­
ees will remain performing the same task. This would introduce individual 
uncertainty at the project voting stage regarding the final productivity of 
each employee. Alternatively, consider a cooperative in which redistribution 
is determined by a majority of winning coalitions. An increase in the size 
of the firm would raise the number of potential coalitions that may form at 
the redistribution stage, thereby introducing an element of uncertainty in the 
employees’ final payoff. Next, consider an increase in the complexity of the 
operations undertaken by the firm. Following the adoption of a new project, 
a certain number of employees (movers) will increase their individual pro­
ductivity. But these employees may be uncertain ex-ante about their own 
ability to increase their productivity after implementation. If all movers are 
equally productive under the status quo project, they will share the same 
beliefs about their own capabilities under the new technology; hence the 
probability of success for each mover will be the same. Ex-post however, a 
reduced number of movers will increase their productivity (say, the employ­
ees suffering lower individual costs to switching to the new project), whereas 
the remaining movers will continue being low productivity employees.
In addition, this chapter can throw some light on the source of poten­
tial inefficiencies arising from the existence of heterogenous investors in an 
outside-owned firm. Heterogeneity among shareholders may be introduced 
when a firm issues “targeted stock” . This means that the payoff of each 
shareholder is tied to the earnings of a particular project. This may in turn 
create conflicts of interest among investors over the firm’s productive deci­
sions. Suppose that, following the implementation of a project, cash-flows 
could be transferred across different lines of businesses. This would entail 
ex-ante uncertainty regarding the final benefit accrued by each shareholder. 
As a result, shareholders may be reluctant to undertake a dominant project 
when it facilitates the diversion of income to other activities of the firm (due 
for instance to unobservable or unverifiable earnings). As a consequence, 
technologically dominated outcomes might also arise. This may help to ex­
plain the scarce existence of this type of stock among investor-owned firms 
(Hansmann, 1996).
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1.6.2 Governance Provisions
Regarding potential mechanisms that may circumvent these inefficiencies, 
the first question we could ask is whether the uncertainty at the voting stage 
could be eliminated by designing an adequate insurance scheme after the 
new project has been revealed but before the vote on technology takes place. 
Employees whose current payoff may be jeopardized by the adoption of a 
new project would be willing to pay a premium upfront that guarantees the 
payment of a subsidy in the event of a bad realization. However, this scheme 
boils down to a system of transfers by which high types compensate the 
resulting low types. Yet, the limitation imposed by lack of credibility and 
asymmetric information will render this scheme unfeasible.
We can devise two main governance provisions to solve the inefficiency 
that arises due to the failure of the cooperative in selecting a dominant 
technology. One solution is to constrain the domain of projects subject to 
decision making so as to decrease heterogeneity across employees and thus 
diminish the degree of conflict. Alternatively, the redistributive policy could 
be restricted in the constitution of the cooperative. Therefore, employees 
would not try to manipulate the investment decision so as to favor their 
preferred redistribution scheme. This seems to confirm empirical evidence. 
Barzel and Sass (1990) show that projects whose total net value is positive 
but opinions are likely to be divided, will be excluded from the domain of 
voting by the developers of condominiums. Likewise Benham and Keefer 
(1991) state that the constitution of Mondragon cooperatives limits direct 
voting on controversial issues such as maximum dispersion in wages.
Another possibility is to change the allocation of control rights across 
employees. Since a superior technology is forgone whenever low productivity 
employees fear a low redistribution policy following investment, the allocation 
of more voting rights to high types would mitigate this underinvestment 
problem. If high types were identified with more senior employees who have 
accumulated more firm-specific skills to the firm over time, thus increasing 
their productivity, this ownership structure could then contribute to explain 
partnerships.
Finally, even under the assumption of a one-member-one-vote coopera­
tive, the voting rule that governs ownership reversion proves to be relevant 
for efficiency. If we consider a general cooperative in which the productivity
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of employees varies within a continuous interval, employees with lower pro­
ductivity will be more entrenched to power. This would implies that more 
inclusive voting rules would increase the likelihood of survival of inefficient 
constitutions. Davis (1998) argues that the one-member-one-vote governance 
rule in cooperatives contributes to the survival of the institution in coopera­
tive form. Here we argue that it is not only the assignment of votes but also 
the voting rule that is crucial for the survival of cooperatives.
Employee-owned enterprises should be mostly encouraged in sectors char­
acterized by homogenous employees and stable technological environments. 
In contrast, in volatile technological industries outside ownership should be 
actively promoted. The design of an appropriate standard statutory form 
and a complementary income tax schedule for corporate benefits are two po­
tential instruments that may favor the development of the desired ownership 
structure.
1.6.3 Related Literature
The vast traditional literature on cooperatives has focused on incentive prob­
lems arising from a restricted access to capital markets. Employees are by 
definition suppliers of labor to the firm. Therefore they may lack the wealth 
to buy enough capital to establish a firm.19 As a consequence, we would 
expect that industries which are capital intensive should be dominated by 
investor owned firms. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. There is no clear 
correlation between ownership structure and capital intensity.20. As Bonin, 
Jones and Putterm an (1993) argue, the effect on internal decision making 
(i.e. change in decisive coalitions) on new investments should be considered 
in the analysis of worker cooperatives. Also Barzel and Sass (1990) state 
that with heterogeneous preferences, voters’ interests may diverge, creating 
opportunities for majorities to capture wealth from minorities through ma­
jority voting. Here, we explain how the opportunity of holding power ex-port
19Borrowing may be unfeasible or excessively costly due to the high interest rate re­
quired as a way to compensate for the potential opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
employees with full control rights over the decisions of the firm.
20For instance, investment banking (with high capital requirements) has been domi­
nated until very recently by employee ownership, whereas restaurants are typically investor 
owned (Hansmann, 1996).
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(which in turn allows appropriation of wealth) may affect productive joint 
decisions.
The recent literature on ownership within the framework of incomplete 
contracts has emphasized the distortions on individual investment decisions 
arising under alternative organizational modes. Kremer (1999) and Bolton 
and Xu (1998) focus on the ex-ante inefficiencies arising in firms as a conse­
quence of poor private incentives to exert effort or to invest in firm-specific 
skills. This may be caused either by the anticipated redistribution of in­
dividual productivity in cooperatives or by the classical hold-up problem. 
Depending on which kind of investment (effort or specific skills) is relatively 
more productive, ownership will be granted to different participants in the 
firm. Likewise, Roberts and Van den Steen (1999) emphasize distortions in 
individual investment in both physical and human capital as the main de­
terminants in the composition of corporate control boards. Hart and Moore
(1998) emphasize the role of ownership in the ex-post efficiency of the firm. 
In their model, they analyze a consumer cooperative where the existence 
of asymmetric information across consumers prevents efficient renegotiation. 
Conflicts in decision making among heterogenous individuals may lead to 
distortions in investment. On the other hand outside owners, by targeting 
the marginal consumer instead of the mean consumer, may also choose an 
inefficient investment. However they do not allow for endogenous transfers 
ex-post which are in our chapter the origin of vested interests lying at the 
heart of inefficient collective choice. Alboeck and Schultz (1997), Barzel and 
Sass (1990) and Aghion and Bolton (1998) deal with the optimal allocation 
of votes and/or the voting rule conducive to minimizing the costs of deci­
sion making. In contrast to their analysis, we model inefficiencies as being 
driven by dynamic voting and show their persistence, despite the feasibility 
of constitutional change.
Within the dynamic voting literature, Besley and Coate (1998) and Roberts
(1999) show how the anticipation of future voting decisions by forward- 
looking individuals may lead the median voter not to choose his preferred 
policy conditional only on his current period’s preferences. Instead, the deci­
sion is optimal given the constraint generated by the democratic process and 
the transition rule for future states respectively. The first paper is applied to 
the inefficiencies arising in a representative democracy. When current politi-
54
cians cannot commit to future policy choices, efficient investments may be 
forgone whenever they change the preferences of policy makers in a way that 
may hurt the majority today. The second paper shows the dynamics of clubs 
where future club size is determined by the median voter today.
Finally, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) 
analyze how majority voting may lead citizens to disregard an efficient reform 
in order to keep the benefits generated by the status quo. However, they do 
not consider Pareto dominant decisions nor do they allow ex-post transfers 
to compensate losers from reform. In particular, there are two crucial dif­
ferences between Fernandez and Rodrik and our chapter. In their analysis, 
inefficiencies only arise because citizens should pay a cost up front, in order 
to enjoy the benefits of reform. Otherwise, a reform would always be under­
taken. Moreover, they do not allow for ex-post transfers among citizens to 
align interests towards reform. By contrast, in our model, there is no cost to 
be paid under a new technology. And it is precisely the existence of ex-post 
transfers among employees, via redistribution, which causes big inefficiencies 
to arise. In other words, it is this interaction between uncertainty and redis­
tribution through dynamic voting, that creates Pareto dominated outcomes. 
This is why in our model, in contrast with theirs, we can show the existence 
of a status quo bias within a static setting.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter explores the efficiency of employee and outside ownership with 
regard to technology choice. In an incomplete contract framework, decisions 
are undertaken by the firm’s owners. Once the technology is implemented, 
the firm decides how to distribute aggregate production. Employees are 
heterogeneous and decisions axe taken by majority voting.
The main contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, it shows 
that, institutional efficiency is contingent on the economic environment faced 
by the firm. This environment is defined in terms of two variables: the 
feasible technology set and, the degree of skills’ firm specificity. Although 
the technology set can be constrained so as to ensure efficiency, distortions 
typically arise, irrespective of the firm’s ownership structure. Outside-owned 
firms are shown to be relatively more biased towards polarized technologies
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than cooperatives. By contrast, cooperatives prove to be relatively more 
biased towards egalitarian technologies than outside-owned firms. This may 
reinforce the wage compression effect caused by redistribution in cooperatives 
which is acknowledged by the empirical literature.
Provided the current institution is inefficient, a cooperative may decide 
to transfer ownership to an efficient outsider. Yet we show that the feasibil­
ity of constitutional change will not restore efficiency despite the extent of 
inefficient behavior. This is due to the vested interests enjoyed at the selling 
stage by the winning coalition as a result of their decisive power to set both 
technology and redistribution under the current constitution. And this out­
come goes through for any bargaining power of employees vis-a-vis outsiders 
at the selling stage. This result may help to explain institutional inertia.
Second, we show that in a volatile environment, technological uncertainty 
may constitute a new source of inefficiency in cooperatives. Despite the as­
sumption of employees’ risk neutrality, the cooperative exhibits ‘political risk 
aversion’. This means that it may favor a dominated technology, whenever 
the decisive role of the current winning coalition in future voting outcomes 
is jeopardized under a dominant technology. However, constitutional change 
may now take place, provided inefficiencies are sufficiently large. Selling off 
the firm to outsiders can be regarded as an insurance policy that compensates 
employees for their potential loss in power under the new technology. Also, 
we predict a higher likelihood of constitutional change as employees are more 
mobile across firms. The reason being that the extent of vested interests gen­
erated by political power becomes insignificant as the scope for employees’ 
expropriation decreases. These predictions seem to corroborate the empiri­
cal anecdote provided by Hansmann (1996), and leads us to our third result. 
The degree of lock-in effects influences a firm’s ownership structure, through 
its effect on constitutional change.
There are at least two channels in which further research can be directed. 
First, the model can be extended to analyze labor allocation across firms 
in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Second, the initial constitution of 
the firm and the voting rule under employee ownership could be endogenized 
ex-ante. A possible way to proceed would be to introduce a probabilistic 
model to characterize the arrival of new technologies.
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Chapter 2
Sequential Voting in 
Cooperatives
2.1 Introduction
In a world of incomplete contracts, economic agents must rely on spot trans­
actions to realize gains from trade. It has been widely recognized in the lit­
erature that, when an agent fears expropriation from his trading partner, he 
may act inefficiently. This situation may induce two main types of inefficient 
behavior. The first inefficiency known as the hold-up problem includes dis­
tortions in relationship specific investments, thus leading to lower aggregate 
surplus. As the opportunity to invest arises before trading takes place, this 
type of behavior creates ex-ante inefficiencies (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
The second type of inefficiency refers to inefficient trading. Even if agents 
invest optimally ex-ante, the existence of asymmetric information at the trad­
ing stage may prevent agents from reaching an efficient decision ex-post, thus 
neglecting gains from trade (Hart and Moore, 1998).
In this chapter we consider both types of inefficiencies. In particular, we 
assume asymmetric information concerning the agent’s investment decision. 
This imperfection will typically lead to underinvestment as long as expro­
priation is expected in the future. Also, we assume the existence of private 
information at the trading stage that may generate inefficient trading de­
cisions. Whereas the first decision is taken individually by the agent, the 
second decision will be the outcome of a collective action taken jointly by all
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parties involved in the transaction.
We consider I  >  3 heterogeneous agents. As the payoff of an agent is 
contingent on his type, collective decision making requires the aggregation 
of individual preferences into a social preference relation. The aggregation 
mechanism that will be considered in this chapter is majority voting.
Also, the space of trading decisions will be formed by J  >  3 alterna­
tives. Hence a trading equilibrium may fail to exist, giving rise to instability 
or cycling whereby, for any trading decision, one can find some alternative 
that beats the previous alternative in a majority contest. The literature on 
social choice has provided different conditions to ensure the existence of an 
undominated outcome by majority voting. These conditions are essentially 
of two types. Either limitations on the preference types among voters or re­
strictions in the dimensionality of the alternative space. In particular, Gans 
and Smart (1996) show that single-crossing preferences in a one-dimensional 
feasible set is a sufficient condition for a majority voting equilibrium to ex­
ist. In this chapter however, we consider a two-dimensional space. The first 
dimension is given by a trading alternative, whereas the second dimension 
is defined by and expropriation rule. As we do not assume any prior weak 
ordering among pairs of alternatives, voters’ preferences are not restricted in 
any natural ordering.
More specifically, we define the economic agents as a group of employees 
forming part of a cooperative. The individual decision taken by each em­
ployee is how much effort to invest in the cooperative. The trading decision 
taken by majority voting is which productive technology to implement. Ex­
propriation, when favored by a majority of employees, will take the form of 
a linear sharing rule levied on employees’ individual productivity. Redistri­
bution will imply that the share from aggregate surplus accruing to a high 
type is lower than his contribution to the firm.
In a cooperative, employees play a double role. As owners they hold 
control rights to take all public decisions as the future unveils1. In particu­
lar, a one-member-one-vote cooperative will assign one control right to each 
employee and collective decisions will be taken by majority voting. Also,
1In the spirit of the incomplete contract literature initiated by Grossman and Hart 
(1986), future decisions cannot be contracted upon in advance and instead the owners of 
the physical assets hold control rights to decide.
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employees are characterized as workers and thus will decide individually how 
much effort to invest to increase productivity. The efficiency of a cooperative 
will therefore be determined by the technology implemented by the firm and 
by employees’ choice of effort.
The anticipation of expropriation may distort efficiency through two main 
channels. Directly, through its impact on effort choice. And indirectly, 
through its effect on technology choice. The first effect results from the 
existence of moral hazard that creates a friction to perfect contracting. More 
interestingly, consider the latter effect. Different technologies give rise to 
different expropriation schedules in equilibrium. The reason being that both 
the cost of expropriation, measured by employees’ underinvestment in effort 
as well as the benefit from expropriation, given by the difference between 
individual and average productivity, vary across technologies. The antici­
pation of different sharing rules under different technologies will affect the 
equilibrium outcome in technology choice and the reason is twofold. First, 
the sharing rule pins down employees’ individual productivity following effort 
optimization. Also, it defines the relative weight in the payoff function of an 
employee’s individual productivity relative to the firm’s aggregate produc­
tivity.
Moreover, an additional potential effect of collective decision making on 
efficiency will be considered, namely the impossibility to find an undominated 
alternative in a space with more than two alternatives and more than two 
preference types.
One of the main contributions of this chapter is to provide conditions that 
guarantee the existence of a majority voting equilibrium in a two-sequential 
voting game. In particular, we present a set of restrictions that lie on the 
characterization of the technology set. Yet these restrictions, by constrain­
ing the set of sharing rules that may arise in equilibrium, limit the extent 
of conflicts of interest among employees, leading to a transitive preference 
relation in technology choice.
Also we show that although expropriation may cause large inefficiencies 
in technology choice, a cooperative will always choose a Pareto efficient tech­
nology, defined in terms of the employees’ productivity functions. This result 
holds even when in equilibrium, a Pareto efficient technology may induce a 
more severe distortion in effort than alternative technologies. And even if the
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anticipated sharing rule following the Pareto efficient technology may lead to 
a decrease in an employee’s expected payoff.
Finally, we compare the direct effect caused by redistribution via employ­
ees’ underinvestment in effort with its indirect effect caused via distortion in 
technology choice. The direct effect, while always negative, is however lim­
ited by an upper bound. The reason is that it only arises when redistribution 
is positive in equilibrium. But in this case distortions are internalized by em­
ployees as their individual payoff is increasing in total surplus. By contrast, 
the indirect effect of redistribution is in principle ambiguous. It might de­
crease efficiency significantly, provided redistribution arises only under the 
inefficient project. But it can also increase efficiency as long as redistribution 
is anticipated under the efficient project.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In 
Section 3 we present the equilibrium outcomes with respect to both indi­
vidual and collective decisions. Section 4 discusses equilibrium existence in 
connection with the related literature. Section 5 analyzes the relative distor­
tion induced by redistribution on individual choice with respect to collective 
choice. Section 6 concludes and suggests an agenda for further research.
2.2 The model
Consider a firm defined by the assets required to implement a productive 
technology. The constitution of the firm assigns residual control rights to its 
employees. We consider a one-member-one-vote cooperative whereby each 
employee is endowed with one vote and corporate decisions are taken by 
majority voting. When the constitution is drawn at date 0, the set of feasible 
technologies is not yet revealed. Also, the complexity of the environment 
prevents employees from writing a date 0 contract by which decisions could 
be made contingent on the prevailing state of nature. Instead they can 
only commit to a constitution that will govern future decision making. As 
the future unveils, employees are confronted with two main decisions. As 
owners, they should decide which technology to implement and how to divide 
aggregate production. As workers, they should decide how much effort to 
exert in the firm. As effort is not verifiable, it will be optimally chosen 
by each employee to maximize his expected payoff. The efficiency of the
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cooperative is determined by both the technology implemented by the firm 
as well as by employees’ choice of effort.
Tim ing
We make two crucial assumptions that restrict the sequence of events. 
First, we assume that employees are unable to commit. As the implementa­
tion of a technology is irreversible in the short run whereas a redistributive 
rule can be reversed at no cost, only credible schedules can be implemented 
in equilibrium. Second, whereas a technology is defined as a long term in­
vestment and thus becomes a one time decision, effort is assumed to be a 
short term investment which is decided sequentially all throughout the life 
of the technology. This time structure puts an upper limit on the degree 
of expropriation that employees may suffer in a one period horizon. Should 
an employee be fully expropriated once effort is sunk, he would shirk in the 
future leading to suboptimal aggregate production. These two assumptions 
can be captured in the following time line.
At date 0 the constitution of a one-member-one-vote cooperative is de­
signed. Corporate decisions are governed by majority voting. The state of 
nature reveals a set of technologies J .
At date 1, employees vote on technology choice.
At date 2, employees vote on redistribution.
At date 3, each employee chooses a level of effort.
At date 4, surplus is distributed.
T he econom ic environm ent
Consider a set J  of technologies indexed by j  G {1,..., J}  that are avail­
able at date 1. Given technology j , the set of employees X  is indexed by 
i G {1 ,...,/} , where i denotes the employee’s productivity type.2 Individual 
productivity, denoted by 0, is not only a function of technology but also a 
function of effort e G E,  with E  being a compact set of positive reals. Hence
2There are two ways in which we can motivate this assumption. We might consider 
employees as being born with different abilities that are only productive under a partic­
ular technology. Alternatively, we migth regard the effect of technology on employees’ 
productivity as the result of corporate decisions; for instance, in an industrial firm, the 
introduction of a new production process will only rise the productivity of the employees 
assigned to the plant in which the technology is installed.
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technology j  € J  can be defined by a collection of productivity functions
(ej
(A l)  The following relation between productivity and effort holds:
(i) &i (0; j )  =  0 and,
(ii) >  0 a*d < 0
oe oe1
for i € X  and j  G J .
When the set of technologies J  is revealed, each employee privately learns 
his productivity type 0 j(e ;j). Also, the distribution of productivity types 
generated by each technology is common knowledge. We assume that the 
cooperative is large enough so that the ex-ante distribution of types is equiv­
alent to the ex-post realization of productivity types. Once the technology 
is implemented, productivity is revealed so that redistribution takes place 
under symmetric information.3
Given a particular technology j  E J , the marginal effect of effort on pro­
ductivity will typically differ across employees. Yet for tractability reasons, 
we assume two regularity conditions. First, for a given technology there 
is a natural ordering of employees so that the productivity function of an 
employee is a concave transformation of the productivity function of the pre­
vious employee. Also, we assume that for a given employee, the concavity of 
his productivity function is constant for all levels of effort. This assumption 
will allow us to characterize a technology in terms of the average concavity 
of employees’ productivity functions. More specifically:
(A2) Assume the following functional relation:
(.) w p j )  < w p j )
oe oe
mi ddK e''’t i  =  d9l ( e'\i)
[ ’ de2 de2
for all j  € J ;  e,e' e  E; i , l  e  1  such that i < I and all h € X4
3As the cooperative is large, free rinding precludes transfers at date 1 among employees; 
see Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). Hence inefficient outcomes might arise in equilibrium. 
We recognize that the application of mechanism design would help to reveal information 
at date 1, although screening at date 2 only takes place along the equilibrium technology.
4The following numerical example satisfies A1-A2:
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We assume that there is some friction that prevents employees from accru­
ing their marginal product in the spot market. As a consequence, employees 
may be subject to expropriation ex-post in the form of redistribution. How­
ever, there is an upper bound to the extent of expropriation that employees 
may suffer inside the firm. We have assumed a moral hazard approach, under 
which productivity depends on the unverifiable level of effort exerted by an 
employee. Under assumption 1, expropriation will induce underinvestment in 
effort due to free riding. This effect is equivalent to the classical application 
of redistributive income taxation and its impact on labor supply decisions in 
the public choice literature. As in the case of distortionary taxation, total 
expropriation will not generally desirable in order to induce positive effort.5
As a simplifying assumption, we restrict the redistribution policy to be 
linear. It can be regarded as a productivity tax denoted by s G [0,1].
D istribution o f payoffs
An employee’s payoff is determined by his individual share of aggregate 
production, net of his cost of effort.
Given the structure of the model, the preferences of an employee are 
defined with respect to three variables: his choice of effort which is privately 
decided, and two public variables, i.e. the technology implemented in the 
firm and the redistribution policy.
We do not restrict the correlation of employees’ types across technolo­
gies. This implies that the payoff of an employee depends crucially on the 
technology selected by the firm for two reasons. First, it defines his produc­
tivity type. Second, it pins down his realized productivity following effort 
optimization which depends on the equilibrium redistribution policy tha t is 
contingent upon technology choice. Following the linearity of the sharing
$ i  ( e ; j )  =  c t i e  — — with a* >  e for e  G E  and <  a i  for i  <  1 .
b  effect, = ai _ e md = _ L
o e  o e z
5An alternative motivation for limited expropriation is an outside wage interpretation. 
Suppose that, there exists a spot market for employees offering a reservation wage. Also, 
assume that, once the technology has been implemented, employees develop skills that are 
typically firm specific. Therefore, employees’ reservation wage will always be lower than 
their inside productivity. This model has been explored in chapter I.
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rule (complemented by a budget restriction), the payoff of employee i under 
project j  can be expressed as a convex combination of both his individual 
productivity and the technology’s mean productivity, weighted by the redis­
tributive rule and net of his cost of effort:
Ui (j, s, e) =  (1 -  s) 0i (e;j)  +  s ^ l=1^ e'j) -  e
We are concerned with the efficiency of the cooperative measured by its 
aggregate surplus as defined below:
D efin ition  1 Project k E J , is first-best or efficient when it maximizes 
total surplus, that is, when:
j
k = argmaXjcj  ^  (0* (e<; j )  -  e*)
i=  1
The first question that we address is whether a majority voting rule will 
ensure the existence of equilibrium in both technology choice and redistri­
bution. Second and provided that an equilibrium exists, we analyze the 
distortions in efficiency induced by redistribution. As efficiency depends on 
both the technology implemented by the firm as well as on employees’ choice 
of effort, we will compare the relative effect of redistribution on technology 
choice (indirect effect) with respect to its effect on employees’ choice of effort 
(direct effect).
2.3 Equilibrium Outcomes
Given the time line of the model, the equilibrium outcome of the game can be 
worked out backwards, solving first for the individual decision and thereafter 
for the voting decision.
2.3.1 Individual Choice
Employee i chooses effort in order to maximize his final payoff. At date 
3, both the investment project and the redistribution schedule axe publicly 
known.
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Therefore, the private decision of employee i is determined by the follow­
ing maximization problem:
Max^Ui (j, s, e{) = (1 -  s) 0* (e*; j )  +  _  g.
F.O.C.
[ l _ s (l _ i ) ] » i 2 )  = 1
As the cooperative is large enough:
dOijej'J) =  1
de 1 — s
By assumption 1, e* < e*, for 5 > 0 
d0‘ (e*’ i')
where — 1 . 1 ’—  =  1 defines the first-best level of effort e*. 
oe
Also, by assumption 2, e* (s ; j ) < e* (s ; j ) for i < I E X
The above equation shows effort as an implicit function of the sharing 
rule chosen by the cooperative. We can analyze the sensitivity of effort to 
changes in redistribution, by applying the implicit rule of differentiation. 
This analysis will be relevant to characterize employees’ voting behavior at 
the redistribution stage.
d9?(e i(s ; j ) ; j )de i  (s;j)  =  1
de2 ds (l -  5)2
Therefore,
9ei(s;j )  =  1 „
0s ft O') (1 -  s)2
dO2 fej j)
where Si (j) = —%~q !l— » denotes the concavity of employee i’s produc­
tivity function with respect to effort, given technology j .  By A2, Si (j ) is 
constant for any choice of effort.
Hence the effect of redistribution on effort depends on two values: the 
concavity of Oi(e;j) with respect to effort and, the initial value of s. In 
particular, the more concave 0* (e;j), the lower the effect of redistribution on 
effort. This is due to the larger effect on the marginal productivity function
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of a decrease in effort. As this marginal effect is partially internalized by 
each employee, as long as s <  1, he will choose a lower distortion on effort.
Also, the marginal effect of redistribution on effort increases with the 
value of the sharing rule. When s is higher, employees internalize to a lower 
extent changes in the marginal benefit of effort on productivity.
2.3.2 Public Choice
There are two possible interpretations to the sequential voting that takes 
place in the cooperative.
The first interpretation is the use of strategic voting at date 1. Before 
casting their votes, forward-looking employees anticipate future voting out­
comes. Employees may be better off voting for an inefficient project at the 
first stage in order to influence redistribution at the second stage.
The investment decision taken at date 1, could be alternatively regarded 
as the outcome of a multidimensional sincere voting process. Preferences for 
redistribution at date 2 would be embedded in the first period preferences for 
technology. We assume the former interpretation in the analysis that follows.
This dynamic voting problem boils down to a two stage voting process. 
Hence we solve backwards starting at date 2. At this date, employees vote 
on their preferred redistribution policy contingent on the project selected at 
date 1. At stage 1, forward-looking employees vote strategically anticipating 
the equilibrium redistribution policy at date 2.
V oting over R edistribution
The first question is whether a voting equilibrium exists on redistribution. 
We know from standard results that when voters’ preferences are single­
peaked, an equilibrium outcome always exists under majority voting. But 
when aggregate production changes with the redistributive scheme, single­
peakedness is not guaranteed. Gans and Smart (1996) provide a milder 
condition to guarantee the existence of equilibrium. In particular, they show 
that as long as the payoff function of employees is single-crossing with respect 
to the choice variable, i.e. s G [0,1], an equilibrium will exist. The following 
Lemma shows that our assumptions satisfy this condition.
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Lem m a 1 Given A1-A2, a majority voting equilibrium on redistribution 
exists.
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition is as follows. Given A1-A2, employees can be ordered ac­
cording to their optimal choice of effort. It turns out that an employee who 
chooses a higher level of effort is also a higher productivity type so that his 
realized productivity is larger. As this is true for any choice of effort, the 
ordering is invariant to the sharing rule chosen in equilibrium. Hence the 
Hierarchical Adherence Condition proposed by Roberts (1977) is satisfied. 
He shows that if the ordering of individuals’ choice of labor is the same ir­
respective of the tax policy adopted, an equilibrium exists for a linear tax 
schedule chosen by majority voting.6
Next, we determine which redistributive schedule will be selected in equi­
librium by the cooperative.
Employee i will vote for the redistribution policy that maximizes his ex­
pected utility Ui (j, s,ei) :
maxui  (j, s, ii) = (1 -  s) 9{ (e* ( s] j ) ; j )  +  _  g* (s; j )
S  1
-Oi (* (a; j) i i) + (1 -  a) + sf-i««w>*) +
l s r i d6i(el ( s ; j ) ; j )d e i ( s ; j )  d£i(s;j)  n 
1 1=1 de ds ds
By the envelop theorem, only the direct marginal effects of s on utility are 
relevant. Denote by 6 (e (s ; j ); j )  the mean productivity of the cooperative 
when each employee i exerts effort e* (s;j)  and technology j  is implemented. 
Then:
o (fi (a; j ); j )  -  Oi (h (a; j ); j )  =  - s )  Z'¥ i ^
From the individual optimization problem, the slope of the productivity 
function at the optimal choice of effort is constant across employees. That 
is:
6And in the case of a linear tax schedule, the Hierarchical Adherence Condition is 
equivalent to single-crossing, as shown by Gans and Smart (1996).
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dQjjej j s ; j ) ; j )  =  d6t (et ( s ; j ) ; j )  =  dO (e (s ] j ) ; j ) 
de de de
However, the sensitivity of effort to redistribution depends on the con­
cavity of the employee’s productivity function which, by A2, is different for 
each employee.
Therefore, for a large cooperative:
det {j)
0 (e (s; j ) ; j )  ~  Oi (s; j ) ; j )  = - s
d e ( e ( s ; j ) ; j ) ^ i  ds
de I
At employee i ’s preferred redistribution schedule, the marginal benefit 
of redistribution (given by the LHS and positive for low types) equals the 
marginal cost of redistribution (given by the RHS, i.e. employees’ underin­
vestment in effort). Note that whereas the marginal benefit of redistribution 
is decreasing in an employee’s individual productivity, the marginal cost of 
redistribution is the same for all employees. Given technology j ,  by A1-A2 
employees can be ordered according to their preferences for redistribution. 
As this ordering is preserved under any sharing rule, the redistributive policy 
preferred by the median type is a Condorcet winner.7
To solve for the equilibrium sharing rule, substitute:
9 0 ( e ( s ; j ) ; )  1
 We =  ( W j  a n d ’
dei (j) = ______ 1______
ds
Therefore, the equilibrium sharing rule is given by:
s* (j) — min <max 1
V |« 0')| ( 1 - - • ) * ' /
,1
I
7We assume that voting takes place by pairwise comparison of two linear schedules. 
The winner of this contest is confronted with a third candidate. It is straightforward to 
show that, the schedule that survives the last round is the redistributive rule preferred by 
the median productivity employee.
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where 6 (j) = denotes the average concavity of employees’ pro­
ductivity functions under technology j.
Note the endogenous relation between the choice of effort and redistribu­
tion. A low value for the sharing rule leads employees to a high choice of 
effort. By A2, a high choice of effort gives rise to a greater dispersion between 
the mean and the median productivity. But greater dispersion increases the 
benefit accruing to the median employee from redistribution thus leading him 
to choose a higher value for the sharing rule. Yet we can apply the fixed point 
theorem to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in redistribution.8
The determination of the equilibrium sharing rule, draws on two vari­
ables that characterize technology j: the concavity of employees’ productivity 
functions and its equilibrium average skewness. Provided the distribution is 
positively skewed, a more concave technology leads to higher redistribution. 
The reason is that the cost of redistribution in terms of effort distortion 
is lower as employees’ marginal benefit from increased effort will is higher 
leading to lower effort distortions.9 Second, a more positively skewed dis­
tribution induces higher redistribution. Whereas the marginal benefit from 
increased redistribution accruing to the median employee is higher the cost 
of redistribution remains the same.
V oting over Projects
Given the technology set J , employee i will cast his vote in favor of project 
k provided it maximizes his expected payoff:
k = arg m axu{ (j, s*, e* (s y j ))
We shall address two main issues. First, whether there is an equilibrium 
in technology choice under majority voting. The answer to this question is
8The fix point theorem can be applied given the characterization of the set 5  as a 
non-empty, compact and convex set. Also, the function /  : S  —► S  can be shown to be 
continuous from the linearity of the sharing rule in the payoff function. Hence there is a 
value s* such that s* =  f  (s*).
9In effect, if concavity increases so that |<5 (j?)| rises, should increase to maintain
2s* +  1
the equality. As ——■—— = ---------- j  > 0, then s* will be higher.
os  (1 -  s*)
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not straightforward with sequential voting and a number of projects J  >  3. 
Second and provided an equilibrium does exist, whether the technology is 
efficient.
(i) E x istence of E q u ilib riu m
Consider the following assumption:
(A3) The set of technologies J  can be ordered as follows: k > j ,  where 
j  is positively skewed and & is a mean preserving spread10 of technology j  
for all e € E.
In the analysis that follows we assume that A3 holds.11 Interestingly, 
A3 does not order the preferences of employees for technology choice and 
the reason is twofold. First, preferences are defined not only with respect 
to individual productivity but also in relation to redistribution. Second, 
even if the productivity type of an employee is higher under a technology 
his realized productivity as well as the firm’s aggregate productivity may be 
lower provided the distortions on effort are sufficiently high.
The fact that for the same level of effort, aggregate productivity is the 
same for all technologies has the following implication. The concavity of each 
employee’s productivity function is the same for all technologies. The next 
lemma states this result.
L em m a 2 For a technology set defined by A3, the sensitivity of an em­
ployee’s productivity to effort is the same across projects. That is:
m p j )  =  dei p k )  f o r a U i e I a n d j k e J
de de J J
P roof: See Appendix
This result has the following implication. As the marginal effect of effort 
in productivity is the same for all technologies, for the same sharing rule, an
10We define a mean preserving spread as follows. For a given a choice of effort, an em­
ployee whose productivity is lower than the mean productivity decreases his productivity. 
Similarly, an employee whose productivity is greater than the mean productivity rises his 
productivity.
n A3 implies that only technology j  satisfies AI (i). Otherwise, the definition of mean 
preserving spread would not hold for e =  0.
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employee’s choice of effort would be independent of technology choice. But 
the sharing rule is determined by the median employee. And his preferences 
depend both on the concavity and on the skewness of the technology. From 
Lemma 2, the individual concavity of each technology is the same, i.e. 8i (j) = 
6i (k ) for all i G I  and j ,  k £  J . Hence 8 (j) = 8  (k ) =  8. Yet the degree of 
skewness typically differs across technologies. As a result, both the sharing 
rule as well as employees’ level of effort will vary across technologies. W ithout 
further restrictions on the technology set, we cannot ensure the existence 
of an equilibrium in project choice. But an additional restriction on the 
concavity of the technology set with respect to effort is sufficient to guarantee 
the existence of a majority voting equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under A I -A3, an equilibrium in technology choice exists, 
provided the concavity of productivity with respect to effort is either too low 
or too high. That is:
8 < 8i or 8 > 8U
Proof: See Appendix
To understand Proposition 1, let us restrict attention to the voting be­
havior of a 3 member cooperative. Suppose that employees have to choose 
among three projects h , j  and k , tha t satisfy A3. That is, projects are or­
dered according to their degree of dispersion. It follows that the ordering of 
employees with respect to their productivity is invariant to project choice. 
This ordering defines a low, a median and a high productivity type. As 
h is positively skewed, the individual productivity of the median employee 
is decreasing with the dispersion of the technology. Also, the benefit from 
increased redistribution is greater under project k whereas the cost of redis­
tribution is the same across projects; therefore, si > Sj > s£.
As the median employee is decisive to set redistribution, it can be shown 
that his utility is maximum under project h and minimum under project 
k. Hence, a necessary condition for the intransitivity of social preferences 
is that the other two employees exhibit reverse preferences relative to the 
median type. In particular, both the low and the high type should prefer 
project k over project h. The productivity of a low type is relatively lower 
under project k given both the skewness of the project and the more severe 
underinvestment in effort. Yet he would be willing to favor project k as long 
as the increase in the equilibrium sharing rule under project k is high enough
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in relation to project j .  On the other hand, the productivity type of the high 
type is relatively higher under project k. Yet he will only vote for project k 
as long as the anticipated sharing rule is relatively low by comparison with 
project j .  And the reason is twofold. First, high redistribution may induce 
lower productivity through greater distortions in effort. Second, his residual 
claim on individual productivity is lower. As the sharing rule is pinned down 
by the concavity of employees’ productivity function, it can be shown that 
only for intermediate values of concavity the preferences of the low and the 
high type can be aligned. This implies that for extreme values of concavity, 
the social preference relation induced by majority voting will be transitive.
(ii) Efficiency
The first question to ask is whether a cooperative may forego a Pareto 
efficient technology driven by the conflicts of interest generated by dynamic 
voting. To address this question we constrain the feasible technology set 
according to the following definition.
D efin ition  2 A project j  defined by the distribution of productivity func­
tions (61 (e;j) , 0 2  (ejj )  > •••0/ (elj ))  is Pareto efficient i f  there is not another
project k £ J  with associated distribution (0i (e; k ) , 62 (e; k ) , ...0/ (e; k )) such
that for a given vector of efforts e € E, the following is true:
9i (e; k) > Qi (e;j) for all i = 1..../, and;
0i (e; k) > 6i (e;j) for some i G X
The answer is not obvious. The reason is that the preferences of em­
ployee i are determined not only by his individual productivity but also by 
the sharing rule anticipated in equilibrium. Moreover, his individual produc­
tivity under project k will be pinned down by the equilibrium choice of effort 
under project k. Lower effort following greater redistribution will lead to 
lower realized productivity. As both the optimal effort choice as well as the 
equilibrium sharing rule vary across technologies, employee i may be better 
off under a Pareto dominated project. Yet the following result shows that 
there will always exist a majority of employees favoring a Pareto efficient 
project.
P ro p o sitio n  2 Let {j*,Sj}be the equilibrium outcome of the two-stage 
sequential voting that takes place in the cooperative. Under A 1-A2, project 
j* is Pareto efficient
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Interestingly, proposition 2 holds for any correlation of employees’ produc­
tivity functions across projects. That is, irrespective of whether the ordering 
of employees in terms of their productivity is contingent or not on technology 
choice.
Although project k is Pareto efficient given e, the equilibrium choice 
of effort under project k and j  are typically different. Then it is possible 
that the productivity of employee i under project k might be lower than 
his productivity under project j .  Given the definition of Pareto efficiency, a 
necessary condition is that e* (sj; k) < This inequality may arise
for two reasons.
First, for a fixed sharing rule, when the marginal productivity of z’s pro­
ductivity function given project k and evaluated at e* (s*; j )  is lower than 
under project j .  Yet given A2, this condition would contradict the charac­
terization of A; as Pareto efficient.
To see why, fix eo small enough, i.e. eo < e. As k  is Pareto efficient, 
dOj (e0; k) dOi(e0;j)
de de
Consider e<j =  S  (s*; j ) .  By A2, the following relation holds:
dOi (eij-; k) d9i(e0;k) eirj d20i(e;k) d9i(e0;k) W IW ^  ^
“ a T “  = —gT~ +1  —d^~de =  —oT~ + Si {k) (eii ~eo)■
Likewise:
d9j (ejj'J) d9j(e0;j) y d20j(e;j) ^  d9j(e0;j)  _
de de I  de2 6 de eoheo
d9{ (eZj, A:) d9{ (c*j, j )
Given that 6i ( j ) , <5* (A:) < 0, fo r  —  to be satisfied, a
necessary condition is |<5i (A:)| > |<5i (j)|. But then for e sufficiently high, i.e. 
e »  M, 9i (e; k) < 0i (e;j), which contradicts the definition of A; as Pareto 
efficient.
Second, e< (sj; k) < e* ( s p j )  may hold when the equilibrium sharing rule 
under project k is higher than under project j .  In this case, an employee may 
prefer project j  for two reasons. First, because his realized productivity at the 
optimal choice of effort might be higher under project j .  Also because the ex­
tent of redistribution is larger under project k. To analyze the voting behav­
ior of the winning coalition at date 1, consider the preferences of the median
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employee under project k. He is by definition pivotal to set redistribution at 
date 2, had project k been implemented. We show next that he is always bet­
ter off under the Pareto efficient project. Let us suppose that he sets s*, =  s*. 
Given the definition of Pareto efficiency, um (A:, s*, emj) > um (j, s*, emj). If 
he prefers s* > s*, then um (k, emk) > um (A;, s*, emj). Putting the previ­
ous inequalities together we obtain the result.
The question is: will he be able to form a majority coalition in favor 
of his preferred project? The answer is positive. To see why consider the 
preferences of a low productivity employee under project k , given the sharing 
rule s*. From concavity and Pareto efficiency, it follows that:
Oi (etj; k) >_$i (ei:j;j)  and
9(ej;k) > 0(ej;j)
where e^ - =  ei (s*; k )
This implies that Ui (&, s*, e^-) > Ui (j, s*, % )
As s*k > s*, there is an additional cost generated by project k in terms of 
increased underinvestment in effort. Yet as m  is decisive in redistribution, 
this means that the benefit accruing to m  from a higher sharing rule is greater 
than the cost induced by lower incentives to exert effort. For i < m, the 
benefit of increased redistribution is higher than for m, whereas the cost is 
the same (in a large cooperative), therefore the payoff of i would increase with 
a higher redistributive schedule. Given that the sharing rule is linear in the 
payoff function, by continuity, (k , s£, e^) >  Ui (A;, sj, e^-) >  (j, s^e i j)  .
When s% > Sj, the date 1 winning coalition will be formed by all employ­
ees with weakly lower productivity than the median employee under project 
k, that is i G T  such that i < m. They will favor the efficient project de­
spite the additional inefficiency caused by increased underinvestment in effort 
generated by a higher equilibrium sharing rule.
On the other hand, when < s*, given concavity and Pareto efficiency, 
Oi ieik] k) > Oi (eij;j). Yet an employee may favor project j  as it allows for 
higher redistribution. However there will always be a winning coalition in 
favor of the efficient project. This coalition will be formed by all employ­
ees whose productivity under project k is weakly higher than the median 
employee’s productivity. More specifically, consider the preferences of high 
productivity employees under project k, that is i G X  such that i > m.
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Suppose that the equilibrium sharing rule under k was given by s*. From 
concavity and Pareto efficiency, it follows that:
0_i (eij- k) >Ji  (e'ij;j)  and
0(e j ’k) > 9 (ej; j )
This implies tha t (/c, s*, e*ij) > ui (j, s*, e^)
As i >  m, the cost of redistribution is the same but the benefit from 
a lower sharing rule is higher than for the median employee. Hence em­
ployee z’s payoff decreases with the value of the sharing rule. Given that the 
sharing rule is linear in the payoff function, by continuity, Ui (k, s£, e**) >
Ui (&, •
In short, there will always be a winning coalition at date 1 in favor of 
the Pareto efficient project. This coalition will be formed by i < m  (where 
this ordering is defined under project k) as long as >  s*. Otherwise, when 
si < Sj, the winning coalition will be formed by i > m.
2.4 Discussion on Equilibrium Existence
The existence of a Condorcet winner under majority voting has been explored 
by Roberts (1977), where voting is applied to the selection of a tax schedule. 
He proposes a hierarchical adherence condition that guarantees a transitive 
preference relation over tax policies. Hierarchical adherence is satisfied when 
individuals’ ordering in terms of their income is invariant to the tax policy 
adopted.
In principle, we might think that an equivalent condition applied to the 
ordering of employees according to their individual productivity would ensure 
a majority voting equilibrium in technology choice.
A revisited hierarchical adherence condition would imply that employees’s 
ordering after optimizing on effort choice holds irrespective of technology 
choice. Replace A2 by the following assumption:
(A 2 ’) 9i(ei;j) < 9i(ei;j) <=> 9i(ei;k) < 9i(fy;k) for alii,  I G I  and, all 
j , k e J
In Roberts (1977), hierarchical adherence is not only sufficient for the 
existence of equilibrium, but it also guarantees that the median voter theorem
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is satisfied. Yet, we shall see that A2 ’ is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the median voter theorem to hold in technology choice. More interestingly, 
it does not even guarantee the existence of a majority voting equilibrium in 
technology choice. The following examples illustrate such claim.
Exam ple 1: (A 2’) is not necessary for th e M V T  to  hold in tech­
nology choice
Consider a cooperative with three employees {i, m, 1} and with a technol­
ogy set given by J  = {j, k}. To simplify the analysis, assume that there are 
no effort distortions from redistribution.
As J  = 2, a date 1 equilibrium exists in technology choice. The median 
voter theorem could only be applied provided the median productivity em­
ployee m, is the same under both projects. Now assume that A2’ does not 
hold. This imply that the productivity ordering between i and I is reversed 
across projects. W ithout loss of generality assume tha t 0* (j) < 0i (j ) but 
6i (k ) > 6i (k ). From definition, m  is always decisive in redistribution at date 
2, irrespective of the technology. That is, the median voter theorem holds 
at date 2. The question is whether the median voter theorem also holds at 
date 1 . Suppose first that the median employee favors project k. We shall 
explore whether project k is always chosen in equilibrium.
Interestingly, m  will always form a winning coalition with i at date 1 
in favor of project k , irrespective of the redistributive policy chosen at date
2. If m  favors positive redistribution, {l ,m}  will win the vote at date 2. 
Alternatively if m  votes for no redistribution, { i ,m }  will join the winning 
coalition at date 2. Consider first the case whereby =  0. If > 0 => 
ui (j ) =  um (j) =  0 ( j ) . As si  =  0 and m  prefers project k then Ui(k) =  
Qi (k) > 6m (k) > 6 (k) = Ui ( j ) . Otherwise if = 0 => Ui (k) = 6i (k ) ^  
9m {k) > 9m (j) ^  Oi (j) =  U i( j ) . A similar analysis applies when > 0. In 
this latter case, m  will still form a date 1 winning coalition with i. Yet he 
will change coalition partners at date 2.
By symmetry, if m  prefers instead project j ,  the winning coalition at date 
1 will be formed by {/, m} and project j  will always be chosen by majority 
voting.
■
Notice that A2 ’ does not restrict the relative gain or loss of employees’ 
productivity across projects. As the voting behavior of an employee at date 1
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is determined by this productivity differential, is not surprising that assump­
tion 2  is not sufficient to ensure the decisive role of the median productivity 
employee. What is more surprising though, is that the median employee may 
be in the minority coalition at date 1 even if assumption 2  holds and for an 
overwhelming majority of employees, i.e. (I — 1 ), their individual produc­
tivity under the project favored by the median employee rises. The next 
example illustrates such a case.
Exam ple 2: (A 25) is not sufficient for the M V T  to  hold in tech­
nology choice
Consider a cooperative with seven employees {1,..., 7}. The firm has to 
decide whether to implement technology 0 or 1. In our notation J  =  {0,1} . 
The following table provides the productivity of each employee under each 
project, after optimizing in their effort level:
01 i 2
02 i 2
03 i 2
04 4 6
05 8 7
0 6 9 1 0
07 9 1 2
£ 0 33 41
Notice that the mean productivity of projects 0 and 1 is 0 (0) =  4.7 and 
9 (1 ) =  5.8 respectively.
As there are only two projects, we know that an equilibrium technology 
exists at date 1 . Given that the ordering of employees by their productivity 
is constant across projects, A2 ’ holds. Employee 4 is the median productivity 
employee and hence will be decisive to set redistribution irrespective of the 
project chosen at date 1 . However, he may not be able to form a majority 
at date 1. The reason being the change in the composition of the majority 
group at date 2 .
Note that to simplify the analysis, we have not provided the character­
ization of employees’ productivity functions. Though we assume implicitly 
that the difference in the optimal level of effort across projects is not very
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significant. Hence preferences for technology choice will not be driven by 
differences in cost of effort.
Let us start by the equilibrium at date 2. As O4 (0) < 6 (0) => s j >  0 ; 
however as 64 (1 ) > 0 (1 ) => sj =  0. If project 0 was chosen at date 1 , 
employee 4 would form a date 2  winning majority with low types. Similarly, 
if project 1 was chosen at date 1 , he would form a date 2  winning coalition 
with high types. But this change in the balance of power ex-post will prevent 
employee 4 from forming a winning majority for technology choice. Consider 
employees’ voting behavior at date 1 .
For Sq > 0.27 redistribution effects are more important than individual 
effects for low productivity employees (i < 4) since 1 +  s j3.7 > 2. Therefore, 
they will be willing to sacrifice their gain in individual productivity under 
project 1 in order to obtain positive redistribution under the status quo. To 
form a majority, they require at least one high type being better off under 
the status quo. Notice that employee 5 will accrue a higher payoff under the 
status quo for <  0.3; in effect, for this range of values 8  — sJ3.3 >  7. As a 
result, for redistribution policies s j E [0.27,0.3], the date 1 winning coalition 
will be formed by {1,2,3,5}. Not only will the median employee lose the 
vote at date 1 but also the cooperative will choose the inefficient project 0 .
The above argument brings to light the following comparative statics 
analysis. For higher sjj, the loss in efficiency induced by a change in the 
redistribution policy can be bigger. This is because the redistribution effect 
under the inefficient project becomes more significant. Similarly as N  rises 
(keeping the proportion between low and high types constant) the loss in 
efficiency can increase as the date 1 winning coalition formed by low types 
does not internalize the increase in high types’ productivity under the efficient 
project.
■
Now let consider the second part of our claim. It says that despite im­
posing an ordering of employees across projects, the existence of equilibrium 
in project selection is not guaranteed. The following example illustrates this 
result.
Exam ple 3: (A 2’) does not guarantee the existence o f equilib­
rium in technology choice
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Let consider a cooperative with three employees {1,2,3}. The firm de­
cides at date 1 which technology to implement from a set J  = {0,1,2}. The 
productivity of each employee under each technology, after optimizing on his 
effort level is depicted as follows:
0 1 2
01 1 2 1
02 4 8 7
03 2 0 9 12
E 0 25 19 20
It is easy to see that for al\ i, I G X  and all j , k  G J  with i < I : 0i(j)  <
Oi (j ) => 6i (k ) < Oi (k ) so that A2 ’ holds.
Notice that the equilibrium sharing rules are >  0, and =  0.
To simplify the analysis we shall maintain the implicit assumption dis­
cussed in Example 2 whereby technology choice is not driven by differences 
in cost of effort across projects. Hence, the final payoff of employee i under 
project j  is given by:
0 1 2  
U\ l+s$7.3 2 1
112 4-fsJ4.3 8  7
u3 20-SJ11.7 9 12
For Sq G (0.68,0.7), there exists an intransitive social preference relation 
of projects in the cooperative when decisions are taken by majority voting. 
Given the definition of sj, this condition is satisfied when the average con­
cavity of employees’ productivity functions under project 0  falls between the 
interval 8 (0) G [4.8,6.0]. In this case, employee 1 shows the preference rela­
tion 0 > i 1 £ 4  2, whereas employee 2 prefers 1 > 2  2 ^ 2  0 and employee 3’s 
preference ordering is 2  > 3  0  ^ 3  1 .
■
But, why is A2’s ordering condition not sufficient to ensure equilibrium in 
project selection? Because the preferences of employees are not determined 
solely on the basis of their individual productivity but also on the expected 
redistribution policy under each technology. That is, employees vote along 
two dimensions (j, s}) G J U  [0,1], with no prior weak ordering between the 
pairs (jf, s}) and (k, sjjl). We know from standard results that a majority vot­
ing equilibrium exists provided voters’ preferences are single-crossing after
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optimizing over private choices; in particular, the ideal point of the median 
productivity employee would be a preference induced equilibrium. However, 
when voting over more than one dimension arises, an outcome is stable under 
majority voting only if it is a median point in all dimensions. This require­
ment imposes very stringent conditions on the symmetry of preferences across 
individuals (Plott, 1967). Otherwise, existence is not guaranteed when em­
ployees vote over a set with two variables which does not form a chain, that 
is, which is not ordered. All employees weakly prefer more efficient projects, 
tha t is, projects with high mean productivity values 9 ( j ) . But they will typ­
ically exhibit conflicts of interest concerning the other two variables, that is, 
the distribution of individual productivity under each project and its degree 
of skewness. Ceteris paribus, an employee favors the project that maximizes 
his individual productivity. But the distribution of employees’ productivity 
may not be aligned across projects. In addition, low types prefer projects 
with high positive skewness (to increase redistribution), whereas high types 
prefer projects with negative skewness (to avoid redistribution).
Note that the extent of inefficiencies are emphasized by dynamic voting, 
as example 2 illustrates. The threat of a change in the balance of power 
in the cooperative following the adoption of a new project induces employ­
ees to forego a very efficient technology under which all employees except 
one increase their productivity whereas the loser only decreases slightly his 
productivity. Remarkably, this result goes through despite the feasibility of 
endogenous transfers across employees via redistribution.
Yet Proposition 2 provides a limit to the inefficient behavior that may be 
observed in the cooperative. Even if a cooperative may be very inefficient 
in terms of aggregate productivity it will never choose a Pareto dominated 
technology.
2.5 Redistribution and Efficiency
In this section we explore how the feasibility of redistribution may influ­
ence the efficiency of a cooperative. Given Al, positive redistribution always 
decreases the efficiency of a cooperative through underinvestment in effort. 
Also, by changing the composition of the winning coalition at date 1 , it may 
influence the efficiency of a cooperative through its impact on technology
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choice. Interestingly, this effect could lead to the choice of a more efficient 
technology. This is because redistribution allows to internalize aggregate 
production. In effect, when redistribution is not feasible, the voting behavior 
of an employee will be entirely determined by the ranking of his individual 
productivity across projects net of his cost of effort. By contrast, when redis­
tribution is feasible, his payoff will be determined by a convex combination 
between his individual productivity and the mean productivity of the project, 
weighted by the equilibrium sharing rule and net of his cost of effort. As a 
case in point that illustrates a positive effect of redistribution on technology 
choice, consider two technologies, such that under the first technology the 
productivity of employees is much higher than under the second tech­
nology, whereas the productivity of ^ ± 1  employees is slightly higher under 
the first technology. In the absence of redistribution, the cooperative would 
choose the first technology. Yet if redistribution was feasible and 0m < 0, the 
second technology would be selected in equilibrium.
In short, redistribution may influence the efficiency of the cooperative 
through two channels: (i) directly, via employees’ choice of effort, and (ii) 
indirectly, via employees’ choice of the technology. We shall next compare 
the relative size of these two effects on efficiency. By A1 redistribution always 
induces an inefficient choice of effort. Yet as we have seen in the previous 
example it may lead to efficient technology choice. 12 We define the direct 
and indirect effect of redistribution below.
D efinition 3 The D irect E ffec t (D E ) o f  red istribu tion  captures the change  
in  surp lus due to em ployees’ u n d er in ves tm en t in  effort. G iven  the equilibrium  
outcom e
d e  = Y 1 [“ * (*'*• sb  -  “ *' (?•  e«)]
where e*j is em ployee € s  op tim a l level o f  e ffo rt g iven  pro jec t j .
Alternatively,
D efinition 4. The Ind irec t E ffec t (IE ) o f  red istribu tion  captures the  
change in  surplus due to a change in  technology choice. G iven  the equilibrium
12This approach contrasts with Kremer (1999), where only effort underinvestment is 
considered.
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outcome { j* ,S j } :
I E  = ' £ [ u i ( f , e* j ) - u i (k\e*k)]
i€l
where k* is the equilibrium technology chosen in the absence of redistri­
bution.
Note that the total effect of redistribution on surplus is given by:
T E  =  I E  +  D E  = J2 h (•?*> 3) - (fc*> <k)\
i e i
Let us consider these two effects in turn.
2.5.1 Direct Effect
Consider the voting equilibrium where s* > 0. Given A l, positive
redistribution leads to underinvestment in effort. Yet there is an upper bound 
to the extent of direct distortions that may occur. The following lemma 
presents the result.
L em m a 3 The direct effect of redistribution on efficiency is limited by:
D E  <  (e« -  3 0
s ’
P roof: See Appendix
Consider the effect of a change in the equilibrium sharing rule on the 
upper limit of redistribution. When the equilibrium sharing rule increases, 
the upper bound on efficiency increases and the reason is twofold. First, 
the marginal benefit from an increase in effort around the equilibrium re­
distributive schedule is lower. Second, there is a greater underinvestment in 
effort.
Let us remind ourselves how the equilibrium sharing rule was determined. 
Remember from Section 2.3 that:
_ s *
0 ( e - , j ) - d m (em-,j) = -  1
6 (j*) ( 1 - 5 ; ) 3 •
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Hence both Eeij and s* are determined by the concavity of employees’ 
productivity function. When relative concavity is high, i.e. 8 (j *) is high, 
the equilibrium redistribution schedule is high. But as productivity is more 
sensitive to effort, employees internalize to a larger extent the benefit of 
increasing effort so that E (e* — e*) is low. Otherwise, when concavity is low, 
employees’s benefit from increased effort is low so that E (e* — ei) is high but 
the equilibrium sharing rule is low, thus constraining efficiency distortions.
The inefficiency created directly by redistribution is limited because it 
only arises when redistribution is positive. But it is precisely in this case 
when employees internalize total efficiency and therefore the negative effect 
of underinvestment in effort. This will contrast with the indirect effect of 
redistribution on efficiency tha t is analyzed next.
2.5.2 Indirect Effect
Consider the technology set J . Assume that redistribution is not feasible 
and that k* € J  wins the vote on a pairwise comparison among alternative 
projects. That is, k* is the equilibrium technology chosen by majority voting. 
On the other hand, suppose that {.7* ,^ }  is the voting equilibrium when 
redistribution is feasible.
Given that the indirect effect of redistribution neglects the distortion 
caused by underinvestment in effort, we measure the inefficiency caused by 
redistribution as the difference between total productivity under project k 
and total productivity under project j , where productivity is computed at 
employees’ optimal choice of effort, that is at e*k and e* respectively.
First note that there is not a general upper bound to the efficiency distor­
tion created by redistribution on technology choice. The reason is that the 
indirect effect depends on the relative efficiency of the neglected technologies 
included in the feasible set. Yet this negative effect on technology choice 
could be quite large. In particular, it may outweigh the efficiency loss caused 
by underinvestment in effort. The following example illustrates such a case.
Exam ple 4: The negative indirect effect o f redistribution out­
weighs its direct effect.
Consider a cooperative with five employees (1,..., 5}. The firm has to vote 
on whether to implement technology 0 or 1. The following table provides
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the distribution of employees’ productivity after optimizing in their effort 
choice. The ordering of employees in terms of their productivity is invariant 
to project choice.
0  1
1 0i Oi
2 $2 02
3 Os 0s +  2A
4 64 64 — 5 6
5 Os 6s +  3A
where A is arbitrarily large, namely A »  K  € R.
Note that employees’ mean productivity under project 0 and 1 is given 
by 6 and (0 +  A — 8) respectively.
Suppose that Os is just smaller than 0 so that =  e with e —> 0. This 
means that the direct distortion of redistribution on efficiency is negligible. 
But, could the indirect effect of redistribution be significant? We shall see 
that the answer is positive.
6 (O4 — O)
Assume that employee 4 slightly favors project 0; that is, 8 -----  —----- - —>
5
0 .
Note that employee 3 favors no redistribution under project 1 as 0 3 + 2 A > 
0 +  A — 8 given that 6s — 0. Hence sj =  0. This puts a lower limit to the 
value of 64 to ensure that the date 2  winning coalition under project 1 is 
formed by high types.
At date 1 there will be a majority coalition formed by employees 1 , 2  and 
4 voting for the inefficient project 0. The resulting efficiency loss will amount 
to 5 ((0  +  A -<5) - 0 )  = 5  ( A - 6) - * 5 A.
Inefficiencies may be arbitrarily large in technology choice whenever the 
efficient project is negatively skewed. The reason is that, in this case, the 
winning coalition does not internalize the size of the forgone project as its 
associated redistribution policy is zero.
Conversely, the following example shows the case of a cooperative where 
the indirect effect of redistribution on efficiency is not only beneficial but it 
also outweighs its negative effect via effort distortion.
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E xam ple  5: P ositive  n e t effect of re d is tr ib u tio n  on efficiency.
Characterize the technology set J  as follows. Given the optimal choice 
of effort e* and e*k:
6i (k ) =  j  for all i € X, with e —> 0
a / -\ f  0 i E S  (X) for i < ^  ... A/f „  . e
6i W  =  { K  i t S ( T )  otherwise wlth K  »  M  6  R  and for ^  
j  G J  such that j  ^  k*
In the absence of redistribution, technology k is selected by majority 
voting.
Now assume that redistribution is feasible.
Then, s*k = 0 as 0* (e**) =  0 (e*k)
However Sj > 0, as 6m ( e ^ )  < 9 (e*)
By continuity of productivity with respect to effort, there will be some 
s > 0  such that:
sS(e} {s-,j)) >  j .
As is preferred to s by the median productivity employee, it follows that 
in equilibrium: ( l -  sj) k-\-s*9 (ej (s*;j)) > s*9 (e, (s*; j ) )  > s9 (ej (s ; j )) > 
£
7
Therefore, project j  will be chosen even under unanimity.
Given that e —> 0, the following relation holds:
I E  = Eisi [Si (j; e ] ) - 0 i  (*; el)] =  Eiei (j;
E i€i  ^  (j; ei )  ~  Si ( j ) ; j))] =  d e
■
The previous example shows that redistribution while always causing a 
negative impact on efficiency via effort distortion, it may nevertheless rise 
aggregate efficiency as long as its indirect positive effect on technology is 
large enough. But is there a necessary condition for the indirect effect on 
technology to be positive? The following result provides the answer.
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L em m a 4 L e t be the equilibrium  outcom e o f  the tw o-stage se­
quentia l gam e tha t takes place in  the cooperative. A  necessary cond ition  fo r  
the ind irect effect o f  red istribu tion  on effic iency to be positive  is th a t Sj > 0.
P roof: See Appendix
The result implies tha t positive redistribution may lead to higher aggre­
gate efficiency. That is, a cooperative characterized by the equilibrium voting 
game{j*, s*} with Sj = 0  may be dominated in terms of efficiency by another 
cooperative where s* > 0 , even if redistribution generates effort distortions.
The above results lead to the following conclusion. Although the direct 
effect of redistribution on efficiency is negative, its size is constrained by an 
upper bound. The reason is that when redistribution is positive, employees’ 
payoff increases with total efficiency and hence all employees internalize the 
distortions induced by effort underinvestment. However, the indirect effect 
of redistribution on efficiency is unbounded. The reason is that it may arise 
when redistribution is zero under the efficient project and hence employees 
fail to internalize the efficiency gains foregone via technology choice. Yet, the 
indirect effect of redistribution on efficiency can be positive as long as the 
equilibrium sharing rule is positive under the efficient project. In this case, 
the feasibility of redistribution can even lead to an increase in the efficiency 
of a cooperative.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has analyzed distortions induced by dynamic voting on a firm’s 
efficiency where efficiency is determined by both a collective decision (technol­
ogy choice) and a collection of individual decisions (employees’ effort choice).
This analysis extends chapter I in two directions. First it generalizes the 
voting model to a general cooperative and a general economic environment. 
This generalization is carried out along two dimensions. In particular, it al­
lows for the existence of an unrestricted policy set containing more than two 
alternatives and also for an unrestricted number of voters, containing more 
than two types. As it has been widely recognized in the social choice liter­
ature, an equilibrium by majority voting may fail to exist in such a setting. 
Moreover, we cannot apply the results provided by the standard literature 
that focuses on the existence of equilibrium in one-dimensional models. This
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is because in our model, voters’ preferences are defined in relation to two 
voting decisions. Instead we propose a restriction on the technology set that, 
by decreasing conflicts of interest in redistribution, guarantees an equilibrium 
in technology choice.
Second, this chapter allows for a collection of individual investment deci­
sions represented by employees’ choice of effort. The introduction of moral 
hazard permits to compare the direct effect of redistribution on efficiency in 
the form of effort underinvestment (individual distortion), with its indirect 
effect in the form of inefficient technology choice (public distortion). We 
show that whereas the direct effect is always negative but bounded, the in­
direct effect can be negative and unbounded as it is defined in relation to 
the technology set. But it can also lead to increased efficiency, provided 
redistribution is positive under the efficient project.
By contrast, the property rights literature typically focuses on hold-up 
problems in the form of distortions in individual investment decisions, hence 
assuming efficient bargaining or otherwise, it considers efficient investment 
decisions allowing for inefficient trading outcomes. In this chapter however, 
we analyze both sources of inefficiencies. Also, we assume that collective de­
cisions are taken by majority voting as opposed to bargaining. This analysis 
is in line with Hart and Moore (1998), where they study ex-post inefficiencies 
in a cooperative where decisions are taken by majority voting. But in con­
trast with their paper, we allow for conflicts in decision making concerning 
redistribution as well as for individual investment decisions.
Alternatively, the literature on social choice generally considers conflicts 
in public decisions but assumes away individual decisions, e.g. the choice 
of a public project. Or it deals with distortions on individual decisions but 
excludes inefficient collective choice, e.g. the choice of distortionary taxation.
We conclude by suggesting several ways in which we can extend this anal­
ysis. First, we have denied employees to agree on a mechanism at date 0, 
whereby decisions could be made contingent on information arriving at date
1 . Although the efficacy of such a mechanism would be limited by the partic­
ipation constraint of employees and the existence of asymmetric information 
regarding employees’ productivity function, mechanism design would help 
to increase efficiency. Second, this model focuses on the effect of employee 
ownership on efficiency. Employees, by anticipating conflicts of interest in
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technology choice, could in principle sell off the firm to efficient investors and 
hence internalize increased efficiency via the selling price. Third, we have con­
sidered tha t collective decision making is implemented by majority voting. 
This choice rule turns out to be inefficient as it neglects the preferences of 
the minority. It would be interesting to consider alternative mechanisms that 
aggregate heterogenous preferences such as bargaining, although the analy­
sis would be more complicated given the existence of multiple players and 
asymmetric information.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two employees i , l  G T  such that i < I and s G (0,1]. From the 
optimization problem:
dOi (e^ j )  d0i(ei;j)  1
de de 1 — 5*
Given A2, this implies that:
A . Ae* < ei
Fix s* and apply A1-A2:
>. m  - /  sqsfl* < j  aga* < J  s^aa*.«
0 0 0
Given redistributive schedule s*, employees can be ordered in terms of 
their final productivity. As this ordering is invariant to s, it follows that 
employees’ preferences over feasible redistributive rules are single-crossing 
in (5 , >), where > denotes the ordering of employees’productivity after op­
timizing over effort. This allows us to apply the result provided by Gans 
and Smart (1996) that show that single-crossing is a sufficient condition to 
guarantee transitivity in the social preference ordering induced by majority 
voting.
2.7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider two projects j , k  G J .  By A3, \~^9i{e\j) =  ^20i(e;k)  for any 
e G E.  Consider two values e\, e2 G E  such that e\ < e2 - Plugging the values 
of 6i (e,2;j)  and 6i (e2 ; k) in terms of 0* (ei;j)  and Oi (e\, k) respectively:
E M e i - J )  +  E  J ^ ^ - d e  =  E M d ; * )  +  E  By A3,
this is equivalent to:
89
deei ei
Consider employee i and a value of effort e > e\. The following relation 
holds:
ei de2
dOj(e-J) _  d9i (e1;j )  ef <9fl?(e;j)  ^
de de J ~ " 6
By A2: 
er d 2Qi ( e ; j ) J
J  — ^ — d e  =  ^  u )  ( e  “  e i )
ei de2
Now substitute:
e2
f d9<(e'’j ) de =  /
ei
'^ » (e i; j )  
de
de
(e2 -  ei) +  <$i (j) -  di (j) ei (e2 -  ex)
de
dQj (ei; j)
de 2
Summing over all employees, we get the following expression:
(e2 - e i ) 2(e2 _  e i ) + E 5 j  U)
ei de de
-  ei (e2 -  ei)
As this relation holds for any e1} assume that e\ =  0 and e2 =  e. The 
above equality becomes:
f  ddi (e;j) d0i (0;j)  _  , . e2
Performing a similar analysis for a mean preserving spread project k :
, v - c / - \ e2 , v - c / , N e2E  5 ^ e + E^0)Y = E ge e + E 5i(fc)~de
As this relation holds for any e G E, 8i (j ) =  <5; (&) and
dQj (e; A;) 
de
d0i{e-J)
de
for all i G I
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2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
For simplicity, consider a cooperative with three employees and a set of tech­
nologies J .
A3 implies that the ranking of employees in terms of their productivity 
is constant across projects. That is, if we denote by X = {i, m, I}, then:
6i (e; j )  < 0m (e;j) < 9t (e;j) for any e G E  and any j  G J
Consider three projects h , j , k  G J  such that h < j  < k according to 
assumption 3.
As h is positively skewed 9m (e; h) < 9 (e;h).
Given the characterization of j  it must be the case that for the same level 
of effort e G E: 9m (e; h ) > 9m (e ; j ).
The productivity of all projects is the same for a fixed level of effort, 
namely 0 (e; h) =  9 (e; k).
Fix e =  emj where emj =  em
Given the definition of an employee’s payoff and the above inequality:
'U'm ( ^5  S j  j t ' r n j )  ^  (jS S j ,
But the equilibrium sharing rule differs across projects. Yet by Lemma 2, 
the sensitivity of productivity to effort is the same for all projects so that the 
cost of redistribution is irrespective of the technology. However the benefit 
to  m  from an increase in redistribution rises with the project index, so that 
s*h < s*. As m  is pivotal for redistribution:
{k'-t S ^ i & m h )  ^  'U'm ( h j  S j ,  C m j )
If we put the above inequalities together we infer that m  favors project h 
over project j . By applying the same argument we can show that h >m j  >m 
k.
We know from standard results that an intransitive preference relation in 
majority voting arises provided both i and I prefer project k over project h. 
This will be true as long as:
Ui (k,s*k,eik) >Ui (h,s*h,eih) and,
ui (k,s*k,eik) > u t (h,s*h1elh)
By expressing the above equations in terms of employees’ productivity:
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4  >
X
\\@ i (^zTij ^)] (&ih &ik)} “1“ $h {C-hi ^ )  @i {f'ihi ^ )]
9 (efc; k) -  6i (eik; A:)
Likewise:
{[fl (ezfc; fc) -  Oi (eih; fr)] +  (ej^ -  e^)} +  s*h [<% (eth; h) -  0 (e*; h)]
Oi (eifc; A;) -  9 (efc; A;)
A
From the definition of sj, the two above inequalities will be satisfied if 
and only if:
9 (e*, A:) 0m (em ,^ A:) < 1 < 9 (efc, A:) 0m (em ,^ A:)
M l - 4 ) 3
Renaming [0 (e*; A;) — 0m (emfc; A:)] (1 — s£)3 =  k , the above inequality can 
be expressed as:
«i = = < \e\ <  -k = |«.|
If productivity is either very sensitive or very insensitive to effort so that 
|tf| <  |^ f or |«| >  |<5U|, there is a transitive preference relation in technology 
choice induced by majority voting.
2.7.4 P roof of Lemma 3
Given project j, denote by ej = e .
For employee i, the direct effect on redistribution is given by:
[Oi (e?;i) -  Oi (5; j ) h ( 4  -  %) = /  -  1 ) d e <  /  f ^ ^ j )  -  1
\  /  6 |  \  
where the inequality follows from the concavity of the productivity func­
tion.
99i (ei ’ j )Notice tha t both brackets are positive as — -^7-^ —  > 1 given the equi- 
^  ae
librium condition =  — -—  and (e* — E) >  0 from concavity.de 1 -  s* K 1 J J
By substituting this value into the previous equation and summing up
across all employees, we obtain the result.
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2.7.5 Proof of Lemma 4
We will show this result by contradiction. Suppose that the indirect effect 
is positive and yet Sj = 0. Denote by k* the project that would be chosen 
in equilibrium in redistribution was unfeasible. For redistribution to influ­
ence technology choice it must be the case that s j >  0. This implies that 
0m (e*m;k) < 6 {e*;k).
As project k* is chosen in the absence of redistribution, this means that 
there is a majority of employees for which U{ (k , e* (k )) >  u, (j, e* ( j ) ) .
But project j * is chosen when redistribution is feasible, therefore for a 
majority of employees Ui (j, e* (j)) > Ui (k, s£, ei).
Consider the preferences of a low type i under project k*, that is i G 1  such 
that i < m. The fact that 0m (ej^; k) < 0 (e*; k) and that the cost of redistri­
bution in terms of effort distortions is the same for all employees whereas the 
benefit is higher for low types, implies that Ui (k , sj, e )^ >  Ui (k , e* (k )). And 
this inequality holds for at least A±! employees. Hence there is a majority 
of employees for whom:
ui 0 ‘> ei U)) > ui (k> sl^ ik )  >  ^  (fc, e* (k))
This means that it is not possible that k* was chosen by majority voting 
in the absence of redistribution.
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Chapter 3
Privatization in a Political 
Voting Game
3.1 Introduction
Public ownership has been regarded as a mechanism that facilitates the 
pursuit of political benefits to the government Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994). Consistent with this observation is the belief that privatization may 
increase economic efficiency by depolitizing the provision of goods and ser­
vices. Empirical support to this interpretation is provided by Lopez-de- 
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1995), where they analyze the privatization of 
local government services in the United States and show how state laws, by 
influencing the political benefits of in-house provision by counties, affect the 
likelihood of privatization. Implicit in this approach is the view that the 
government does not maximize social welfare but its own political agenda 
that includes the maintenance of political support by providing benefits to 
its electorate.
Yet if the preferences of the government follow this characterization, two 
natural questions arise. First, why will the government design an efficient pri­
vatization program while allowing corruption under public ownership? Sec­
ond, in the context of a regulated industry, why should the scope of control 
by the government decline following privatization?
Regarding the first question, there is a mixed evidence in the design 
of privatization schemes implemented following major privatizations in Eu­
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rope. On the one hand, there is evidence of a popular capitalism structure 
in which each investor has a small stake in the rents accruing to the com­
pany. This policy was followed in the privatization of natural monopolies in 
Britain. The spreading of ownership was achieved by general underpricing 
and by the imposition of restrictions in the number of shares acquired per 
capita. (Suleiman and Waterbury, 1990). On the other hand, in the main 
privatizations pursued in France, the government targeted at a stable core 
of institutional investors. Apart from trying to protect the newly private 
companies from hostile raids, the official justification of such a policy was 
the limited size of the french capital market. However, there was a oversub­
scription ex-post which partially undermines this argument.
Concerning the second question, it is not clear why the government can 
be restrained from subsidizing a privatized firm to keep up the pursuit of 
political objectives. This argument although recognized by Boycko, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994) is partially undermined in their analysis by the assumption 
that the political cost of foregone profits under state ownership is lower than 
the cost of subsidies awarded to private firms.
This chapter is concerned with the effect of a firm’s ownership structure 
on the efficiency of a natural monopoly. A natural monopoly is assumed to 
be heavily regulated by the government irrespective of its ownership struc­
ture. Whereas privatization of firms operating in a competitive sector is quite 
widely agreed upon, public companies are still well regarded when monopoly 
power or externalities induce a wedge between private and social objectives. 
Regulation imposes the constraint that ultimately, control rights are always 
exerted by the government. Yet different ownership structures, by allocat­
ing income rights differently, may change the preferences of the government 
towards regulation. In particular I focus the analysis of ownership on two 
extreme cases: private and public ownership. Under private ownership, two 
alternative distribution of shareholdings are considered, i.e. dispersed versus 
concentrated ownership. In the former, the company is privatized aiming 
at small shareholders that own a negligible fraction of the total capital of 
the firm, whereas in the latter the government targets at large institutional 
investors.
For ownership to influence efficiency, there must be some market imper­
fection and differences in the solution of this imperfection under alternative 
ownership structures. I introduce ex-ante asymmetric information about the
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action taken by the manager of the firm that in turn  influences the cost level 
of implementing a public project. Also, for ownership to be relevant it should 
be true that complete contracts are unfeasible. Otherwise, any organizational 
structure could be imposed through the design of a comprehensive contract 
and therefore ownership of physical assets would be irrelevant (Williamson, 
1985, Grossman and Hart, 1986). If the ownership of a company is going 
to matter, it must be due to the fact that complete contracts cannot be 
designed at the stage of privatization. The contract incompleteness of the 
model lies in the inability of the government to propose a regulatory schedule 
that maximizes total welfare. Instead, it will set regulation to maximize its 
own interests. In particular, it cannot commit not to appropriate the infor­
mational rents accruing to a public company (either for private consumption 
or to finance future elections).
Within the framework of incomplete contracts, there are several papers 
in the literature that have tried to explain the influence of ownership on the 
efficiency of an enterprise.
Schmidt (1996) regards privatization as a commitment device of the gov­
ernment to award some informational rents to the firm. The government 
wants to commit itself ex-ante not to become informed about the state of 
the nature which has occurred. It designs a subsidy scheme contingent on the 
state announced, offering an inefficiently low production level if high costs are 
reported, in order to limit the informational rents accrued by the firm in the 
good state of the world. While it reduces allocative efficiency (the amount of 
production turns out to be too low when a bad state of the nature realizes), 
it may enhance productive efficiency. The manager has more incentives to 
increase his effort, assuming that his utility depends on the production level, 
and therefore reduces the possibility that a bad state of the nature occurs, 
considering that this probability depends on the effort invested by the man­
ager. This mechanism can not be replicated in a nationalized firm since the 
government now has access to the information concerning the realized state 
of the nature and then, it cannot credibly threaten to reduce production 
ex-ante so as to increase managerial incentives to work hard. As a result, 
the government imposes a soft-budget constraint in a public company and, 
conversely, a hard-budget constraint in a privatized company.
However this model relies heavily on the manager accruing private bene­
fits from a high production level; furthermore, the government is assumed to
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be benevolent and social welfare maximizer which is not very realistic in a 
political environment. The key assumption in his model is that ownership of 
physical assets gives access to private information. But even though it is true 
that it increases the incentives to collect more information, managers of pub­
lic companies could collude with their employees to protect the informational 
rents of the company when it enjoys a favorable state of nature, and therefore 
may choose not to disclose this private information to the government.
I propose instead the basic framework suggested by Laffont (1996), where 
there is a heterogeneous population of consumers who extract different sur­
plus from the project. At the initial stage there is a democratic election 
that selects a government which acts to maximize the welfare of its elec­
torate. The government regulates a natural monopoly by offering a subsidy 
to the firm. The efficiency of the firm is defined by the cost to implement 
the project that depends on two variables. The state of nature and the in­
vestment of the manager in cost reduction. Investment is non-verifiable but 
will be determined by the transfer received from the government. In contrast 
with Laffont (1996), I consider two alternative informational settings. First 
the existence of hidden information regarding the state of nature that has 
realized. The optimal transfer will be contingent on the state reported by the 
manager of the firm. Second, the existence of moral hazard. The investment 
of the manager influences the distribution function of the cost realization. 
The optimal transfer will be contingent on the observed realization of the 
cost.
When the economy begins, the firm is under public ownership. Depart­
ing from Laffont’s analysis, I allow the government to privatize the firm by 
targeting at either a dispersed population of prospective owners (dispersed 
ownership) or by aiming at big institutional investors (concentrated owner­
ship). Under concentrated ownership, each investor, accounting for a signifi­
cant fraction of the firm’s income rights, may decide to coordinate his actions 
with the other investors and lobby with the government in exchange for a 
favorable regulatory schedule. The aim of the chapter is to analyze which 
ownership structure minimizes the inefficiencies caused ex-ante by asymmet­
ric information.
It is worth to emphasize that the same informational structure is assumed 
under both ownership structures. Underlying this assumption is the belief 
that the access to private information over the state of nature that has real­
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ized, is determined not so much by the ownership of the firm but rather by 
the transparency of the government or the regulatory body. The remainder 
of the chapter is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 
2, where imperfections to complete contracting between the government and 
the firm are based on hidden information. The section analyzes the efficiency 
a of natural monopoly under public ownership and allows the government to 
privatize the firm. It then analyzes the efficiency implications of dispersed 
and concentrated ownership. A parallel analysis is performed in Section 3 
in a setting of moral hazard. Results prove to be robust to the informa­
tional specifications of the model. The section concludes with a discussion 
of the similarities between both approaches. Finally, Section 4 contains the 
concluding remarks and suggests a research agenda.
3.2 The m odel
The basic structure of the model is based on Laffont (1996). Consider a 
firm defined by the assets required to implement an indivisible project. This 
project is defined as a natural monopoly and will therefore be regulated by the 
government irrespective of the ownership structure of the firm. In the spirit of 
the incomplete contracts literature -Grossman and Hart (1986)-, we assume 
that it is not feasible to write down a complete contract whereby regulation is 
contingent on all possible states of nature. Instead the government will hold 
control rights in the provision of the regulatory scheme as the future unfolds. 
Regulation takes the form of a transfer of funds to the manager of the firm in 
order to cover the cost of implementing the project. The cost of the project, 
C, is determined by the prevailing state of nature /3, and the effort exerted 
by the manager e. In particular, we assume the following simple linear form:
C = { 3 - e
with (3 £ {A/?}- Let /? denote the good state of nature with prob­
ability v = Pr (/? =  /?) and (3 the bad state of nature with probability 
(1 — v) =  Pr (/? =  /?). Also, let e £ R + represent the level of effort spent by 
the manager in cost reduction. Managerial effort creates a disutility to the 
manager given by 4/ (e) in monetary units, with (e) >  0 and (e) >  0. 
Although the cost level is public knowledge ex-post, the state of nature is
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privately observed by the manager and the choice of effort cannot be verified. 
Therefore, the government cannot infer whether a high cost realization is the 
result of a bad state of nature or the outcome of the manager’s low level of 
effort.
The government would try to elicit high effort from the manager of the 
firm, by offering a transfer conditional on the cost which is observed ex-post. 
However, given the existence of private information over the state of the 
world that has realized, together with the fact that effort is costly and non 
verifiable, implies that the manager has always an incentive to report that 
a bad state of nature has occurred. To induce tru th  telling, the government 
shall offer incentives to the manager to reveal the tru th  when the good state 
realizes. By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to a mechanism 
whereby transfers are made contingent on the state of nature announced by 
the manager. In equilibrium:
t(/3) = { t ( 0 ) , t ( 0 ) }
This mechanism induces truth-telling at the expense of awarding positive 
informational rents to the firm when the good state of nature is reported. 
Informational rents are increasing on the level of effort induced to the ineffi­
cient type. That is,
$  (e) =  $  (e) -  ^  (e -  A/3)
Therefore the utility of the manager from implementing the project is 
given by:
JZ =  $ (e )  v = Ft (/?)
U = 0 1 — v =  Pr (/?)
That is, the utility of the inefficient type is always zero.1 The transfer 
offered by the government just covers the cost to implement the project. 
However, it will be positive for the efficient type so that he has incentives to 
reveal the truth.
1Both the incentive compatibility constraint of the efficient type and the individual 
rationality constraint of the inefficient type bind in equilibrium:
(IC)J: t - t f  (e) =  t  — (e — A/3)
(IR)*: t - t f ( e ) = 0
Then U =  $  (e) =  (e) -  (e -  A/3)
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When the economy begins at date 0 there are two type of consumers, type
1 and type 2, defined with respect to the level of surplus that they extract 
from consuming the project. Type 1 extracts Si whereas type 2 extracts 
S2 with S 2 > S\. There is an exogenous fraction a  of type 1 citizens (and 
therefore (1 — a) of type 2 consumers). We assume that a  > Type 1 is in 
the majority and will select a government which represents his own interests.
Citizens derive a benefit from project consumption but suffer a disutility 
from paying taxes. Taxation is imposed by the government to finance the 
transfer granted to the firm in order to implement the project. We assume 
that the government can discriminate in taxation between type 1 and type
2 consumers. Let denote by t\  and £2 the tax received by the government 
from type 1 and type 2 respectively. There are several ways in which we 
can motivate this assumption. Consider for instance a world in which type 
1 owns mainly labor whereas type 2 owns mainly capital. Discrimination 
will occur as long as the tax burden levied upon labor and capital differ. 
However, taxation is distortionary. One unit of funds collected via taxation 
has an associated cost of A units. The net payoff of consumer of type i is 
determined by:
Vi = Si -  (1 -  A) U
The company receives a transfer2 from the government financed via tax­
ation:
t =  at 1 +  (1 — a) t2
The timing of events is as follows:
The economy begins at date 0 with the existence of a natural monopoly, a 
public project and the realization of a random variable a. 6 [0,1] that divides 
the population of citizens into two types, i.e. type 1 and type 2. We assume 
that type 1 is in majority so that a  >
The manager of the firm observes the state of nature that determines, 
together with his effort in cost reduction, the cost to implement the project.
A government is selected by the population of consumers using a majority 
voting rule. Each consumer casts his vote in favor of the candidate who
2 A straightforward example of the regulatory intervention of the government is to 
grant funds to the firm; but the interpretation can be enlarged to take into account other 
alterations of the economic environment of the regulated firm: revision of price cap, change 
of competition policy...(Faure-Grimaud, 1997).
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maximizes his expected payoff, that is, who minimizes his anticipated tax 
burden.
The government pursues its own interest, namely the maximization of 
his probability of reelection. W ith this purpose in mind, it regulates the 
public project by offering a contingent transfer to the manager of the firm, 
{- {§) »^  (@)} • ^his t rans e^r is collected via differential taxation levied upon 
both the electorate and the opposing citizens. As a  ^  2’ the elected gov­
ernment maximizes the welfare of type 1 consumers by expropriating type 2 
consumers.
The manager reports the state of nature and chooses a level of effort to 
maximize his own utility.
Finally, the collection of taxes and the payment of subsidy take place.
First, we will analyze the effect of asymmetric information on the effi­
ciency of the firm, when the government is self-interested. Here we depart 
from the analysis of Laffont (1996) by considering the possibility of tax dis­
crimination. Also, we move a step backwards and allow the government to 
change the ownership structure of the firm. As a public project is always 
regulated by the government, a transfer of ownership will not compel the 
government to relinquish its control rights over the allocation of the sub­
sidy. However, it may change its preferences over the optimal transfer of 
funds. If the government decides to give out the firm’s income stream to pri­
vate investors, it may choose between two alternative ownership structures, 
namely between concentrated and dispersed ownership. To achieve concen­
trated ownership, the government will target at institutional investors. As 
each investor receives a big fraction of the rents accruing to the firm, they will 
be able to overcome free riding problems to organize themselves as a lobby. 
This lobby may offer a monetary contribution to the government in exchange 
for a favorable regulatory outcome. Under dispersed ownership, we assume 
that the firm’s stakeholdings are distributed uniformly among consumers. As 
each consumer accrues only a negligible fraction of the firm’s rents, citizens 
are assumed to be unable to form a pressure group.
The purpose of the chapter is to analyze which ownership structure will 
be observed in equilibrium and which efficiency distortions will be gener­
ated by the presence of asymmetric information in the regulated firm. It is
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important to emphasize that private information prevails despite the own­
ership structure of the firm. Also we assume away any conflict of interest 
between the shareholders of the firm and the manager. That is, we consider 
that the rents generated by the existence of private information accrue to 
the shareholders of the firm via dividends. Before analyzing the decision on 
privatization, we analyze the efficiency of the firm under public ownership.
3.2.1 Public Ownership
The government will choose a system of transfers to maximize the social 
welfare of type 1 consumers, that is, their surplus extracted from consumption 
minus the cost of taxation. Also, the government, as the owner of the firm, 
will perceive the informational rents derived from the existence of private 
information. In fact, it cannot credibly commit not to appropriate such 
rents for its own interest, either for future consumption or to finance future 
electoral campaigns. When choosing the system of transfers, the government 
faces two sets of constraints. First, the incentive compatibility constraint of 
the manager to induce tru th  telling when the good state of nature realizes. 
Second, the participation constraint of type 2 of consumers. Their net surplus 
should be weakly positive in order to encourage them to participate in the 
political system.
The decision problem of the government boils down to the following max­
imization problem:
M ax^e}  {<*Si — (1 -I- A) a \ytY +  (1 — v) ti] +  vU_}
s.t.
U > $ ( e )
S2 ~  (1 +  A) £2 ^  0
5*2 ~  (1 +  A) ^2 0
where:
c^ t.i T  ( l  — o) t.2 =  ft — c T  'k (e) -f- U
a ti +  (1 — a) t 2 =  P — e +  (e)
Note that the level of taxes levied upon type 2 consumers is the same 
irrespective of the state of nature and hence regardless of the cost to im­
plementing the project. The government will simply expropriate the surplus
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enjoyed by type 2 consumers which is the same across states and, will set the 
tax level on type 1 consumers to cover the cost of the project. In particular:
S2t2 = to = t2 = — ——~2 1 +  A
The level of effort exerted by the manager of the firm is defined by:
'I'' (e1) =  1 => e1 = e*
W  ( ? )  =  1 -  ( e 1 )
=* e1 < e*
where the last inequality follows from (e) >  0 and \I/// (e) >  0. In 
fact, the characterization of (e) as an increasing function is based on the 
convexity of (e).
There is a suboptimal effort applied by the manager of the low type. This 
is due to the fact that an increase in the level of effort of the bad type rises 
the amount of informational rents accrued by the high type (See Laffont 
and Tirole, 1991). As taxes are costly to consumers in terms of taxation, 
the government faces the following trade-off. If it induces a higher effort 
provided the bad state of the world is reported and this happens to be the 
case, the efficiency of the firm will be enhanced. If instead, the good state 
of nature realizes, the government will have to pay out higher informational 
rents to the manager in order to induce him to reveal the truth. Depending 
on which state is more likely to arise, the optimal level of effort will be 
set to minimize the expected taxation levied on type 1 consumers. As the 
government accrues all the informational rents and can impose a differential 
taxation to type 2 consumers, the optimal transfer scheme offered by a self- 
interested government will be the same as if the government was benevolent 
and tried to maximize the welfare of the whole population. That is, the 
effort induced in the bad state of nature does not depend on the fraction of 
its electorate.
3.2.2 Private Ownership
The government may decide to privatize the firm aiming at a dispersed pop­
ulation of consumers. In such a case, it has two options. First, it may decide 
to aim at type 1 consumers. It may achieve this outcome by offering favor­
able conditions for the acquisition of shares. Informational rents would then
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accrue to its electorate. As the government maximizes the welfare of type 1 
citizens to stay in power, it will offer the same regulatory scheme as in the 
case of a public ownership. Consequently, the level of efficiency of a regulated 
but privately held firm will be the same as the efficiency of a publicly owned 
firm. Alternatively, the government may target a dispersed population of 
type 2 consumers, by spreading ownership holdings across consumers. The 
benefit of this privatization pattern would be to allow the government to 
levy a higher burden of taxation upon type 2 consumers and hence decrease 
taxation levied upon its electorate. The objective function of the government 
would be the following:
M a x^e}  {aSi — (1 +  A) a  \ytx +  (1 -  v) ti] } 
s.t. 
U><S>(e)
S2 — (1 +  A) t2 4-  ^~  a  — ®
S 2 ~  (1 4- A) £2 ^  0 
Again:
a t x 4- (1 — a ) t 2 = §_ — e +  ^ (e )  +  C/ 
a t i  +  (1 — a) t 2 =  (5 — e +  ^  (e)
Now the tax burden suffered by type 2 consumers is higher when the good 
state of nature realizes. In particular:
So
h  = 1 +  A 
and,
 ^ 1 — a
h ~  1 + A
The first order conditions determine the optimal level of effort chosen by 
the manager:
9 '  (e2) =  l = > e 2 =  e*
V  (e2) =  1 -  ( e 2)
=> e2 =  e1 < e*
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Note that the same regulatory outcome prevails under private ownership 
even if it is type 2 consumer that holds stakes in the newly privatized firm. 
This is due to the existence of tax  discrimination. In principle, the govern­
ment tries to minimize the extent of informational rents awarded to the firm 
as they fall outside its electorate and however are costly in terms of taxation. 
Yet, tax discrimination allows to impose the cost generated by informational 
rents on type 2 consumers, by increasing their tax  burden when the good 
state of nature realizes. This in turn decreases the level of taxation imposed 
on type 1 consumers. The government, despite being self-interested offers 
the same regulatory outcome as if it was a benevolent government, that is, 
as if it maximized the total welfare of the population. The only difference 
lies on the distribution of taxes, being type 2 consumers responsible for the 
payment of a higher per-capita proportion of the cost, not only because their 
final surplus is reduced to zero, but also because they extract a higher surplus 
from consuming the project.
3.2.3 Concentrated Ownership
The government may decide to privatize the firm targeting at a stable core of 
institutional investors. Given that the surplus enjoyed by type 2 consumers 
is higher than the benefit derived by type 1, we assume that the optimal auc­
tion would assign the firm to a concentrated group of type 2 investors. We 
also consider that institutional investors decide to coordinate their actions 
and constitute themselves as a lobby. They will offer a contingent monetary 
contribution to the government to influence the government’s regulatory pol­
icy.
Denote by U (e, C) the utility of the lobby, where e denotes the level 
of effort induced by the regulation schedule and C  denotes the contingent 
contribution offered to the manager. Likewise, denote by G (e, C) the utility 
of the government. The lobby’s payoff is decreasing in the contribution of 
its members where the government’s payoff is increasing in the contribution 
received from the lobby.
To simplify the analysis, assume that both the lobby and the government 
have quasi-linear preferences in contributions. That is:
U [e,C ) = V { e ) - C
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and,
G (e,C ) = a W {e) + C
where a € [0,1] parameterizes the weight attached to the welfare of the 
electorate vis-a-vis the collection of monetary contributions. For instance, if 
the electorate constitutes a narrow majority, i.e. a  ~  the government may 
find it more compelling to receive contributions in order to finance future 
electoral campaigns and hence swing votes from indecisive voters.
In the spirit of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the lobbying game can be 
modeled in a two-stage game. In the first stage, the lobby offers a contingent 
contribution schedule, anticipating the response of the governmental policy. 
In the second stage, the government chooses an effort vector optimally, given 
the contribution schedule offered by the lobby.
An equilibrium of this problem consists of a contribution C° (e) and a 
vector of effort e° such that:
C ° e C  
e° =  arg max G (e, C° (e))
G (e°, C°) = maxg G (e, 0)
There are multiple equilibria of this two-stage game. To restrict the set 
of equilibria, we apply the concept of Truthful Nash equilibrium as proposed 
by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). This concept can be interpreted as fol­
lows. Consider the regulatory scheme provided by the government as a public 
good. The organized group of investors would purchase an efficient quantity 
of the good at the marginal cost of influencing the existing level of provision 
by the government. Given the presence of just one organized group, it be­
comes pivotal in the public decision and hence lobbying can be regarded as 
a demand-revealing process whereby the contribution reflects the degree of 
influence over the quantity of the good offered by the government. W hat is 
required to pay is the difference between the gains to institutional investors 
in the form of informational rents and the losses to the electorate in the form 
of increased taxation. In general, as the transfer scheme is costly and lies in 
a continuum, the quantity that a lobby is willing to pay is its marginal valu­
ation of the subsidy net of the marginal increase in taxes. In this particular 
case, as the government cannot discriminate in taxation between institutional 
investors and the remaining type 2 consumers, the marginal effect of increas­
ing the subsidy on the amount of taxes is zero. As a consequence, not only
106
the level of taxes is constant irrespective of the transfer scheme offered by 
the government but also it is the same regardless of the state of nature.
When we require the optimal contribution to form a locally truthful Nash 
equilibrium, it can be defined as follows:
dU (e°,C °  (e°))
9C° (e») de '
de dU  (e°, C° (e°))
dC
In words, the marginal product of an increase of effort around the op­
timum should equal the ratio of marginal rates of substitution between the 
increase in utility due to an increase in effort and the decrease in utility due 
to a higher contribution.
Extending the concept to global truthfulness, the payment offered by the 
lobby equals the amount in the increase in welfare enjoyed by a change in 
the transfer scheme elicited from the government. In particular:
CT (e°, u°) =  max (0, C  (e, u°)) foralle  € R.
where C  (e,u°) is defined as U (e,C  (e, u°)) =  u° for all e £ R.
By substituting the equilibrium contribution into the objective function 
of the government, the optimal level of effort induced to the manager of the 
firm will be defined by:
e° =  arg max aW  (e) -I- V  (e)
That is, the objective function of the government becomes a linear func­
tion of the utility of its electorate and the monetary contribution offered
by the organized group of investors. Therefore, the government chooses a 
system of transfers that maximizes a weighted sum of the welfare of type 1 
citizens and the fraction of type 2 investors that form the lobby.
The new maximization problem of the government becomes:
MCLXe eCL { a ^ i — (1 +  A) OL [vtj +  (1 — v) tij  } +
+  {(1 — a) 6 (S2 — (1 +  A) a [vt2 +  (1 ~  v ) *2] +  vU )}
s.t.
U > $ ( e )  
$2 ~  (1 T  A) t2 > 0  
S2 — (1 ■+* A) £2 ^ 0
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It is important to emphasize that the taxation levied upon type 2 when 
the good state of nature realizes cannot account for the informational rents 
accruing to the firm as the government cannot discriminate between institu­
tional investors and the remaining type 2 citizens. This assumption can be 
motivated by institutional constraints or by the existence of private infor­
mation on the identity of the investors. This assumption imposes an upper 
bound on the maximum level of taxes that can be levied on type 2 consumers. 
This constraint may become binding for type 2 consumers that do not hold 
shares in the newly privatized firm but will be slack for institutional investors. 
By definition of concentrated ownership, institutional investors account for 
a small fraction 6 of type 2 citizens.
Depending on the parameters of the model we can distinguish two cases, 
that are analyzed in turn in the following discussion.
H ighly concentrated ownership
This case corresponds to a set of parameters satisfying the following relation: 
a a >  (1 — a) 6
In this case, the government cares more about the welfare of its electorate 
than about the welfare of institutional investors which is internalized in its 
objective function through the lobbying game. Therefore, the participation 
constraints of type 2 consumers will be binding, which in turn implies con­
stant level of taxation irrespective of the state of nature. Remember that the 
government participates from the informational rents awarded to the firm 
via the monetary contribution received from the lobby. The solution to the 
maximization problem of the government is as follows:
'I'' (e3) =  1 => e3 =  e*
(S3) = 1 -
Again the first-best effort is induced in the good state of nature. But 
distortions arise in the bad state of the world. Look at the second equation. 
The LHS denotes the cost suffered by the manager from a marginal increase 
in effort. The RHS denotes the marginal benefit of increasing effort in the 
bad state of nature (which translates into a smaller cost of implementing 
the project) minus the marginal cost of increasing effort, in terms of higher 
informational rents awarded in the good state of nature (which translates
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into higher taxation suffered by type 1 citizens). This cost rises with the 
value of a since this parameter shows how much the government cares about 
the welfare of its electorate vis-a-vis monetary contributions, and with the 
value of A which captures the economic distortions generated by taxation. 
Yet the marginal cost of increasing efficiency is reduced by the increase in 
the contribution offered by the lobby.
Next, we compare the efficiency of a privatized firm characterized by 
dispersed and concentrated ownership. As long as a < 1, which is true by 
assumption, the marginal cost of increasing e is higher in the former case than 
in the latter. Given that the benefit of increasing effort is the same under 
both ownership structures, the firm will be more efficient under concentrated 
than under dispersed ownership. That is:°
a < 1 => e3 > e2
The natural question that arises is whether there can be overinvestment 
in effort when the bad state of nature realizes. The answer is positive as long 
as:
a  (1 +  A) ^  e3 >  r
In words, if the weight attached to the welfare of the electorate is lower 
than the cost generated by the transfer of funds to the firm in the form of rents 
raised through taxation, the regulatory schedule offered by the government 
will lead to overinvestment in cost reduction provided the bad state of nature 
realizes. This is because the informational rents, captured by the government, 
are highly appreciated to finance future elect ions. The optimal contribution
offered by the lobby in equilibrium, C° (e3,u°), is defined implicitly by:
G (e3, C° (e3,u°)) =  m axG (e,0) =  aW  (e1)
Substituting both terms of the equation:
a {a S 1 -  (1 +  A) [vC (e*) +  (1 -  v) C  (e3) +  v *  (e3) - T 2}} + C° (e3, u°) =  
a {a S 1 -  (1 +  A) [vC (e*) +  (1 - v ) C  (e1) -  T2\ -  Au$ (e1)} 
where: C  (e*) =  /? — e* +  (e*)
C (e1) = ft — e1 + (e1) for i € {1,3} and,
109
s2
T2 =  (1 — a )    denotes the taxes levied upon type 2 citizens.
1 4- A
After some manipulation, the optimal contract in equilibrium is given by:
r°(f .a , . o \ _ n { [(1 +  A )v $ (e3) — \ v $ ( e 1) ] -  1
[(1 +  A) (1 -  «) (C7 (el) -  C7 (5®))] J
Look at the RHS of the equation. Notice that both brackets are positive. 
The first bracket captures the greater expected cost from higher informational 
rents under concentrated ownership whereas the second bracket represents 
its lower expected cost from higher efficiency.
M oderate concentrated ownership
In this case, the relation between the parameters of the model is the following: 
aa  <  (1 — a) 8
In this case, the government cares more about the welfare of institu­
tional investors than over the welfare of its own electorate. This implies that 
the participation constraint derived from tax discrimination will be slack. 
The reason being that the government will try  now to minimize the bur­
den imposed on institutional investors via taxation in order to obtain higher 
contributions from the lobby. When choosing the regulatory scheme the gov­
ernment faces the following trade-off. On the one hand, higher informational 
rents increase the surplus of the lobby and hence the contribution that it is 
willing to offer. On the other hand, higher rents lead to higher taxation that 
decreases the net surplus of the lobby and hence its optimal contribution. In 
equilibrium, the efficiency of the firm is defined implicitly by:
W' (e4) =  1 => e = e*
where the marginal cost imposed from an increase in efficiency to the 
members of the lobby in terms of lower gross welfare increases with <5 (1 -I- A), 
that is, with the fraction of institutional investors and the economic distor­
tions induced by taxation.
Given that aa  <  (1 — a) 8 and that a  > it follows that 6 > a.
Therefore:
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5(1 +  A) — 1 a (1 +  A) -  1 ^  3
5(1 + A) a ( l  +  A)
To summarize, when monetary contributions are highly valued by the
government, i.e. a G [0,1], the efficiency of a natural monopoly is greater
under highly concentrated ownership. The intuition is as follows. Investors 
play a double role as taxpayers and shareholders. When they account for a 
small fraction of the total population, they internalize only partially the cost 
from higher taxation levied upon type 2 consumers. However, they enjoy all 
the informational rents awarded to the firm. As informational rents increase 
with efficiency, so does too the net payoff of the lobby. Given the character­
ization of the equilibrium contribution as a truthful schedule, this marginal 
increase in the lobby’s net payoff will lead to an increase in the contribu­
tion offered to the government, which by assumption is more appreciated 
than the welfare of type 1 consumers. However, when investors account for 
a bigger fraction of type 2 consumers, the increase in the cost of taxation 
from higher efficiency becomes more important in the payoff function of the 
lobby. Therefore, they will be willing to rise their optimal contribution for a 
regulatory schedule leading to lower efficiency.
3.3 A Moral Hazard Approach
Let us review the informational imperfections that led to the inefficient be­
havior of a natural monopoly. The only impediment to perfect contracting 
between the government and the firm was the impossibility of the government 
to observe the information received by the manager of the firm concerning the 
state of nature. This information is learned by the manager after the contract 
has been signed and hence constitutes an illustration of hidden knowledge.
Also, it is interesting to remember the relation between the action of 
the government and the efficiency of the natural monopoly. The regulatory 
schedule offered by the government induces a specific effort in cost reduction. 
The functional form between effort and efficiency is linear. More specifically, 
an increment in effort leads to the same decrease in cost, and this irrespective 
of the state of nature. Finally, the state of nature realizes independently of 
the action of the manager.
In this section, we change the informational environment of the model to
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check the robustness of our results. Now we assume that the government can 
observe the state of nature. However it cannot verify the investment of the 
manager to increase the probability that the good state realizes. That is, we 
consider a moral hazard approach, where the inability of the government to 
observe the action taken by the manager is the only source of inefficiencies.
Moreover, we shall consider a non-linear relation between investment and 
efficiency. In particular, we assume that the expected marginal increase 
in efficiency from additional effort is decreasing in the level of effort. The 
basic structure of the model is the same presented in the previous section. 
The only difference lies on the cost structure of the project. Now the cost of 
implementing the project, /?, which is stochastic at the contracting stage, can 
take on two values: /3 = (3_ with probability v (e) and (3 =  j3 with probability 
(1 — v (e)) with /?> /? , where e G E  denotes the effort spent by the manager 
in cost reduction. Finally, v (e) is an increasing and concave function. The 
cost of the project is observed by the government ex-post but the choice of 
effort is non verifiable. Therefore, the government should provide incentives 
to the manager to elicit positive effort.
The firm receives a transfer from the government t (/?), where (3 represents 
now the cost of the project instead of the state of nature reported by the 
manager.
We shall replicate the analysis performed in Section 2 to determine which 
ownership structure minimizes the efficiency distortions created by asymmet­
ric information.
3.3.1 Public Ownership
Let us start the analysis by considering the first-best case, where effort is 
chosen to maximize total expected surplus:
M in ev (e) (3 +  (1 — v (e)) (3 + e 
F.O.C.
v(e) (j3 — /?) = 1 and,
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But the choice of effort is non verifiable. Therefore, in order to induce 
first-best, the government should provide appropriate incentives to the man­
ager through an optimal system of transfers. In particular, it should satisfy 
both the participation constraint as well as the incentive compatibility con­
straint of the manager. Suppose that citizens are credit constrained so that 
their utility should be weakly positive in both states of nature. This is true 
in particular for the manager and hence:
U(e*), U(e*) > 0
where U_ and U denote his utility in the good and bad state of nature 
respectively. Also:
e* = arg maxe {v (e) (t — (3 — e) -f (1 — v (e)) (t — /3 — e) }
1v (e) =  -----^
( t - t )  ( P - 0 )
But the government will set the efficiency of the firm to maximize its 
own objective function, namely the welfare of its electorate together with 
the rents accruing to the firm. The constrained optimization problem faced 
by the government is the following:
M axe {a5 i — (1 +  A) a  [v (e) t x +  (1 — v (e)) ti\ }+u (e) U_ (e)+ (l — v (e)) U (e)
s.t.
C/ (e), U (e) > 0
e = arg maxe {?; (e) (t — (3 — e) +  (1 — v (e)) (t — (3 — e )}
S2 — (1 T  A) £2 ^  0 
$ 2  — (1 T  A) ^2 ^  0 
where:
t = a tx +  (1 — a) t2 = P +  e +  U (e) 
t = Oit\ +  (1 — cn) t2 = (3 c U
The optimal system of transfers that solves this constrained optimization 
problem is given by:
t(e) =  /? +  e +  U (e) and, 
t (e) =  f} + e
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where U_ (e) is defined by:
U_ (e) =  — +  C/3 — 0 ) for all e € E
v (e) x '
We can rewrite the utility of the manager in the good state of nature as:
U_(e) = £ (e) where f(e )  > 0 given the assumption that v'(e) <  0 for all
e e  E
Therefore, the effort choice induced by regulation is defined implicitly by:
(1 +  A) v (e1) (j3 -  0) =  (1 +  A) +  Xv (e1) f  (e1) +  v (e1) f  (e1)
The LHS captures the marginal benefit to the government from an in­
crease in efficiency, namely the greater probability that the good state of 
nature arises. The RHS represents its marginal cost, namely the increased 
cost of effort, the higher probability of awarding rents to the manager and 
the marginal increase in the amount of these rents as a result of higher effi­
ciency. As the manager’s payoff is internalized by the government, the cost of 
granting rents is only given by the economic distortions created by taxation. 
Solving for ^/(e1):
l + 7 x iw (el)£V)„'(ei) =  l ± A
As v (e ), f  (e) >  0 and f  (e) > 0  for all e E E  then: 
e1 < e*
There is a distortion in the effort induced to the manager with respect to 
first-best. Tax discrimination allows full expropriation of the surplus received 
by type 2 consumers. This means that any increase in taxation necessary 
to induce higher efficiency is fully levied upon the electorate of the gov­
ernment. Efficiency is costly since taxation is distortionary. Although the 
benefit enjoyed by the manager is internalized in the objective function of the 
government, still is lower than the corresponding cost of raising additional 
funds.
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3.3.2 Private Ownership
We shall analyze separately both dispersed and concentrated ownership as 
they lead to different economic implications.
Suppose first that the government privatizes the firm by spreading own­
ership holdings among type 2 consumers. The new shareholders will now 
receive any income rights accruing to the firm. Given tax  discrimination, 
higher rents will allow the government to transfer the higher cost of tax­
ation from greater efficiency to type 2 consumers. Hence the constrained 
optimization problem of the government becomes:
M axe {aSi — (1 +  A) \av (e) ^  +  (1 — v (e)) £i] }
s.t. :
? (e) > o
S 2 — (1  +  A) t2 +  ^ 3 7 ™ — 0  
S 2 — (1 T  A) ^2 ^  fi
where:
t = a t1 +  (1 — a) t2 — P +  e +  £ (e) and, 
t = a ti + (1 — a ) t 2 = {3 + e
Now the difference in taxation levied upon a type 2 consumer between 
the good and the bad state of the world is determined by the rents to which 
he is entitled as a shareholder of the firm. In particular,
1 — a
The first order condition that implicitly defines the effort chosen by the 
manager in cost reduction is given by:
1 +  — v (e2) f ( e 2)
!/(e2) = ----------------- ^----------=> e2 =  e1 < e*
( ^ - £ ) - Y ^ ( e 2)
Now the government although does not internalize directly the utility ac­
cruing to the shareholders, it does internalize their payoff indirectly through 
tax discrimination.
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3.3.3 Concentrated Ownership
Consider the case where the government sells off the natural monopoly 1° 
a group of institutional investors within the group of type 2 consumers As 
in Section 2, investors form a lobby and offer a contingent monetary con­
tribution in exchange for a favorable regulation. The government chooses a 
system of transfers optimally, given the contribution function offered by the 
lobby.
Given the preference functions of the lobby and the government presented 
in the previous section, namely U (e, C) =  V  (e) — C  and G (e, C) = aW  (e) +  
C, where a 6 [0,1], the truthful equilibrium of the game, {C °(e ) ,e c} Is 
characterized by:
e° — are max. a /  -  (1 +  A) a  [« (e)tj +  (1 -  v (e))*,] +  1 +
-  arg max,, (1 _ a)tf _  (1 +A) [w (c)|a + (1  _  „ (e))^,]) /
v  (e) £ (e)
s.t. : 
C (e°) >  0
£ (6°)
S 2 — (1 4- A) t2 +   ------- > 01 — a
S 2 — (1 +  A) £2 ^  0
G (e3, C° (e3, u°)) = maxe G (e, 0) =  aW  (e1)
By the same argument presented in Section 2, the efficiency of the fin11 
will depend on whether ownership is highly concentrated or not.
H ighly concentrated ownership
As before, the relationship between the parameters of the model is the fol- 
lowing: aa > (1 — a) 8
The equilibrium effort induced to the manager of the firm is defined im­
plicitly by:
, , , ,
( ^ ) - ^ aT ^
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a (1 +  A) — 1 A o oa <  i  =* — — < - ---- — => e3 > e2
a (1 +  A) (1 +  A)
The optimal contribution schedule defines the utility u° captured by the 
lobby from bargaining with the government, so that the government is indif­
ferent between privatizing the firm or keeping the firm under public owner­
ship. Therefore:
C° (es,u°) = a [(1 +  A) v (e3) £ (e3) — Xv (e1) £ (e1)] —
a [(1 +  A) (P -  0) (v (e3) -  v (e1))]
The expected rent is higher under concentrated ownership. In effect, not 
only the probability of awarding positive rents is higher, as v (e3) > ^ (e 1) 
but also the amount of the rent is greater as £ (e) > 0. But the expected cost 
of the project is lower under concentrated ownership as the probability of a 
low cost realization is higher than the probability of a high cost realization.
M oderate concentrated ownership
This case is complementary to the one presented above, that is: aa < 
(1 - a )  6
The weight attached to the surplus of institutional investors in the objec­
tive function of the government is higher than the weight corresponding to 
the welfare of its electorate. Therefore, the participation constraint of type 
2 citizens does not bind and the optimal level of effort solves the following 
equation:
The assumption that aa < (1 — a) <5 together with the fact that a > ^ 
implies that e4 < e3.
3.3.4 Discussion
Our results are robust to the characterization of the informational environ­
ment as a hidden information problem (where the manager holds private
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information concerning the state of nature) or as a moral hazard problem 
(where the action taken by the manager influences the distribution of the 
cost function).
The reason of this observation lies on the similarity between both spec­
ifications. In the hidden information problem, the marginal benefit of an 
increase in the manager’s effort is linear in effort, whereas its marginal cost 
is an increasing function. This is due to the convexity of the cost function, 
which implies that the cost of informational rents to induce tru th  telling 
increases with the efficiency of the firm.
By contrast, in the moral hazard approach, the marginal cost of an in­
crease in effort is linear whereas its marginal benefit decreases with the ef­
ficiency of the firm (as the probability of a good state is concave in effort). 
Therefore, the cost of incentives to elicit higher efficiency increases with the 
effort of the manager.
To summarize, in both informational settings the efficiency of the firm 
under public and dispersed private ownership is the same and lower than first- 
best. Also, the efficiency of the firm is higher under concentrated ownership 
when the lobby plays a truthful strategy. When monetary contributions 
are highly appreciated by the government (for instance, when the fraction of 
indecisive voters is significant), the lobbying game can lead to overinvestment 
in cost reduction.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
We are concerned with the efficiency of a regulated firm as a function of 
its ownership structure. Regulation implies that the ultimate control rights 
are held by the government irrespective of the firms’ organizational form. 
However, ownership can still affect efficiency by influencing the preferences of 
the government towards regulation, as long as there exists some impediment 
to perfect contracting between the government and the firm. We consider the 
existence of private information concerning the action taken by the manager 
in cost reduction.
We focus the analysis on two ownership structures. Public ownership, 
where the rents accruing to the firm are captured by a self-interested gov­
ernment. And private ownership, where income rights are held by individual
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investors. If the government favors privatization, it may sell off the shares 
of the public firm to a dispersed population of consumers or alternatively 
to a reduced group of institutional investors. In the latter case leading to 
concentrated ownership, the government acknowledges that investors may 
constitute an interest group to bargain with the government for a favorable 
regulatory outcome.
We show two main results. First, the efficiency of a natural monopoly 
is greater under concentrated ownership as long as monetary contributions 
are sufficiently valued by the government. Second, the same efficiency arises 
under public and dispersed private ownership, given the possibility of tax dis­
crimination. Also, the rents from the lobbying game are captured by investors 
so that the government is indifferent between both ownership structures. Our 
results hold in two different informational environment, namely in a hidden 
information model where the manager has private information over the state 
of nature that has realized and, in a moral hazard model where the action 
taken by the manager influences the distribution function of the random cost 
of the project.
We propose several extensions to the model presented in the chapter. 
First, given that the model values the monetary contribution received by the 
lobby to maximize its chances of reelection, it would be interesting to model 
the future political campaign between opposing candidates where contribu­
tions would be used to sway the voting behavior of indecisive voters.
Second, we could allow for the existence of competing lobbies. In effect, 
not only institutional investors but also the firm’s employees may be willing to 
bargain with the government in exchange for a favorable regulatory policy. 
A priori, the surplus from the lobbying game would be captured by the 
government as it could credibly threaten to impose a different regulatory 
outcome to match the preferences of an alternative interest group.
Finally, any potential moral hazard problems between the manager of the 
firm and its shareholders have been assumed away. In a richer framework, 
a double agency problem would increase the cost or rising efficiency. If we 
assume that institutional investors can improve the effectiveness of corporate 
governance, we should expect higher efficiency induced under concentrated 
ownership, thus reinforcing the predictions of the model.
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